

Global Security

IN SEARCH OF A New Vision

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 25th INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON GLOBAL SECURITY

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Workshop Patron

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Admiral Giampaolo di Paola
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FRONT COVER

View of Hadrian's Mausoleum, also known as Castel Sant'Angelo, from the Sant'Angelo bridge over the Tiber River.
In the forefront, the angel holding the lance is the work of Domenico Guidi (1625 – 1701).

INSIDE TITLE PAGE

Ceiling of the Sistine Chapel: *The Creation of Adam*, painted by Michelangelo around 1511.

BACK COVER

Sistine Chapel: *The Last Judgement*.

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Preface

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Workshop Chairman and Founder

I*talian Defense Minister Ignazio La Russa's Patronage of the 25th International Workshop.* At the invitation of Italian Defense Minister Ignazio La Russa, this year's 25th anniversary meeting of the International Workshop on Global Security was held in Rome, Italy, on 20–22 June 2008, at the Grand Hotel Parco dei Principi, Castel Sant'Angelo and Palazzo Barberini. We greatly appreciate Minister La Russa's personal support and contributions as patron of the 25th anniversary workshop and as an opening keynote speaker. We also would like to acknowledge the support of Italy's former Chief of General Staff, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, who assumed the chairmanship of the NATO Military Committee—NATO's highest military position—a few days after the workshop. In addition, we appreciate the outstanding support of General Vincenzo Camporini, who succeeded Admiral Di Paola as Italy's Chief of General Staff. Both Admiral Di Paola and General Camporini gave significant opening addresses and contributed to the workshop as honorary chairmen. Moreover, they both have been involved in this series of annual workshops for nearly a decade, as participants and as major speakers.

Vatican Museum, Sistine Chapel, Castel Sant'Angelo, and Palazzo Barberini. We greatly enjoyed the private visit to the Vatican Museum and its world-famous Sistine Chapel as well as the reception and dinner that followed at the Castel Sant'Angelo, with its spectacular view of the entire city of Rome. On the final day of the workshop, the Italian Ministry of Defense hosted an evening at the Palazzo Barberini, which included a private visit to the museum's famous art collection, a dinner presided over by NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Admiral Luciano Zappata, and a reception in the Barberini Gardens.

Keynote Speaker of the 25th Anniversary Workshop. We would also like to acknowledge the contributions of other principal speakers, including British Defense Minister the Rt Hon Des Browne, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül, Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze, Finmeccanica's COO Giorgio Zappa, and NATO's former Supreme Allied Commander Europe General George Joulwan, who led a dinner debate again this year. Because of the interest in and the significance of the many remarks by participants in the dinner debate, we transcribed the debate and published it in the introductory pages of this book.

Italian Defense Ministry Organizing Committee. The contributions of the Italian Ministry of Defense, especially those of Brig. Gen. Filippo Ferrandu, who was our coordinator for all organizational and logistic questions, including the organization of the Palazzo Barberini dinner, are gratefully acknowledged. Other key Italian military officials who assisted with organization and planning were Lt. Col. Fernando

Barletta, on the personal staff of Admiral Di Paola, and Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, Italy's Permanent Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee.

Italy also contributed important workshop speakers and session leaders, including NATO's Deputy Secretary General Claudio Bisogniero, who chaired a major panel; Ambassador Stefano Stefanini, Italy's Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (who contributed to that same panel); Rear Admiral Luciano Callini, President, Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD); Dr. Stefano Silvestri, President, Istituto Affari Internazionali; and Major General Claudio Tozzi, Head of 3rd Department, Armaments Policy, Italy's Secretariat General/National Armaments Director. At Finmeccanica, we would like to thank COO Dr. Giorgio Zappa for his opening workshop address, as well as additional support, which is mentioned below.

Principal Sponsors of the Workshop. We gratefully acknowledge the principal sponsors of the 25th International Workshop:

The Italian Ministry of Defense, with the patronage of Defense Minister Ignazio La Russa
Alenia Aeronautica, a Finmeccanica Company
Northrop Grumman Corporation
Microsoft Corporation

The U.S. Department of Defense (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; Office of the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Defense Threat Reduction Agency)

Center for Strategic Decision Research, which instituted the workshop series and has presented workshops annually for 25 years.

Alenia Aeronautica. At Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A., we appreciate the support and principal sponsorship provided by CEO Ing. Giovanni Bertolone. We are also grateful for the long-term interest and encouragement of Ing. Dr. Giorgio Zappa, now COO of Alenia's parent company, Finmeccanica, as well as for his personal participation and the important address he gave during the workshop's opening session. We also wish to recognize the contributions of Mrs. Palmira Rotolo, Alenia Aeronautica's head of international relations, for her tireless coordination of Alenia Aeronautica's participation in the workshop, especially the Sistine Chapel visit and dinner at Castel Sant'Angelo.

Northrop Grumman. After many years as a leading supporter of the International Workshops, this year Northrop Grumman was a principal sponsor for the fifth time. Under the leadership of Northrop Grumman executives Mr. William Ennis, Mr. Joseph Penarczyk, Mr. Timothy Shephard, and Mr. James Heath, Northrop Grumman helped us broaden and strengthen the workshop's senior military dimension and added greatly to the discussion of Alliance transformation and network-centric operations (including Allied Ground Surveillance).

Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft was a principal sponsor of the workshop for the third time, corresponding to the recent establishment of a Microsoft corporate element supporting military, national security, police, and fire department customers worldwide. Mr. Tim Bloechl, Executive Director, Microsoft Worldwide National Security and Defense, was the leading industry representative on infor-

mation technology, and we were also delighted to welcome Mr. Daniel Maly, Director for Public Safety and National Security (Central and Eastern Europe); Lieutenant General Mike McDuffie (Ret.), Vice President, U.S. Public Sector Services; Mr. Wayne Philips, Director for Worldwide Defense Solutions; and Mr. Ralph Young, Vice President, Worldwide Public Sector.

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. In the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, we are grateful for the advice and support of Mr. Alfred Volkman, who developed and chaired the panels on international cooperation over the last several years. We appreciate as well the support of Mr. Roger Golden and Ms. Mary Miller, and the efficient assistance of Ms. Rita Bidlack.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration). Through the assistance of Assistant Secretary of Defense John Grimes, Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Lentz, and Mr. Tim Bloechl (now at Microsoft), network-centric operations have become an increasingly important component of the International Workshops, and we thank these officials for their work.

Office of the Director of Net Assessment. Since the beginning of this workshop series almost 25 years ago, the Director of Net Assessment in the U.S. Department of Defense, Mr. Andrew Marshall, has sponsored the activities of our organization. Ms. Rebecca Bash, also in the Office of the Director of Net Assessment, reviewed this report prior to publication, and we were delighted that she was also able to participate in this year's workshop for the first time, after so many years of assistance and support. We appreciate Net Assessment's support over the years and the very helpful advice and assistance we have been given.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). At DTRA, we are grateful for the many contributions of Colonel Robert Dickey and especially the agency's director, Dr. James Tegnalia, who participated actively in the workshop sessions again this year. We would also like to thank Dr. Arthur T. Hopkins, Principal Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, for his encouragement and very effective advice, as well as Mr. Michael Evenson, Deputy Director for Combat Support, for his significant contributions to the very high-level panel that DTRA assembled for this year's workshop. Mr. Hank Keese represented the DTRA Field Office in Belgium. All of the DTRA efforts were very effectively coordinated by Colonel Bob Dickey, Senior Strategic Planner-Operations Enterprise at DTRA.

Major Workshop Sponsors

Lockheed Martin Corporation. Dr. Scott Harris, Lockheed Martin's President for Continental Europe, has contributed to the workshop for many years, both as a participant and as a speaker. This year, he was joined by Mr. Mesut Ciceker of Lockheed Martin's Rome office, and we are grateful to them both.

EADS. We greatly appreciate the interest and assistance of a number of senior executives at EADS, especially Mr. Louis Gallois, EADS CEO; Dr. Thomas Enders, Airbus CEO; Mr. Marwan Lahoud, COO of EADS (who welcomed us with an address at the Musée Jacquemart-André during last year's Paris workshop); Dr. Stefan Zoller, President and CEO of EADS Defence and Communications Systems; Professor Dr. Holger Mey, head of Customer Relations in Defense and Security Systems; Mr. Thomas Homberg, EADS Sr. Vice President for Corporate Strategy and Planning; and Mr. David Oliver, Presi-

dent and CEO, EADS North America Defense. Although he was not able to participate in the workshop this year, Admiral Jean Betermier, Senior Advisor to the EADS CEO, was a vital contributor to all phases of workshop planning.

Thales. Senior Vice President Edgar Buckley, whose workshop participation and address we appreciate, brought to the workshop discussions his experience not only at Thales but as a former NATO Assistant Secretary General.

AFCEA. Thanks to the continued interest and support of Mr. Kent Schneider, AFCEA joined the workshop for the first time this year as a major sponsor. We appreciate Mr. Schneider's workshop participation and address, as well as the participation of his colleagues, Lieutenant General John Dubia and Ms. Becky Nolan.

MITRE Corporation. We would like to thank MITRE for its sponsorship of the workshop over the last two decades, and also appreciate the participation of Mr. Raymond Haller, Mr. William Knickerbocker, and Mr. Peter Sherlock at this year's event.

Workshop Patrons, Advisors, and Participants

Workshop Patrons and Honorary Chairmen. We deeply appreciate the encouragement and support we received from our workshop patrons and general chairmen:

His Excellency Ignazio La Russa, Minister of Defense of Italy (*Workshop Patron and Keynote Speaker, 2008*)
 His Excellency Hervé Morin, Minister of Defense of France (*Workshop Patron, 2007*)
 His Excellency Franz Josef Jung, Minister of Defense of Germany (*Workshop Patron and Keynote Speaker, 2006*)
 Her Excellency Michèle Alliot-Marie, Minister of Defense of France (*Patron, 2005, 2007; Keynote Speaker, 2005*)
 His Excellency Peter Struck, MdB, Minister of Defense of Germany (*Keynote Speaker, 2004*)
 His Excellency Rudolf Scharping, Minister of Defense of Germany (*Patron and Keynote Speaker, 2000, 2002*)
 His Excellency Aleksander Kwaniewski, President of Poland (*Patron, 1996; Keynote Speaker, 1996–98, 2000, 2002*)
 His Excellency Václav Havel, President of the Czech Republic (*Patron, 1997; Keynote Speaker, 1996, 1997*)
 His Excellency Árpád Göncz, President of Hungary (*Workshop Patron and Keynote Speaker, 1999*)
 His Excellency Jan Trøjborg, Minister of Defense of Denmark (*Workshop Patron, 2001*)
 His Excellency Dr. Werner Fasslabend, Minister of Defense of Austria (*Patron and Keynote Speaker, 1998*)
 His Excellency Volker Rühle, Minister of Defense of Germany (*Workshop Patron, 1995*)
 General George Joulwan, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (*Honorary General Chairman, 1994–1997*)
 Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Chairman of NATO Military Committee (*Honorary Chair, Keynote Speaker, 2008*)
 General Vincenzo Camporini, Chief of General Staff of Italy (*Honorary Chairman, Keynote Speaker, 2008*)
 General James Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (*Keynote Speaker, 2004, 2006, 2007*)
 General Henri Bentegeat, Chairman of the EU Military Committee, former Chief of General Staff of France (*Keynote Speaker, 2007*)
 General John Shalikashvili, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (*Keynote Speaker, 1993*)

Advisory Board. For helping to shape the workshop agenda with their guidance and ideas, our Board of Advisors deserves warm thanks. Our advisors are:

His Excellency Valdas Adamkus, *President of Lithuania*

Ing. Giovanni Bertolone, *CEO, Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A.*
 Admiral Jean Betermier, *Senior Advisor to the CEO, EADS*
 Mr. Tim Bloechl, *Managing Director Worldwide Public Safety and National Security, Microsoft*
 Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, *Chairman of NATO Military Committee, former Italian Chief of Staff*
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 Ambassador Jaromir Novotny, *Ambassador of the Czech Republic to Japan*
 Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, *Secretary General, OSCE*
 Dr. Andrey Piontkovskiy, *Director, Strategic Studies Center, Moscow*
 Ing. General Robert Ranquet, *French Defense Ministry*
 Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, *former Italian Military Representative to NATO Military Committee*
 Mr. Kent Schneider, *President, AFCEA International*
 His Excellency Borys Tarasyuk, *former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine*
 His Excellency Dr. Alexandr Vondra, *Vice Prime Minister of the Czech Republic*
 Ing. Dr. Giorgio Zappa, *COO of Finmeccanica and Chairman of Alenia Aeronautica*

Participants in the 25th International Workshop. This year, delegates from more than 30 countries as well as representatives from the U.N., NATO, the EU, OPCW, and NATO's PfP and Mediterranean Dialogue joined the workshop. We appreciate their active involvement with the workshop agenda, themes, and speakers and their interest in participating in workshop discussions. The participants were:

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo, *Estonian Minister of Defense*
 Ms. Renée S. Acosta, *President and CEO, Global Impact*
 Ambassador Munir Akram, *Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations (at the time of the workshop)*
 Ambassador Iraklis Asteriadis, *Director, D2 Directorate NATO/WEU, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs*
 Colonel Adil Ayaz, *Office of Turkish Minister of Defense*
 Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall GBE KCB, *Former United Kingdom Vice Chief of Defence Staff*
 State Secretary Jozsef Bali, *Hungarian Ministry of Defense*
 His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze, *Vice Prime Minister of Georgia*
 Colonel Kemal Basak, *Chief of Cabinet, Turkish Ministry of Defense*
 Ms. Rebecca Bash, *Office of the Director, Net Assessment*
 Ms. Anne D. Baylon, *Co-Director, Center for Strategic Decision Research*
 Mr. Joseph Benkert, *U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs*
 Ambassador-at-Large Grigory V. Berdennikov, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*
 Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero, *NATO Deputy Secretary General*
 Mr. Tim Bloechl, *Managing Director, Worldwide Public Safety & National Security, Microsoft Corporation*
 Ambassador Davor Bozinovic, *Croatian Ambassador to NATO*
 The Rt. Hon. Des Browne MP, *United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence*
 Dr. Edgar Buckley, *Senior Vice President, Thales*

Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky, *Russian Ministry of Defense*
Rear Admiral Luciano Callini, *President, Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD)*
General Vincenzo Camporini, *Chief of General Staff of Italy*
Ms. Marie-Jeanne Capuano, *EuroFuture/Aspect Consulting*
Mr. Enzo Casolini, *Vice President of Alenia Aeronautica*
Ambassador Georgiy Chernyavskiy, *Ukrainian Ambassador to Italy*
Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, *Russian Ambassador to the EU*
Mr. Mesut Ciceker, *Lockheed Martin*
Commander Jeffrey Cima, *Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs*
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Colonel Robert Dickey (Ret.), *Defense Threat Reduction Agency*
Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, *Chairman of NATO Military Committee, former Chief of Defense of Italy*
Lieutenant General John Dubia (Ret.), *Executive Vice President, AFCEA International*
Mr. Richard Ekwall, *Chief of Staff, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons*
Ambassador Stewart Eldon CMG OBE, *British Ambassador to NATO*
Mr. William Ennis, *Northrop Grumman International Inc.*
Rear Admiral Nadir Hakan Eraydin, *Chief of Plans and Policy, Turkish Ministry of Defense*
Dr. Werner Fasslabend, *President, Political Academy of Austrian Peoples' Party, former Austrian Minister of Defense*
Brigadier General Filippo Ferrandu, *Italian Ministry of Defense*
Admiral Mark P. Fitzgerald, *Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples and U.S. Navy Europe*
Assistant Secretary General Peter Flory, *NATO Assistant General for Defense Investment*
Captain (Navy) Valentin Gagashev, *Chief of Strategic Planning Directorate, Bulgarian General Staff*
His Excellency Vecdi Gönül, *Minister of Defense of Turkey*
Mr. Darko Göttlicher, *Deputy Head, Counter-Terrorism, Croatian Interior Ministry*
The Honorable John G. Grimes, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (CIO)*
Mr. Raymond Haller, *Senior Vice President (C2C), MITRE Corporation*
Dr. Scott Harris, *President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin*
Mr. James Heath, *Northrop Grumman/Electronic Systems Sector*
Ms. Melissa Hento, *Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs*
Mr. Thomas Homberg, *Corporate Vice President, Strategic Coordination, EADS*
Dr. Edward Ifft, *Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University*
Ambassador Tacan Ildem, *Turkish Ambassador to NATO*
Ambassador Kire Ilioski, *Macedonian Ambassador to NATO*
Ambassador Robert Joseph, *former U.S. Under Secretary of State*
General George Joulwan (Ret.), *former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe*
Ambassador Dr. Mahmoud Karem, *Egyptian Ambassador to the European Union*
Mr. Henry Keese, *DTRA Field Office, Belgium*
Mr. William E. Knickerbocker, *MITRE Corporation, Belgium*
Mr. Batu Kutelia, *Georgian First Deputy Minister of Defense*
His Excellency Ignazio La Russa, *Minister of Defense of Italy*
General Karl-Heinz Lather, *Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers of Europe*
Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Lentz, *Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (NII)*
Ambassador Kirsti Lintonen, *Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations*
Ambassador Juri Luik, *Estonian Permanent Representative to NATO*
Ms. Carmen Maccarone, *Northrop Grumman Italia S.p.A.*

- Mr. Daniel Maly, *Microsoft, Director for Public Safety and National Security (Central and Eastern Europe)*
Lieutenant General Mike McDuffie (Ret.), *Vice President, U.S. Public Sector Services, Microsoft*
Professor Dr. Holger Mey, *Vice President, EADS Defense & Security Systems*
Mrs. Mary Miller, *International Programs Manager, U.S. Department of Defense (AT&L)*
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Ms. Becky Nolan, *Executive Vice President, AFCEA International*
Mr. Renatas Norkus, *Lithuanian Undersecretary for International Relations and Defence Policy*
Ambassador Jaromir Novotny, *Czech Ambassador to Japan*
Capt. Dirk Oehmichen-Dau, *SHAPE*
Mr. J. David Patterson, *former U.S. Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)*
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Ambassador Rogelio Pfrirer, *Director General, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons*
Mr. Wayne Phillips, *Microsoft, Director Worldwide Defense Solutions*
Ing. Gen. de l'Armement Robert Ranquet, *Deputy Director, Strategic Affairs, French Defense Ministry*
The Honorable John Rood, *U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs*
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Mrs. Palmira Rotolo, *Alenia Aeronautica S.p.A*
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Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, *Italian Military Representative to NATO*
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Mr. Patrick Worms, *Aspect Consulting*
Mr. Ralph Young, *Vice President, Microsoft, Worldwide Public Sector*

Ambassador Youcef Yousfi, *Algerian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (at the time of the workshop), former Foreign Minister of Algeria (and currently the Algerian Ambassador to Tunisia)*

Dr. Giorgio Zappa, *Chief Operating Officer (COO), Finmeccanica and Chairman, Alenia Aeronautica*

Admiral Luciano Zappata, *NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation*

Major General ZHAN Maohai, *Vice Chairman of the China Institute of Intl. Strategic Studies, Former Dir. General of Foreign Affairs, Chinese Defense Ministry*

Dr. Stefan Zoller, *CEO, EADS Defence & Security*

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Jean Lee, *CSDR workshop photographer/graphic designer*

Montse Morell, Ph.D., *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*

Eugene Whitlock, J.D., *CSDR staff*

Observers

Mr. David Hogan-Hern, *Private Office of the British State Secretary for Defence*

Ms. Sue Hutchinson, *Private Office of the British State Secretary for Defence*

Mr. Irakli Chitadze, *Office of Georgian Vice Prime Minister*

Colonel Lorenzo D'Addario, *Office of Deputy Supreme Allied Command Transformation*

Commander John Hottendorf, *ACT*

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Mr. Chuck Humenansky, *Allied Joint Force Command, Naples*

Mr. Kristopher Stanton, *Allied Joint Force Command, Naples*

Mr. Joseph Zappala, *Defense Threat Reduction Agency*

Acknowledgments: Vatican Museum and Sistine Chapel, Castel Sant'Angelo, Palazzo Barberini, Grand Hotel Parco dei Principi, Workshop International Staff

Vatican Museum, Raphael's Rooms, and Sistine Chapel. With greatly appreciated help from Isabella Moro-Raineri, early arriving participants enjoyed a private visit to the Vatican Museum, Rafael's Loggia, and the Sistine Chapel on 19 June. Raphael's rooms were commissioned by Pope Julius II in 1512. The Sistine Chapel was built by Pope Sixtus IV between 1477 and 1489. Michelangelo painted the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel between 1508 and 1512. The chapel is famous for its fresco of the "Last Judgment" and also for nine scenes from the Book of Genesis, including the "Creation of Adam."

Castel Sant'Angelo National Museum at the Vatican. The dinner event on 21 June, the workshop's second evening, was held at the Castel Sant'Angelo, with a private visit to the loggia of Pope Julius II, designed by the papal architect Bramante; the apartments of Pope Paul III; and the Sala Paolina. One of ancient

Rome's largest surviving monuments, Castel Sant'Angelo was built by the Emperor Hadrian as a mausoleum for himself and his successors and was completed by Antonius Pius in 139 A.D. When the Emperor Marcus Aurelius built the vast Aurelian Wall that surrounds the city of Rome to this day, he transformed the monument into a fortress. In 1277, Pope Nicholas II connected it to the Vatican by an elevated fortified passage to provide a safe refuge for the pontiffs in case of attack. Today the Castel Sant'Angelo is a national museum. Its beautiful rooms include frescoes by Giulio Romano, Perin del Vaga, and others of the Raphael school.

The Parco dei Principi Hotel in Rome. Conveniently located near the Villa Borghese and Borghese Park, the Parco dei Principi Hotel was a perfect site for this year's workshop. The conference facilities were excellent and we received outstanding support from the hotel's general manager, Carla Milos, who made sure that everything ran smoothly. The workshop opened with a dinner debate moderated by General George Joulwan at the wonderful dining facilities of the Parco dei Principi and the workshop sessions were held in the hotel's superb conference rooms. Based on our experience with the Parco dei Principi, we strongly recommend it for any high-level workshop, conference, or other events in Rome.

Workshop International Staff. This year's workshop staff consisted of Eugene Whitlock, J.D., a graduate of Stanford University and the University of Michigan Law School; Jean Lee, who began contributing to the workshop soon after her Stanford graduation; Dr. Montse Morell (who recently completed her doctoral studies in biochemistry at the Institut de Biotechnologia I Biomedicina in Barcelona); and Dr. Ania Garlitski, M.D., also a Stanford graduate. Ania is now an M.D., a cardiologist, and an Assistant Professor at Tufts-New England Medical Center. Caroline Baylon, an economics graduate of Stanford University, was the overall director of the workshop staff. Caroline has led the staff for the last four years, and has contributed as a staff member for more than 10 years; Eugene handled workshop logistics as well as contracts and other legal issues; and Jean was responsible for the workshop's graphics and photography, including the cover design of this book and all of the photography. Anne D. Baylon, a graduate of the University of Paris Law School who has an M.A. from Stanford, arranged a cultural program for visits by workshop spouses to Rome, with planning assistance from Federico Pellegrini, a well-known Rome guide. Together with his father and brother, who are also accomplished Rome guides, Federico brought enthusiasm and a wealth of interesting historical details to the spouses' program in Rome, as well as to the Vatican visit by workshop participants. Without the tireless efforts and expertise of everyone on this outstanding staff, the workshop would have been difficult, if not impossible, to organize.

Workshop Publications. In addition to being a founding co-director of the Center for Strategic Decision Research (CSDR), Anne D. Baylon was responsible for the editing of these *Proceedings*. In her role as head of publications, Anne transcribed many of the workshop presentations, carefully edited all of them, and coordinated the editing and publication approvals with the chapter authors. In her editing role, she gratefully acknowledges the assistance and contributions of Carol Whiteley, who read and copy edited all of the chapters; Jean Lee, for her professional assistance with the photo layouts and other graphics; and Kevin Cotter, for arranging the final preparations for printing.

Acknowledgement to our "alumni." Since this year's workshop was our 25thth anniversary event, we would like to thank all those who have contributed to the workshop over the last two and a half decades—as workshop participants, speakers, advisory board members, sponsors, and staff members. Many of them have contributed in various ways for a decade or more. More than 30 countries have participated on an active, continued basis for most of the workshop's history, and the approximately 1000 participants and staff members who have contributed over the years represent a substantial group of "alumni," most of

whom now occupy positions of influence in the international defense and security community. We hope that they have benefited from their involvement in this activity as we have.

Paris, France and
Menlo Park, California
November 2008

Workshop Chairman's Overview

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon

and

Welcoming Dinner Debate

General George Joulwan

Workshop Chairman's Overview: In Search of a New Vision

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon¹
Workshop Chairman and Founder

At the 25th International Workshop on Global Security, held in Rome in June 2008, Admiral Giampaolo di Paola—the incoming chairman of the NATO Military Committee (and the workshop's honorary general chairman)—gave the opening address, followed by key presentations by Italian Defense Minister Ignazio La Russa (workshop patron), British Defense Minister the Rt Hon Des Browne, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül, Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze, Italy's Chief of Staff General Vincenzo Camporini, and other leaders, including Finmeccanica's COO Giorgio Zappa. NATO's former Supreme Allied Commander Europe General George Joulwan then led a dinner debate that addressed fundamental issues, including the vital importance of NATO's relationship with Russia.

During the two and one-half days of workshop discussions, these speakers were joined by more than forty others, including senior diplomats—with ambassadors to NATO, the EU and the U.N.—and some of NATO's most senior four-star flag and general officers, i.e. SHAPE Chief of Staff General Karl-Heinz Lather, Allied Joint Force Commander Naples Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Admiral Luciano Zappata.

THE NEED FOR A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND A COMMON VISION FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

British Defense Minister Des Browne describes the “need to reform our international institutions in the light of the global challenges we face” and calls for countries to “focus on the transformation of NATO.”² While recognizing NATO's remarkable successes, he believes that fundamental changes are necessary:

...reform should take us towards three clear objectives for NATO: well-planned and well-managed operations; an ability to help identify and deliver the capabilities needed to support both current and future operations; and a framework of

1

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon is the Workshop Chairman and Founder as well as Co-Director of the Center for Strategic Decision Research. The views expressed in this overview are entirely his own and do not reflect policies of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other sponsoring or participating organization.

2

Following up on his proposals for reform, Minister Browne proposed that the NATO Secretary General convene a special meeting of defense ministers, which was held in London in September 2008.

partnerships that will allow us to work with others who share our interests and can contribute to them including as part of a more comprehensive approach.

Minister Browne further argues, “We need to help the Alliance understand better its real priorities, and then encourage it to focus and organize itself to deliver them most effectively.”³ Speaking along the same lines, Admiral Di Paola says that we have “a responsibility to think through all the key issues” that affect our global security so that the Alliance can develop “a new strategic concept based on a common vision for the transatlantic relationship.”

Which Threats Present the Gravest Risks?

In the search for a new strategic concept, a common vision, and a reformed and transformed NATO, Estonia’s Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo argues that security is “much more a subconscious feeling than the result of some rational argument.” According to Minister Aaviksoo, “A lot of what we do in defense, at least on the political level, is very much related to our perceptions of threats. . .and that some of the problems we face in global as well as regional security are sometimes diversions of these perceptions.” He also warns that “we perceive the threats differently—some as real, some as less real—and that creates a number of problems and misunderstandings.” Italian Chief of Staff General Camporini, who was the first workshop speaker to emphasize the need to think through the concept of security, warns that it is not enough to simply seek security as an end in itself:

Even a superficial analysis reveals that. . .the search for security is at the origin of most of the forms of violence. . .Even World War II was justified in this way: Hitler wanted the ‘vital space’ [liebensraum] for the Third Reich, the space which was needed to make Germany feel secure. . .Why do I tell you this? Simply because I want to warn you against the belief that the use of the term ‘security’ is sufficient to grant legitimacy and legality to any action and intervention.

For this reason, it is vital to consider which threats present the greatest risks to our security, to prioritize them, and to address them in the wisest and most effective ways.

In calling for a new NATO strategic concept, Admiral Di Paola expresses particular concern for several challenges:

Pressures on the earth’s ecosystem. Such pressures often lead to hunger; scarcity of oil, water, and other natural resources; and effects on global warming and climate change. At the time of the workshop, when energy prices were near their peak, Minister La Russa put “scarcity of energy resources at the top of the list.” He warned that “today’s energy prices are not only a danger, but a true and direct threat to the orderly functioning of our communities.”

Minister Browne’s concerns include (1) a NATO Response Force that is not yet achieving its full potential; (2) the reality that some countries are not yet reaching the goal of 40% deployable land forces, which suggests that “resources need to be switched away from non-deployable capabilities” in order to reach this goal; (3) the need for an “initiative to make more helicopters and strategic lift available for operations”; (4) “a non-deployable command structure that is scarcely optimized for the type of operations we now conduct”; (5) “a rigid committee structure and culture that inhibit cross-cutting thinking and advice and are disinclined to emphasize delivery”; and (6) the fact that it is “hard to prioritize investment decisions, which still tend to be driven too much by potential equipment solutions than by an analysis of capability requirements.”

Demographic growth. The world's population is expected to grow by several billion during the coming decades, and the world's largest cities are now found in India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and Korea; Istanbul and Cairo are already far larger than major western capitals such as New York and London.

Increasing income inequality. When "increasingly large numbers of people have absolutely nothing," Admiral Di Paola suggests that conflicts may be inevitable. As Egyptian Ambassador Mamoud Karem points out, "The feeling of insecurity is pervasive, with 40% of the world's population living below the poverty line of \$2 per day."

Rapidly evolving information technology. This challenge is truly revolutionizing the way work is done.⁴ In fact, the Internet continues to introduce fundamental changes in the relationship between people and their governments. According to Estonian Defense Minister Jaak Aaviksoo, "The Internet provides open access to information, which is the best instrument for undermining totalitarian systems." IT may even be changing the way governments operate.

Loss of sovereignty. Because of membership in organizations such as the U.N., the EU, NATO, the IMF, or WTO, Admiral Di Paola points out, countries are often left with a "dilution of sovereignty" and, consequently, often have far more limited options than is generally realized to address fundamental problems.

These factors, together with such problems as regional or interstate conflicts, hunger, disease, migration, environmental dangers, and organized crime, drive traditional security challenges, including "terrorism with weapons of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation, and the radicalization of ideologies or religions."⁵ In describing the present challenges, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown emphasizes:⁶

- The globalization of the economy
- The threat of climate change
- The long struggle against international terrorism
- The need to protect millions from violence and conflict and to face up to the international consequences of poverty and inequality

The Speed and Span of Change

In discussing the new global challenges,⁷ Prime Minister Brown calls attention to "their scale, their diversity, and the speed with which they have emerged." In fact, as Admiral Di Paola observes, these chal-

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According to Microsoft's Tim Bloechl, future military applications of information technology include "...touch or voice manipulation and searches of massive amounts of data and imagery on commercially available and inexpensive horizontal and vertical displays. Pilots will learn basic flying skills or plan and 'fly through' flight missions using computer-generated cockpits within virtual worlds displaying real terrain and weather on laptops or desktop computers at minimal cost. This same capability may soon be in the hands of platoon and squad leaders on the ground, armed with the latest imagery from military and commercial sources and augmented with 3-D, 360-degree views of target areas and routes."

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Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola. Op. cit.

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Cited by British Secretary of State for Defense Des Browne in his principal address to the 25th International Workshop on Global Security.

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Op. cit.

lenges are magnified by the “speed and span of change.” While we are accustomed to dealing with change, we “tend to adapt to change rather slowly” and, unfortunately, the speed of change is now extraordinary. Italian Defense Minister La Russa, describing the difficulties⁸ in dealing with the speed and span of change, emphasized that politicians need much more time to make and implement decisions effectively:

We need time! The time we have for crisis management and resolution no longer matches the time required to actually solve such crises. The time we are given by politicians, the media, and western society is incompatible with the time a crisis takes to spread out, be tackled, and solved.

Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonül, at a workshop planning meeting in Ankara, Turkey, suggested that it is impossible to predict the kind of crises that will arrive in the near future. As an illustration of the speed and span of change, less than six months after the Rome workshop additional challenges to global security have already emerged:

The Russia-Georgia conflict. Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia on August 7, 2008, sparked a brief but intense military conflict between Russia and Georgia, during which Russia was widely accused of overreaction. As a result of this conflict, as well as growing Russian resentment over the planned ballistic missile defense installations in Hungary and the Czech Republic, there is risk that Cold-War tensions between Russia and the West could return. As to the Georgia-Russia conflict, there were already signs of deep tension between the parties during the Rome workshop. Georgia’s Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze warned:

...Russia would redraw the map of Eastern Europe and risk an armed conflict. Rather than fulfill its role as a peacekeeper and a mediator in Abkhazia Georgia, Russia has become a party to the conflict. Withdrawing from the 1996 CIS embargo that banned weapons transfer to the separatist rebels in March, extending legal recognition to Georgia’s separatist territories with the April 16 presidential decree, shooting down in Georgian air space an unmanned and unarmed surveillance drone of the ministry of internal affairs of Georgia on April 20..., and introducing the Russian Ministry of Defense’s so-called railroad troops in May all offer clear evidence of Russia’s intentions.

As to the hotly contested ballistic missile defense installations, Russia may have at least some reason for optimism, since U.S. President-elect Obama has not expressed support for the proposal. In the meantime, Ambassador Chizhov, Russia’s representative to the EU, sums up Russia’s opposition and concern:

...another element which also proves the existing continuing fragmentation of security space is the famous—or infamous, depending on your point of view—third ballistic missile positioning area in Poland and the Czech Republic, which I would describe as an attempt to deploy an untested system of questionable reliability against a nonexistent threat.

The sub-prime crisis and global recession. The sub-prime crisis is developing into a full-blown global recession—perhaps the deepest in 75 years. Its resolution may be especially challenging because the underlying financial causes are not yet fully understood. Princeton University’s Paul Krugman, win-

As Finmeccanica COO Dr. Giorgio Zappa observes, the difficulties in dealing with the speed and span of change are due in part to the arrival of new players because of globalization: “...new actors such as the Briga countries, sovereign funds, international organizations including NGOs, transnational corporations, and terrorist groups, as well as the type of methods and strategies adopted to pursue actions, violent or non-violent, based on lobbying or seeking support from the public.”

ner of this year's Nobel Prize in economics, lays most of the problems on the doorstep of the huge "shadow banking system" that lies completely outside regulatory structures. The current crisis is extraordinary not only in its scale, but in the rapidity with which a global recession of great magnitude has emerged, the scale and complexity of the policies that will be needed to turn the crisis around, and the extreme uncertainty of the effectiveness of proposed policies.

Cyber-war. In what may be an emerging pattern during international conflicts, the military conflict between Russia and Georgia was accompanied by cyber-attacks against Georgia's Internet infrastructure, and several important Georgian government Web sites were blocked or compromised. In the U.S., defense-related sites seem to be under almost constant attack. Dealing with these challenges often requires international cooperation and raises complex political issues. Defense Minister Aaviksoo describes some of this complexity:

...Whenever there is [cyber-space] policing, individual rights are infringed upon, and this is always a high-profile political issue. So how can we enforce traffic rules? Can we impose hardware and software on the Internet?...And who is responsible for enforcing the rules? What are the legitimate means of counter-attacking even when we are able to identify the possible intruder? Since most attacks are globally distributed, there is a legitimacy problem. To what extent will we be willing to tolerate infringement of national rules when there is a possible target in a third country?...Do we develop only reactive measures or do we devise and develop active cyber-crime prevention measures, including intelligence and other means?

In a North African context, Algeria's U.N. ambassador and former foreign minister, Youcef Yousfi, is concerned that "groups linked to Al Qaeda" are presenting real problems by "using web sites for recruitment, propaganda, and conducting attacks." Like Minister Aaviksoo, he says that "international cooperation is also needed to face this issue, and we need to think how we can develop such cooperation."

Among the gravest concerns, in the view of Microsoft's Tim Bloechl, "...would be efforts to quietly infiltrate infrastructure-related computer networks and, when the time is right, to execute attacks to disrupt or render inoperative elements of the infrastructure." He also warns:

If such attacks are carried out by terrorist organizations that do not identify themselves as the source of the attack...how would we respond?...Would the circumstances of the attack present a *casus belli*? And who would we counterattack if it did? And what ROE would we employ as part of such operations?

According to Robert Lentz, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks (NII), the threat is increasing rapidly. He warns:

our dependency on this network, all the information that flows on it, all the platforms that are now tied to it, and all the business systems and economic systems that are linked to it, make it imperative that the cyber-defenders and -protectors do their job effectively.

His overall judgment is not encouraging: "At this point in time," he says, "I think the assessment is that we are really losing that battle."

Unexpected, Unrecognized, or Underestimated Threats

Fading or intermittent threats. Rapid change is characterized not only by the arrival of new and often unexpected threats, but also by the speed with which many issues simply fade from view—or appear only intermittently: Concerns over anthrax, the avian flu, the Asian tsunami, and hurricane Katrina have been eclipsed by the more recent crises, although those issues may well return at some point.

Unrecognized or underestimated threats. In addition, there are serious issues that policy makers have been reluctant to recognize as crises or that have not yet been assigned the importance they merit:

Consequences of cyber-crime. While Admiral Di Paola lists information technology as one driver of security challenges, the international community seems to underestimate or ignore the economic and social effects of cyber-attacks, malware, and computer-related crimes. In fact, these crimes are often of the same order of magnitude as illegal drugs and, as indicated above, are potentially even more dangerous.

Piracy at sea. The recent capture of a Saudi supertanker off the coast of Somalia highlights the reality that piracy at sea is increasingly brazen and could become a significant security threat. Already, the African Union has asked the U.N. to send peacekeepers to Somalia and calls have been made for NATO intervention. According to the Kenyan government, ransoms over the last year exceeded \$150 million, which potentially gives pirates resources with which to increase their capabilities. These funds also might be used to support the activities of Islamic fundamentalists. On the other hand, some Islamic groups in Somalia are seeking to interfere with the pirates' activities, which they consider to be non-Islamic.

Religious fundamentalism. While September 11 and a vast number of Al Qaeda-related attacks throughout the world—from Madrid to Indonesia—clearly demonstrate that radical Muslim beliefs can represent a grave danger to our societies, it would be an unpardonable mistake to consider all Muslims as threats. At the same time, the religious conservatives in many western countries—including evangelical Christians, Catholics, and Jews—are seeking to acquire political power in the name of such beliefs as opposition to the teaching of evolution, stem cell research, abortion, and gay marriage as well as support for Israel's recovery of its so-called Biblical lands. Many of these groups are among the strongest advocates of aggressive military policies.

Unintended policy effects of western governments and international organizations. Many of the most harmful economic and social problems that contribute to extreme income inequalities and poverty originate in the policies of western allies in the Middle East, in European and North America countries, and in powerful international institutions such as the EU, the World Bank, the IMF, and WTO.

"Disinformation" by the media. At least in the U.S., news media have often distorted news, causing the public to be badly informed on important policy issues. As an admittedly extreme example, a large percentage of Fox News viewers in the U.S. were convinced that the September 11 attacks were orchestrated by Al Qaeda in Iraq, when in reality Al Qaeda had virtually no presence whatsoever in that country.

Africa as a forgotten continent. According to Ambassador Youcef Yousfi, "Africa is the forgotten continent. The international community looks at disasters, the wars, the diseases, and the lack of development there without any reaction...in Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the international community is unable to make decisions..." According to reports from a delegation that includes former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, the current Zimbabwe crisis is more serious than imagined, with up to five million in need of food.

Health care issues. As Minister La Russa points out, health care in Afghanistan is one of the many endemic problems (education is another) for which improvements are vitally needed, since "the more able Afghanistan is to stand on its feet, the more likely our intervention there is likely to be considered a success." Health care issues are of critical importance in developed countries as well. In the U.S., for example, obesity is reaching such proportions that it already constitutes a grave health prob-

lem, and it seems to be spreading to other countries. Although some may hesitate to consider obesity or other health care problems as security issues, more Americans are likely to die from obesity's direct and indirect effects than would be expected to die from the avian flu, terrorism, or even terrorism with WMDs.

Simultaneous crises. Ambassador Karem asks, "What might happen if a strong nexus develops between soaring food prices, energy sources, and a global water crisis? Could this be a recipe for a new war on a global scale?" As Minister La Russa points out, such simultaneous crises have already occurred: "...energy depletion is overlapping with food shortages...The causes of food shortages are substantially the same as those causing the energy crisis." Given the gravity of the current global financial crisis, the conditions for a "perfect storm" may already be in place.⁹

Multiple Futures

In order to deal with the extraordinary speed and span of change, as well as the difficulty predicting issues and crises that can arise with relatively little notice, Admiral Luciano Zappata, NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, described a new project called "Multiple Futures," which involves:

...trying to illustrate the challenges that decision-makers may face, as well as their implications, and to better understand and analyze how we may best organize and equip our forces and define our future capability requirements. We will analyze the global trends and key drivers in the future security environment. This work will help us understand the resultant implications in terms of potential threats and risks to our populations and values, and then help frame the discussion on future challenges and military implications in terms of roles and missions.

The Multiple Futures project will help answer key questions, including "Which capabilities must we develop?" and "Within which timeframe?"

DEALING WITH THE CHALLENGES

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation

The executive summary of the report Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction begins with the following warning:

"Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in terrorist attack somewhere in the world by 2013."

Of all the challenges to global security, none is greater than the need to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In fact, the concern for WMD proliferation is most likely at the heart of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the concern over Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear technologies, and many other serious issues. In order to discuss the threat, Dr. James Tegnelia, director of the U.S.

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Finland's Ambassador to the U.N., Kirsti Lintonen, gives a somewhat more detailed explanation of possible interactions, "Food crisis today may have developed as a consequence of several factors like: climate change, energy crisis / biofuels, lack of access to land, poor soil, trade policies/ agricultural subsidies, lack of interest by the World Bank and others towards food production in developing countries. All these phenomena might lead to popular anger and create security risks in one way or the other."

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, chaired a major panel with presentations by senior U.S., NATO, and Russian officials. The speakers were Mr. John Rood, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security; Amb. Robert Joseph, former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security; Amb.-at-Large Grigory V. Berdennikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Amb. Jiri Sedivy, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning; Mr. Peter Flory, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment; Amb. Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; and Mr. Joseph Benkert, U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs.

As Dr. Tegnalia notes in his chapter below, the panel addressed issues including:

(a) How do different countries view the risks of WMD proliferation? (b) Which threats seem to be the gravest? (c) Is a nuclear device (or radiation bomb) the principal concern—or are countries more worried by chemical threats, biological threats, or even high explosives? (d) Within governments, is it possible to rank or prioritize the risks, or are there simply too many differences of perception among ministries and agencies—or do priorities simply change too rapidly in response to a steady stream of unexpected news and shifting public reactions? (e) What approaches, including strengthened intelligence, seem to work best? (f) Should risks be addressed at remote distances, the view of some countries including the U.S., or should the highest priorities be domestic? (g) Are current approaches effective or have they merely been fortunate?

U.S. Under Secretary of State John Rood lists some key elements of the threat:

Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...represent the defining threat of our age. Irresponsible states are pursuing the capacity for weapons of mass destruction. North Korea has conducted a nuclear test, launched long-range ballistic missiles, and engaged in the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities to other rogue states. Iran continues to support terrorist groups, to engage in sensitive nuclear activities in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions, and to aggressively develop ever more capable ballistic missiles. Syria also sponsors terrorism and came very close to completing a clandestine nuclear reactor, in violation of its IAEA obligations, that appeared designed specifically to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Bob Joseph, who was asked by Dr. Tegnalia to sum up the discussion, emphasizes the importance of political resolve, especially in dealing with Iran:

...we will not succeed without...the demonstration of political resolve over time...Iran is an incredibly complex problem but I think we know...what we need to do....There is no easy choice. Every choice that is out there for dealing with Iran in an effective way entails costs, but we must be willing to pay those costs.

Concerning Russia, Ambassador Joseph suggests:

...we need to ensure that there is mutual respect in our relationship with Russia. We need to build on opportunities with Russia, and the Global Initiative and the Nuclear Energy Initiative are two cases in which our interests coincide. But we also need to deal with Russia with a sense of resolve, resolve in the context of a commitment to our principles... of democracy, human rights, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Responding to these threats will require international cooperation. According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Benkert, the key to success is partnerships with concerned nations:

What is to be done about these threats? The strategy for dealing with enemies who may not respond to traditional tools of deterrence requires that we build partnerships with nations who share our concerns about WMD terrorism... We, the United States, don't have the resources to do it alone, and we won't succeed if we try.

Regional Security

Security in the Balkans. Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, NATO's Allied Joint Force Commander in Naples and Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, has a generally positive view of progress in the Balkans:

When I look at what has happened in the Balkans over the last few years, I think of how we have brought Croatia and Albania into NATO... and how we are pretty close to getting Skopje in there. And when I see that Bosnia is signing up with PfP and trying to gain MAP status, that Montenegro is coming along, and that Serbia is participating in PfP, I see the trend towards collective security on the EU side. I also see how the signing of Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) is supporting economic stability. . .my headquarters is trying to figure out how we can provide the leadership to get that security sector reform piece. . .in place....

Nonetheless, Admiral Fitzgerald remains extremely concerned about the situation in Kosovo. His concerns are based in part on the stagnant economic situation there, the dependence on funds arriving from the diaspora or by international military forces stationed in the country, and, especially, the prominent role of corruption and smuggling:

. . .We have been [in Kosovo] for 10 years; the situation is what I would call stagnant on the economic side of the house, with the highest unemployment in Europe—58%—and GDP growth is just starting to come up, now at 7%. . . Inflation is up to about 13%. Electricity is the lifeblood of the country, but there has been no new infrastructure put in there, and the people are still living with 1950s and 1960s technology...

[However, the] real issue in Kosovo in my view is not whether this is going to be a Serbian province or an independent country, but where are the people's next euros coming from?. . .The corruption, the smuggling, everything is eating into that country's quest to become an independent state. That is where I think we have failed over the last 10 years.

In assessing the causes of the situation in Kosovo, Finland's Ambassador Kirsti Lintonen, raises three questions:

- Is the mandate not clear enough? It is true that Security Council Resolutions are often a result of compromises. The now-famous resolution 1244 on Kosovo is not an exception. Clarity is therefore essential - especially on the operational level.
- Do the actors not have a common vision of the strategy and a shared starting position? If not, a comprehensive approach is badly needed, as well as a common understanding of the facts relating to the situation. Are the actors duplicating each other's work or leaving things unaccomplished? If that is the case, coordination, leadership and a clear division of labour are needed.
- If the actors do not share a strategy in the beginning, how can they agree on timing and exit strategy? In today's world, the issues we face are complex, and cooperation of various organizations is desperately needed. At the outset, the organizations need a common strategy, a mutually agreed division of labour and a clear exit strategy.

Looking back on NATO's experience in Kosovo, SHAPE Chief of Staff General Lather's overall assessment seems less harsh than Admiral Fitzgerald's or Ambassador Lintonen's. General Lather emphasizes KFOR's successes in crowd and riot control and in guarding sites of religious and cultural importance:

In KFOR, and earlier in SFOR-IFOR, the biggest challenge was to build up crowd- and riot-control units' capabilities to deal with demonstrations, disturbances, and civil unrest. In some cases in which KFOR troops contributed, nations had to change national legislation to allow their forces to be equipped and trained for that task. Once achieved, this capability became what I think is a very powerful and effective deterrent. Also in Kosovo, KFOR had to secure and has to secure many patrimonial sites of religious and cultural significance.

Despite the above concerns (especially Admiral Fitzgerald's), Ambassador Tacan Ildem, the Turkish Ambassador to NATO, is clearly more optimistic about the future of Kosovo:

...Bringing about the independence of Kosovo was the culmination of a long, unique, and complicated process, and, to further consolidate stability in the region, we have to support Kosovo by all means as well as ensure the well-being of all the communities within its borders.

After the parliamentary elections in Serbia, we remain cautiously optimistic about the security situation in Kosovo. The determined presence and increased activities of KFOR have contributed to stability and security, but it is very important for all actors in theatre to assume their responsibilities and respective roles.

In the coming years, let us hope that the more optimistic assessment prevails!

Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan is NATO's most important operation. Consequently, a number of arguments and observations were made about its success and challenges, including a warning by British Ambassador to NATO Stuart Eldon, which we should heed:

...we must be honest about what we are doing. In essence, the international community is engaged in support of the government of Afghanistan... The Afghans must lead—it is, after all, their country—but the more we can tailor our support behind the government's efforts to exercise its authority fully throughout its territory, the more successful we will be.

There is no doubt that Afghanistan presents NATO with its greatest challenge. Italy's Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee, Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, points out that the Afghanistan conflict is subject to the same difficulties experienced in counter-insurgency operations elsewhere, including in Vietnam:

Unfortunately—and Vietnam showed this at length—the more troops you pour into a theatre, the more the resistance stiffens, and you and your allies end up exhausted, unmotivated, and incapable of acting alone. Countering narcotics traffic in Afghanistan, therefore, will require a careful balance between the will to succeed quickly and the need to avoid transforming the Afghan operation into a fight in which the locals move increasingly to the insurgent side.

In an environment in which the opposition is land-heavy, there is no point in trying to match numbers by relying on superior firepower. Asymmetry is at the heart of this science, and the enemy's weak spots must be targeted. ...Sending more troops is a way to avoid deep thinking.

In the view of Ambassador Munir Akram, Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan is currently "strained." Consequently, success in Afghanistan (and the tribal regions in Pakistan) will depend on rethinking the Pakistan-U.S. relationship as well as the security objectives for the region:

The political and operational challenges being confronted in the campaign to eliminate terrorism and to stabilize Afghanistan need to be addressed urgently through strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the United States. The U.S. and NATO also need to review their strategic objectives vis-B-vis Afghanistan and to redefine 'success.' They will:

1. Not be able to transform Afghanistan overnight into a modern democracy
 2. Not be able to change the conservative Islamic ideology and beliefs of the people of Afghanistan
 3. Not be able to eliminate or ignore the major power components in Afghanistan, especially the Pashtun tribes
- The new strategy will need to be truly comprehensive, including political, economic, and military components.

In Ambassador Akram's view, there need to be fundamental changes in the approach to the conflicts in the region: there must be a new political strategy, a new economic strategy, and a new military strategy:

The political strategy should aim at reconciliation. It should be designed to:

1. Isolate the violent extremists from the moderate, non-violent, and non-involved majority
2. Win hearts and minds through practical assistance (health, food, housing, agricultural support)
3. Build peace through grassroots measures, district by district, village by village
4. Utilize traditional modalities, for example, the Jirga system, for dispute settlement and accommodation

The economic strategy should utilize the ‘power of finance’ to win the cooperation of tribal and local leaders, have urgently needed and locally required reconstruction and job-creation projects as the priority, improve transport and communications, encourage local entrepreneurship, and find a viable solution to the poppy problem, for example, buy up the crops of small farmers.

The military option should remain the option of last, not first, resort. While the larger presence of coalition forces may be required in the short term, given Afghan antipathy to foreigners, these forces should be progressively replaced with strengthened elements from the Afghan National Army, especially local militias. The major military targets should be Al Qaeda terrorists, hard-core militants, and criminal elements, not part-time (Taliban) fighters.

He further cautions that none of these strategies can succeed “unless governance and the system of justice are improved throughout Afghanistan.”

Like Ambassador Akram, Egypt’s Ambassador Karem sees “no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan.” Accordingly, he points out the need to deal with a large number of complex problems ranging from the nature of “law, education, and training” to the conflicts between “western-style democracy, rural tribal ethics, and “Islamic values”:

... we must still agree on what constitutes the rule of law, education, training, and so on. Which is more applicable, western-style democracy or rural tribal ethics as well as Islamic values that have been in existence for centuries? ... Uprooting or uplifting national values should not be the mission of NATO. In the meantime we cannot be selective or apply double standards. Take the case of drugs and opium in Afghanistan. If the nexus between crime, terrorism, small arms and light weapons, and drugs has existed for a long time, why is it today, after the coalition forces have been present for a long time, that we still argue that this is a social problem that relates to common trade and social values and leave it to grow and worsen?

As Ambassador Karem notes, there are high expectations and hopes that “coalition forces would bring in order to end the vicious circle.”

A Russian perspective. Since Russia has made important contributions to the fight against the Taliban, its views need to be taken into consideration. Despite the many successes achieved by the U.S., its coalition partners, and NATO in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky of the Russian Defense Ministry expresses some concern as to the slow pace of progress and other issues:

... despite the considerable time that has passed since the failure of the Taliban regime, ... we cannot yet speak about real improvements in the environment there. Frankly speaking, the influence of the central government is limited to the Kabul area—the new Afghan authorities still do not control other parts of the country. As for the country’s economy, it exists only because of foreign donations and the opium trade. But the growth of Taliban activity is even worse than that.

In our opinion, there can not be only a military solution to the Afghanistan problem. A balanced and flexible approach that takes into account both the realities of the country and the mentality of the Afghani people is necessary.

Since Russia has demonstrated a desire to assist the Afghan government (including approximately \$200 million in military aid), General Buzhinsky regrets that his country’s efforts are not more appreciated. Examples of Russian disappointment include “... a pilot project of providing Russian aid and coun-

sel concerning professional training of drug-fighting structures in Afghanistan and central Asia.” Russia also regrets “...Kabul’s refusal to send Afghan cadets to a drug counter-action course.”

Civil-Military Integration

Since local governments and NGOs play a key role in most operations, successful civil-military integration is vital. Nonetheless, as former SHAPE Chief of Staff General Rainer Schuwirth points out, there is still much to learn despite many years of experience in working with NGOs:

...when you look into lessons learned, you find deficiencies in areas such as the quality of situational awareness; the seamless dissemination and sharing of information by actors; the scope, speed, and quality of interdisciplinary planning and decision-making processes; effective linking of political and operational (civil-military) action in a crisis area; coordinated information management up the chain of command; and coordination among international organizations, local actors, and NGOs.

Another military point of view is offered by General Karl-Heinz Lather, General Schuwirth’s successor as SHAPE Chief of Staff. General Lather emphasizes that “international peace forces are not usually deployed alone.” Consequently, they need to cooperate with local governments and NGOs:

Each of these organizations addresses specific target areas and develops its own mostly independent lines of operation. Experience tells us that there is really a need to coordinate all these activities in theatre, to deliver a comprehensive and even-handed approach to the conflicting parties. . . . Recently, we developed the concept of liaison and observation teams in Bosnia-Herzegovina and liaison monitoring in Kosovo. . . . not only to deal with representatives of the local populations but also to coordinate with other organizations working in the same area.

Viewing civil-military interaction from an opposite perspective—that of an NGO that has been involved in crises worldwide—Global Impact’s CEO, Renée Acosta, offers several observations as to how crisis situations might be handled more effectively:

Rebuilding as it was, not as it could have been. “There is a flaw in the rush to provide aid. For example, in the aftermath of the tsunami there was enough money in contributions that the region could have leap-frogged to having schools wired for computers. Instead, the area was rebuilt as it was, not as it could have been.”

Relief may be perceived as aiding the enemy. “For NGOs the only question is how to offer aid, and that aid is offered with a blind eye to the belief systems or actions of those in need. To others that aid could be considered ‘aiding and abetting the enemy.’ This is a real point of contention when it comes to working collegially with the government.”

Safety concerns when NGOs work with the military. “Some NGOs feel that being identified with any government or the military of any country endangers their programs and their safety. On the other hand, in the toughest spots on earth, safety and security need to be provided.” As an example, Renée Acosta gives her organization’s experience in Afghanistan: “Of the organizations [that] Global Impact funds, 18 NGOs are supporting 58 programs, 2 of which have closed because of safety concerns. In Iraq, 6 organizations are supporting 17 programs and another 6 have closed because of safety concerns.”

NGOs’ concern for impact on their funding streams. “Part of the friction we’ve encountered as we launch Global Reach inter alia is the perception on the part of some NGOs that having the military move

into development and sustainability will somehow upset their funding streams and control over their world.”

The Role of Industry

The challenge of transatlantic defense industry cooperation. As leader of the defense industry panel, Alfred Volkman summarized the challenge that both government and industry face in supporting the actual warfighters, the military:

Most nations are now actively engaged in a war against terrorists, but many nations believe that they also must be prepared to fight conventional wars against nation-states. How do we balance the resources that we have to wage the battle against terrorism, the long war that we will be fighting against terrorist threats, with the legitimate need to think about how we must defend ourselves in a more conventional war against traditional nation-states?

As Mr. Volkman points out, this can lead to serious difficulties, with vital programs encountering long multi-year delays:

In NATO, for instance, we have been trying for over 10 years to get a ground surveillance capability. I would contend that this is because we cannot strike the right balance among industrial participation by nations, military capability, and the cost that is required to provide this kind of capability—a problem we need to address.

Speaking from a European perspective, Thales’s Senior Vice President Edgar Buckley adds:

...we need to push ahead with building a strong European defense... At the same time, we need to strengthen transatlantic defense industrial cooperation, including taking steps to streamline, simplify, and make more logical and efficient the regulatory prices on both sides of the Atlantic where security allows.

In line with Dr. Buckley’s call for a stronger European industrial base, EADS Vice President Thomas Homberg proposes the following seven points necessary to achieve progress:

1. Consolidation of demand...contributing to a real transatlantic and global effort
2. Harmonization and privatization of requirements to strongly support industrial rationalization
3. Common programs and real work sharing, most probably based on centers of excellence
4. More focus on, more coordination of, and most probably more money for research
5. Common programs based on common standards to optimize the warfighter’s efficiency
6. Good and open access to government defense and security planners and their concepts
7. Access to lessons learned from exercises and operations to...push forward and optimize industrial solutions

According to Northrop-Grumman’s Tim Shephard, globalization adds additional complexity to the issue of international defense industry cooperation. He offers the recent U.S. Department of Defense tanker contract as an example:

...a Northrop-EADS bid to bring 48,000 jobs to the American south was questioned by elements in America who championed a competitor’s bid. That competitor would build or source much of its own tankers outside America, principally in Europe, ironically, through its commercial partnerships there, but the bid may paradoxically include component sub-systems from as far away as China.

R&D investments. Recognizing the importance of R&D investments, Finmeccanica’s Dr. Zappa points out that his company “...invests about \$1 billion a year in research and development activities—14% of revenues.” This extremely large proportion of revenue gives his company a strong competitive advantage in the marketplace.

In addition, Lockheed Martin's Dr. Scott Harris calls attention to the need for European countries to increase their investments in defense R&D even further:

...Without sufficient resources, we will be unable to continue to advance transatlantic defense cooperation. Meaningful collaboration becomes more difficult, emerging technologies are concentrated on one side of the ocean, the workforces do not have comparable skills. . . There is no substitute for real expenditures on tangible programs if the health of European industry is to be preserved and if further transatlantic cooperation is to be possible.

LOOKING AHEAD

The Need for Countries to Work Together

In order to address the “new risks and threats,” Turkey's Defense Minister, Vecdi Gönül, warns that “no nation has enough power and capacity to cope with them alone.” In fact, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Zappata sees our future as “dense in risks,” but, at the same time, “every risk is a hidden opportunity.” He says, “The scarcity of resources and threats to our peoples must become a factor of unity. The world is so little that everybody can now rock the boat!”

Consequently, coordination and cooperation have become more important than ever for international security. Former SACEUR General George Joulwan, in concluding the workshop's opening dinner debate, which he led again this year, emphasized the need for countries to work together—including with Russia:

The great nations and the great institutions—and that includes Russia and all of the nations of NATO—need to work together, whether they like it or not, to find the way. If they don't, then all we have sacrificed is at risk.

The Importance of Effective Leadership from the New U.S. Administration

It is clear that much will depend on the effective international leadership of the new U.S. administration, which will face simultaneously the enormous domestic challenge of an economy that is entering a recession of such unprecedented proportions that the U.S. budget deficit for the coming year could approach \$2 trillion.

Fortunately, the improved security situation in Iraq—together with the fact that U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates will stay on for the first part of President-elect Obama's term—will undoubtedly make it easier for Mr. Obama to follow through on his promise to withdraw troops from Iraq (and presumably move some of them to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban). In addition, the immense costs of the sub-prime crisis as well as the severe effects of the spreading and deepening global recession are putting the world's political leaders under increased pressure to limit the economic and social damage to their countries, achieve positive results in whatever areas they can, and explore all possible means of doing so.

In such a context, many international leaders can be expected to support Mr. Obama's stated intention of employing when possible diplomatic means, instead of mainly military ones, to address international conflicts, and there are already encouraging signs that this is happening: Turkey, which has significant economic ties to Iran, has floated the idea of trying to help achieve better relations between its neighbor and the United States. Similarly, EU President Nicolas Sarkozy, in order to reduce tensions with Moscow,

has encouraged the Czech Republic and Hungary to reconsider or delay their ballistic missile defense installations. Likewise, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has offered to help use his strong personal ties with Presidents Bush and Medvedev to smooth U.S.-Russia tensions, while Afghan President Hamid Karzai has offered to negotiate with the Taliban. Israeli President Shimon Peres has expressed confidence in his country's ability to achieve peace with the Palestinians.

Some of these intentions may be overly optimistic, and none seems to be bearing fruit as of yet. Nonetheless, a large reservoir of goodwill appears to be awaiting the newly elected U.S. president when he takes office on January 20: Let us hope he will take full advantage of it!

Inspiration from Ataturk—Humanity as a Single Body

Because Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül invited the coming 26th International Workshop on Global Security to Istanbul, it is appropriate to conclude this overview with a quotation from Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, whom Minister Gonül cited in his Rome workshop address:

We should consider humanity as a single body and a nation as one of its organs. Pain on the tip of a finger is felt by all other organs. Therefore, we should see all nations as part of a single body and then take the necessary precautions.

Welcoming Dinner Debate

General George Joulwan¹

Moderator

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: GENERAL GEORGE JOULWAN

These workshops have taken on a special meaning not only for Europe but indeed for the world. Frank, candid discussions have been the order of the day, and, judging from our earlier experiences, this discussion will engender the same candor. As someone who has been through 14 of these conferences, starting when I was the Supreme Allied Commander, back in 1994, I would like to commend the workshop chairman, Roger Weissinger-Baylon, and his team, for again assembling an excellent set of speakers and an exciting agenda set against the background of Rome.

I think all of you will agree that this has been an excellent forum in which to discuss freely and candidly the issues confronting the post-Cold War world that we live in. May I also give to our Italian friends a special salute for sponsoring this workshop in the Eternal City. Rome has witnessed great triumphs, great glory, and also occupation during the nearly three millennia of its history. The city has contributed much to our culture, our language, law, science, and politics, and of course, as witnessed here, to wine and food.

On a personal note, it was to Rome in 1996 that I came to discuss the first two months of the Bosnian operation with members of NATO and the Contact Group. To the surprise of many, NATO was able to coordinate a force of 37 nations, separate three vicious, warring factions, transfer land from one entity to the other, demobilize the warring factions, and set the conditions for an election in September of 1996, all in the first six months and without losing a single life to hostile fire. That has continued for over 10 years. So, if you do it right, if you have the political will, if you have the planning, if you establish conditions for success, you can achieve the right results and I ask you to look at all of that in Afghanistan today.

It was also to Rome, if I may give you one more example, that I was summoned to meet with Pope John Paul in 1996 for what I thought would be a brief photo opportunity, but which turned into a substantive 45-minute discussion about Bosnia. It was like going to confession with the pope. He was well prepared and wanted to know how NATO accomplished this difficult mission while others failed. This story relates to our discussions now because I discussed with the pontiff the importance of political will in NATO.

At that time, 16 democratic nations acting as one created the conditions for success: clarity of mission, unity of command, robust rules of engagement, timely political decisions, and a U.N. resolution condoning NATO intervention. We also discussed the importance of Russian participation in that operation as well as troops from Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan. The pope wanted me to know that the challenges in

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General George Joulwan is a former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Bosnia were not only ethnic but also religious and that he could help. His Holiness said that the worst day of his papacy was the day his trip to Sarajevo was cancelled the year before because of the violence. He looked at me in great surprise when I told him that I guaranteed that he could go to Sarajevo the next year. That was the confidence I had in our strategic plan and our political will. And the pope did indeed go to Sarajevo during Easter of the next year and held a religious service with Orthodox and Islamic clergy in the bombed-out cathedral. It was a great signal to the world about the value of cooperation and reconciliation, and a great lesson to me that more than just the military factor is important in the kinds of engagements we are involved in now.

In 2007, we started the workshop dinner debate on the issue of Russia. We also had a very good discussion about Russia at this workshop, which I think illuminates why this forum is so important. In 2007, President Putin's remarks at Wehrkunde were mentioned. Some of you saw Russia returning to the ways of the past, others who Russia frustrated perceived the country as a threat and not as an ally or a partner. A year later, today, you heard a discussion that I thought was excellent, because it is very hard to have such a discussion anywhere but in this non-attribution, open sort of forum.

NATO now has enlarged to 28 nations, with the door still open to Ukraine and Georgia. Missile defense is still being actively pursued. There has been a change in the presidency of Russia—President Medvedev succeeded President Putin, as you know. Let me quote here, because I think it's very important, a comment that President Medvedev made in Berlin in June, some of which was mentioned today. To use John Le Carre's words, Russia has "come in from the cold after almost a century of isolation and self-isolation. Russia is now actively returning to global politics and the global economy, bringing with it all of its natural, financial, and intellectual resources and possibilities. . . ." "The end of the Cold War made it possible to build a genuinely equal cooperation between Russia, the European Union, and North America as three branches of European civilization." He also said, "It is my conviction that Atlanticism as a sole historical principle has already had its day." We heard the Russian ambassador talk about that as well. We need to talk more about unity between the whole Euro-Atlantic area, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Life dictates the need for this kind of cooperation.

I do not want to keep beating that same issue, but I think we need to have a little more discussion about it. What is the way ahead with Russia? Is it confrontational, cooperative, combative? Do we share common interests? Can we create conditions for mutual trust and confidence? What do you think? Who would like to comment?

Since there are no comments now, I will go to question number 2.

We are now engaged in a six-year war in Afghanistan, with five years in Iraq; the Near East continues to be a battleground between Palestinians and Israelis; Central Africa is ready to implode from tribal war, poverty, and disease; natural disasters in Myanmar challenge humanitarian efforts of the U.N. and NGOs; energy prices have skyrocketed as have global food prices. We will be discussing many of these issues during the workshop, including what should be an interesting panel on civil-military integration. My question to you is, How do we get international organizations like NATO, the EU, the U.N., and OSCE to work together? Why is it so difficult to get these organizations to act together to meet some of the challenges that we have? Will the tension between them continue? We cannot afford to have the duplication we are having now. When will it be time for these organizations to come together and act together?

COMMENTS DURING THE DINNER DEBATE

General Rainer Schuwirth. We may be forgetting that the organizations you refer to—you could add the G8—may not have a common target or objective, though as operators we wish they would, to

build a stable Afghanistan, a stable Balkans, or a stable Africa. And of course they have their electorates back home and their national scenes, and the governments want to be reelected, the importance of which is often underestimated. When you take the specific German situation in Afghanistan—I am German—the question is not, although it is posed again and again, why don't the Germans go to the south? They are in the north. The question is, What do you want from the next German government, because we have elections in 2009. Do you want Germany to continue to participate in Afghanistan or do you want to have an election result that throws the German forces entirely out of Afghanistan? We have seen similar questions in the Irish referendum, without any attacks or any bad feelings towards Ireland. When we talk about values, we have to stick to our own rules, and this of course makes life not as easy as we would like to have it. This is just one piece of an answer to your question, George.

General Joulwan. Thank you very much. Are there any other comments? Is there some way, given what Rainer said about individual nations, that there are some common interests, some common areas? I look at Africa and the problems that are developing there. Is there some sort of cooperative effort that can be made to put an end to the breeding ground for much of the extremism and terrorism we see in the world? Is the United Nations the answer, and how do we make it more effective? I do not think it can be done just with troops alone.

Ambassador Youcef Yousfi. I think that Africa is the forgotten continent. The international community looks at the disasters, the wars, the diseases, and the lack of development there without any reaction. One of the problems is that in Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the international community is unable to make decisions, at least to help the African Union face these problems.

General Joulwan. But the issue is, "What prevents the international community from taking action?" Is it that each nation is concerned about committing its forces or committing its budget? Or is it that they are waiting until we have what we have in Bosnia and in Rwanda, a train wreck? Is there some way to prevent the train wreck? To prevent the sort of atrocities that we have seen?

Ambassador Yousfi. There is really no desire to go to Africa for many reasons, for political reasons, mainly.

Ambassador Tacan Ildem. Your question suggests the need for more effective cooperation among international organizations. At NATO we are dealing with this issue very seriously. What we call as "Comprehensive Approach" aims at more effective cooperation not only among international organizations but also between the military and civilian components in an operational theater and within different bodies in the same organization. I must say, however, that such an integrated approach has perhaps been undertaken in a very idealistic fashion by NATO only. In other international organizations, for instance, the United Nations, there is a hesitation in cooperating with NATO. Same applies to NGOs. When we talk about Afghanistan, we know that many NGOs do not want to be seen as cooperating with NATO. They consider NATO to be a military organization and they do not want themselves to be associated with its work.

When it comes to the EU, EU-NATO relations are certainly something that my country believes are of great importance. Nevertheless, the tendency on the EU side is to see NATO as a toolbox. Whenever there is a need, the EU just sends a wish-list to be ensured by NATO—substantial assistance such as

in-theater airlift capability, logistics support, intelligence sharing. It depends on the safe and secure environment provided by NATO.

I think organizations have to be candid with each other. They have to better understand the circumstances and the modalities for such cooperation. Certain modalities of cooperation agreed upon by both organizations are already in place and they have to be respected. Effective consultation is required in accordance with the agreed format. However, we do not see such consultations taking place in an effective manner. When the EU wants to initiate a mission, be it in Afghanistan or Kosovo, we receive a list of requests before such consultations take place. I think that all organizations should focus on the responsibilities that they undertake. NATO cannot be a coordinating body. It can only be one of those who are coordinated. I agree with you that the United Nations' effectiveness is a must, something we urgently need in Afghanistan. I am happy that the new Special Representative of the United Nations, Ambassador Kei Eide, will be focusing on the need for an effective coordination among different international actors. I hope that he will be successful. We need to support the efforts of the United Nations in that respect.

One personal observation: Sometimes, when we deal with problems related to effective coordination and cooperation between NATO and the EU, it is as if there are two sets of governments, one for the EU and one for NATO. Within the capitals, I think there is need for an effective coordination of efforts for the work undertaken by different organizations. Comprehensive approach should first be implemented at the capitals.

General Joulwan. Thank you very much. Let me just follow that by saying that one of the ways to have a better chance for success is with planning. I know, for example, that the EU now has a cell at SHAPE. But it cannot bring peace without the active involvement of international organizations and NGOs, in my view. So how do you get the planning? If you wait for the train wreck before you do the planning, you are not creating the best conditions and you are putting soldiers at risk unnecessarily. I know it is difficult, but we should more highly value the troops we are committing by doing what needs to be done before we commit them. I think that some good, clear planning by the international organizations and NATO would help.

Ambassador Jaromir Novotny. The world is in turmoil now. The United States population is deeply divided—we shall see what the elections bring. So there is a lack of consensus. Societies in the European Union are also deeply divided: The Irish referendum is not the end. The Czechs may be the second people to refuse to ratify the Lisbon Treaty, and then the EU will be in crisis.

The war in Iraq also has divided NATO. Some allies in NATO support the United States, and some allies refused to go to Iraq. It is the same with Afghanistan. Everybody supports ISAF with words, but if you ask them to send another 500 soldiers to southern Afghanistan, there is lots of trouble. Elections will be held in Germany in 2009, so nobody in Germany will decide that the soldiers should go to the south of Afghanistan. It is the same with the other countries. The European Union is very rich, and rich nations have lost the will to sacrifice something. Everybody in the rich world would like to keep the standard and not sacrifice.

Africa was mentioned as the lost continent. What about South America, Latin America, Hugo Chavez? There may be a renewal of Marxism in South America. Hugo Chavez is building a new axis, with Venezuela, Teheran, maybe not Korea, I don't know. The balance of power has moved to Asia, China, India, Vietnam. These are our new powers. China has such reserves in dollars that the United States will collapse if China withdraws its reserves in dollars. China could do the same thing to us, and we are discussing what we should do about the fact that we are becoming less and less important. Russia is very rich. Russia does not need advice and Russia could advise us. What have we gained? The Security Council has

acknowledged Kosovo. Did we stabilize the Balkans or did we start a new round of crises? This applies to Macedonia because the Albanians and Macedonians would apply for the same status as Kosovo. Would it be the beginning of a new crisis in the Balkans? We have lost Serbia by this—what have we gained? States that cannot survive?

Now we have Central Asia, including Afghanistan, and other problems. But rich nations have lost the will to sacrifice. That is the problem, and international organizations are now fighting each other about who will bring the flag higher. The NGOs are the same. Remember when we were in Bosnia and the NGOs were fighting each other? They did not want to be coordinated by NATO. It was the same in Bosnia, and it is the same in Afghanistan. It is the same in Myanmar. So everybody is fighting to be highest and is only prepared to sacrifice a small bit.

General Joulwan. In doing that, are we really concerned about the nations we are trying to help and about the troops we are trying to commit? If we on the political side cannot get clarity as far as what needs to be done, I think we are not really supporting the forces we send in. Let me go to my Russian General Buzhinsky.

Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky. I will try to answer your first and second questions about NATO and about the interaction of organizations in Europe. First, you mentioned that the United States, the EU, and Russia are main contributors or main forces of European security and stability. Maybe that is true. But speaking about the interaction of organizations, it seems to me that the West, led by the United States, is promoting a division of labor between organizations. NATO is responsible for security, the EU is responsible for economic issues, and the OSCE is responsible for mainly humanitarian issues: elections, human rights. But where, I ask, is Russia? In this case, where is the place for Russia?

In terms of security, we are not members of NATO; the OSCE is not responsible. Six years ago, when the Rome declaration was signed establishing the NATO-Russia Council, we thought that it would be quite a different story from the previous fora, that it would be a fora of individual nations. What do we see now? It is the NATO position plus Russia, it is again 26 plus Russia. Originally it was 16 plus Russia, and so on and so forth. So that is the big issue for us. Where is the place for Russia in terms of security? That is why my president offered this new security treaty arrangement, which will include Russia as the CSCE did back in 1975. But the first question is, “Why is Russia so nervous about enlargement?” It is true that it is an alliance of 26 democratic nations. But it was said this afternoon that this it is not a club, it is an alliance; it is a powerful military alliance at war.

General Joulwan. In Afghanistan.

Lieutenant General Buzhinsky. Okay, but we see NATO as a military alliance, and when NATO enlarges, what does NATO do first? It increases its military expenditures—2% of GDP—and modernizes the infrastructure. What for? For what purpose is NATO modernizing the infrastructure in the Baltic Republics? Against whom? And against whom are you conducting exercises under Article 5, especially in the Baltic? We are participating in the first stage: PfP, stage rescue, humanitarian aid. Then we are told, Thank you, gentlemen, now we are holding our exercises under Article 5. We know the scenario of those exercises. We have our intelligence, thank God. So if a big, unstable, nuclear-powered nation in the East attacks a small, defenseless NATO member in the West, might NATO decide to counterattack and defeat this country? We ask, “What is this country?”

General Joulwan. You know, when I had my discussions in Bosnia with Russians, you agreed with me, or your leaders did, that instability in the Balkans could spread instability to the rest of Eastern and Central Europe, and that was in your national interest as well as in NATO's interest. And we agreed to cooperate. It was not that NATO was here and Russia was there. We were together, we had a common interest. Do we not have common interests in Afghanistan and in Iraq?

Lieutenant General Buzhinsky. We do have common interests. We do. By the way, tomorrow we will be discussing Afghanistan, and I would like to make a small personal remark now about Afghanistan. I recently spoke to some Afghans who fought us back in the 1970s and 1980s. There is a sort of nostalgia regarding the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, because the Soviet Union fought quite a different war there—we fought it at night and in the day, and everything was all right because the Afghan government controlled practically all of the country. We fought but we also constructed a lot: schools, roads, farms, and plants, and there was no unemployment, no drugs, and we did not convene any donor conferences. We did it ourselves, quietly.

General Joulwan. Where is the ambassador from Italy?

Ambassador Stefano Stefanini. Just a remark after listening to the Czech ambassador. I think that the West has been in decline for over a century but still has not done too badly. We have to put things into perspective, and if I am correctly quoting Secretary Gates, who was asked whether or not he was concerned about Russia's defense spending, he said that Russia's defense spending is still a fraction of the overall defense spending, so there is no need to be concerned.

My answer to your original question, Is it confrontational, competitive, or combative, is all of the above. But what it will be depends very much on what we and Russia make it. Regarding the question that was just asked by our Russian friend, I am a great believer in the division of labor, but I do think that some of the problems we run into sometimes come from the fact that we try to have too many organizations working on the same battlefield, which makes it more complicated. But the question asked by our Russian friend as to whether or not there is space for Russia in this should be taken seriously.

General Joulwan. I hate to ask my final question here, but since we talked in Paris about the new French president Sarkozy and he has already made some comments about moving closer to integration with NATO, and since in November a new president will be elected in the United States, I ask, What are the strategic realities that this new president will face and what do you say are his immediate priorities? I think this is a very critical time.

Mr. Patrick Worms. It seems to me after the exchange we heard this afternoon that there is a little piece of unfinished business in this room and in the wider European alliance. That business is the way that our Russian friends and we behave with one another. In that context, I recommend to the next president, whoever he may be, that a good start may be to buy 100,000 copies of Dale Carnegie's *How to Make Friends and Influence People* and send it to our friends in the former Soviet Union, especially in Russia.

Ambassador Franciskus baron Van Daele. I dare say that the challenges any new American president will face will be no different from those we face now, be it Afghanistan or Africa. But how do we put the pieces of our puzzle together? The problem is not the United States, contrary to what many people pretend. The first problem revolves around Europe and the European Union. Individual European countries have different sets of regional interests but no global policy, and such a policy will only come

about if we go further with European integration. For that to happen we have to convince the Irish, but as long as that process has not run its course, we will never transform our transatlantic relationship into an *entente cordiale*, as it used to be called between France and England in the last century.

The other structural problem we have is the one we discussed this afternoon—the place of Russia in the European security architecture. The one thing I find fascinating about it is why people in Moscow continue to consider NATO a threat. NATO cannot extend. I was a party to many of the consultations inside NATO, and saw how many tries there were to make Russia a partner in the missile shield issue, which would have had not only high practical value but symbolic value as well. So the two questions are, “How is America going to work together with an evolving European Union,” and “How is America going to bring Russia as a full partner into some form of European security architecture?” Only when these different pieces of the puzzle are together can we start thinking together about the wider world, with all its challenges and with security being threatened from far away.

General Joulwan. Let me just piggyback on that by saying, “What is the leadership role of the United States, for example, in NATO?” Has it been reduced over the last several years? Is it important for that leadership role to come back or not?

Ambassador Stewart Eldon. I can try to answer your first question. One of the things I think we are facing now is a period of unprecedented opportunity. France has hinted at it, and I think with the arrival of the French administration there is real opportunity for a new understanding of European and Euro-Atlantic security. One of the most important things we all can do, and that includes the new administration, is to figure out a way to capitalize on that. I am not trying to put this in quite the same way as France put it, but I think there is potential for a new deal, for a new understanding of how the system will work.

Another thing I have noticed is that U.S. involvement in NATO has increased over the last couple of years. The administration has attached a growing importance to NATO, but not in the old stereotypical sense, because ultimately the Alliance is now a security provider. Part of the reason for the difficulties that were raised earlier is politics and stereotypes, and they are part of the reason for the question I asked Vladimir Chizhov this afternoon: What are we really all about? Our other friend from Russia was not terribly charitable about the NATO-Russia Council this evening, but there is an explanation for that. It is not that there is a NATO position ganging up on Russia. It is simply that the 26 countries do not agree with Russia, and they do not have to be in NATO to do that. So I really think there is a need to take a good, hard look at abolishing stereotypes about what each other is. That is a particular issue between the U.N. and NATO, and it also applies to NGOs. NGOs have perfectly clear and respectable difficulties about working with the military, but in the 21st century there is a good case for thinking laterally about that and thinking more widely about whether the understandings and political agreements we have—some of which Tacan Ildem referred to—are appropriate for all we want to do and all we need to do in the current situation.

General Joulwan. Thank you very much for getting at the issues and discussions we just had because we need the kind of candor we just heard if we are going to develop political, diplomatic, military, and social arrangements and have some trust and confidence.

I have always said that Russia is a great country with a great history and that we have a great opportunity to contribute to peace and stability in the world. Somehow we have got to find a way to do that by having respect for one another as we go forward. We all want—and I am a grandfather now with eight grandchildren, so I can say this—to create a better world for our children and grandchildren. But what

have I done to prove that? Are we going to continue down this path on which all that we have built up is at risk because we cannot come together for whatever individual, national, political, religious, or ethnic reasons? Must these problems always exist? I think we have an opportunity with the communications we have today to come together and come up with a way to solve problems. The great nations and the great institutions—and that includes Russia, all of the nations of NATO, and indeed much of the world—need to work together, whether they like it or not, to find the way. If they don't, then all that we have sacrificed is at risk.

I think that we are off to a good start on this 25th anniversary of the workshop. Thank you for your participation. I wish you the very best during the next few days, and I believe that when we all go back to our organizations and to our countries, we will have a great opportunity to find a way ahead.

Part One

His Excellency Ignazio La Russa
Minister of Defense of Italy

Rt Hon Des Browne MP
Minister of Defense of the United Kingdom

His Excellency Vecdi Gönül
Minister of Defense of Turkey

Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola
Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, and
former Chief of Italian General Staff

General Vincenzo Camporini
Chief of Italian General Staff

Dr. Giorgio Zappa
Chief of the Board of Directors, Alenia Aeronautica

Chapter 1

Sharing Responsibility in Afghanistan and Globally

His Excellency Ignazio La Russa¹

I very much appreciate your invitation to this workshop, where very important and topical issues are being addressed down to the quantum level. This workshop is a valuable opportunity for those, like us, who are responsible for governing our countries, managing current crises, and preventing future ones.

CHANGES ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

Let me start by noting the limited effectiveness of the available instruments and strategies to manage and solve the crises that threaten the security of our countries and of the international community as a whole. This sense of powerlessness is often the result of a wrong and exaggerated interpretation of reality. What we should actually say is that our degree of security has been growing over the last 20 years. In the 1980s, the world was depicted as a place on the verge of catastrophic conflict, envisioning the use of weapons of mass destruction. The movie industry seized on this picture and portrayed the world in the aftermath of nuclear holocaust, as well as the remnants of human civilization, in quite a convincing and dreadful manner.

We all know that that idea of the world was based on a then-specific and uncertain strategic balance—the so-called balance of terror—that stemmed from two hostile and heavily armed political entities. But the huge arsenals ready to be used were not the only frightening factor; perhaps even more frightening was the fear that war could be triggered by accidental causes and develop in the blink of an eye.

We have witnessed many changes since that time. Yesterday's strong and deep-rooted reasons for confrontation between the two worlds have faded. Communism has faded as well, together with its aberrant vision and practices that subdued a large part of the world population for more than 70 years. With the end of the communist era, so came the end of the need to keep at a high level of alertness all deterrent means that the West had resorted to since the end of the Second World War. We gained an opportunity to

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His Excellency Ignazio La Russa is the Minister of Defense of Italy and was the Patron of the 25th International Workshop. The translation from Italian to English was made by Mr. Paolo Cappelli.

increasingly reduce the size and promptness of our defense establishments, and for several years collected what people called—with creativity and hope—the “dividends of peace.”

The diminishment of international friction had a very strong impact on both the effective organization of the system of international relations and on the way we perceived it. It marked the beginning of a period of collaboration among nations; the improvement of a country’s security situation went hand in hand with the enhanced security of the entire international community.

Later, we recognized that this phase was too short. From the early 1990s on, we realized that the national structure of nations far away from us was close to collapsing. During the tragic experience in Somalia, all major Western countries and the United Nations learned how difficult it was to manage a humanitarian crisis started by internal factions fighting each other and which remained hostile to peacekeepers who sought to bring relief to the suffering population. The Balkan conflict has also shown how strong the effects of war can be, even in a region so close to our world and that shares our history and our culture. We have become aware that violent, destructive conflicts can originate outside of typical 20thth-century conflict patterns. They can erupt from political confrontation and from ideological opposition.

When September 11 came it changed the world. On that date, we had to add a new dimension to the concept of “traditional war.” The destructive potential of catastrophic terrorism and macroterrorism can strike great numbers of victims and cause enormous material damage, and greatly affect the system of international relations as well. That was a rude and painful awakening. September 11’s threat to security took a shape we were not expecting, a shape whose intimate details we had no time to study.

Recent events—those that have an impact on us and on our political and decision-making responsibilities—have been the ultimate consequence of September 11 and of the transformation of the global security scenario. The terrorist attacks that struck the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Indonesia, and other countries have had a profound impact on the perception of security and forced us to adjust our way of thinking and acting.

THE EFFECTS OF CHANGE ON THE WEST, NATO, AND THE EU

The many changes we have seen have not occurred in the same way in every country. Some nations—those more violently hit by terrorist attacks—have vigorously supported the adoption of particularly strong security measures while others have been less timely in doing so. Within the West, we have witnessed friction between those, like the U.S., who feel themselves “at war” and those who interpret the new reality as a phantom menace to be contained at the lowest levels.

NATO has shown it can react quickly and properly to a terrorist emergency. Collective defense provisions, as envisioned by Article 5 of the Treaty, have been adopted quickly and proven their effectiveness. We cannot hide the fact, however, that the strongest reaction—the beginning of a true “global war on terror”—was triggered by the country most directly affected by the September 11 attacks, a country that gathered a huge number of allies around itself. Indeed, the solution adopted relied on a so-called coalition of the willing instead of on NATO, even though all the countries deployed were members of the Atlantic Alliance. But NATO has quickly regained its position as a protagonist of Atlantic security. The increasing responsibilities it has taken on in Afghanistan are the plainest evidence of its capacity to quickly adapt to new environments.

The European Union—despite its ups and downs—is also taking steps to become a more powerful and effective actor on the international stage. The first ESDP missions have been a success. However, further enlargement of the security and defense dimension of the European Union is being slowed down by the general scarcity of resources and in particular by the complex political evolution of the

union and its institutions. The EU club has grown considerably over the last two years but it is still lacking better and more effective decision-making processes.

The fact that the European Union will have to embrace newer and larger responsibilities in the field of security is unavoidable. In particular, it will have to play a better role in the potential crisis areas around its borders. The neighborhood policy is an important step forward, especially in preventive diplomacy and the prevention of crises, but the union needs to field effective management instruments to address current crises, which implies enhancing its political and military capabilities.

Special attention should be devoted to relationships with Russia. For geographic, historical, economic, and political reasons, Russia and the European Union must share the burden of responsibility for security on the old continent. Russia must also work with the EU and NATO to maintain peace and security in Europe and in other areas of strategic importance.

SHARING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADDRESSING GLOBAL THREATS

Terrorism, organized crime, and destabilization caused by failing states or by the irrational behavior of those that acquire military technologies and weapons capable of causing immense damage, even at long distances, represent global threats. Conscientious countries on the other side must share the concerns and responsibilities of security and are therefore morally and politically obliged to make the mechanisms of multilateral cooperation work. Since the end of the Cold War also marked the end of the political and ideological confrontation that split the world in two, the instrumental use of the mechanisms of multilateral crisis management must also cease as well.

Many serious and unresolved issues have come to the forefront again, with the scarcity of energy resources at the top of the list. For some years, the cost of energy has been relatively low and perhaps we tried to forget about that issue. But today's energy prices are not only a danger, but a true and direct threat to the orderly functioning of our communities.

The rise in costs has occurred for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it is due to the quick growth of two Asian giants, namely, India and China, which caused an obvious, exponential increase in energy consumption. The supply of energy, however, has not changed very much, both for technical reasons and because of political motivations, including the will to maintain national control over national resources. This has resulted in the reverse of the liberalization trend.

Now energy depletion is overlapping with food shortages, which affect some populations while casting their shadows on everyone. This is reflected in the increase in the price of agricultural products. The causes of food shortages are substantially the same as those causing the energy crisis.

The combined effect of these two critical situations is potentially dangerous. On one hand, we have the strategic priorities of those who see their energy security threatened. On the other, we have those who feel the pressure of the threats to food security. I think it would be fair to say that the only way to address these issues properly is to have all major stakeholders in the international political landscape work together.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

Let me recall an actual example of crisis management that entails all the points I have just described—it shows how very interconnected they are. In Afghanistan, the international community is deployed in a region where a transnational terrorist structure thrived and in part still survives. National institutions failed there tragically and paved the way for the advent of warlords, who are devoted to smuggling and to controlling the territory with their weapons.

In Afghanistan there is a tremendous scarcity of natural resources and infrastructures. Endemic problems affect the health care sector and all of society. There are also profound difficulties within the newly born democracy and with law and order. In short, the international community in Afghanistan is facing the majority of today's crisis-generating factors in the same place and at the same time. International military intervention has been and still is indispensable for restoring an acceptable security situation, and will be for some years. But if we adopt a long-term vision—if we consider a point in time after the redeployment of our forces—we can easily understand that the more able Afghanistan is to stand on its feet, the more likely our intervention will be remembered as a success.

To provide one example, let's consider the huge program of reconstruction of the Afghan school system, to which Italy is generously contributing. Little sons and daughters now going back to school are clear evidence of what we have achieved. But it will take some years before today's children can play their role in Afghan society. It will require several generations before the "new Afghans," that is, those who lived not only in wartime but had an opportunity to study and to receive proper health care, may prevail on the country.

THE NEED FOR TIME

All that I have discussed is indeed food for thought. We need time! The time we have for crisis management and resolution no longer matches the time required to actually solve such crises. The time we are given by politicians, the media, and Western society is incompatible with the time a crisis takes to spread out, be tackled, and solved.

This is why I have said that we must be aware of how limited our capability may be to influence these phenomena, unless we build a wide and sound consensus for truly long-term political projects. And this should be independent of any change in political establishments, which is a common trait of our advanced democracies. I hope that we can achieve such a wide and sound consensus at the national level and within the international organizations we are part of.

Chapter 2

Transforming NATO to Meet the New Global Challenges

Rt Hon Des Browne MP¹

INTRODUCTION

It is a great pleasure to be here with you today. These meetings are our opportunity to discuss the issues that we all agree are important. Fundamentally they give us an opportunity to set the agenda for how we handle international security, both as individual nations and as a global community.

It is appropriate that they take place here in Rome. I have a great deal of awe and respect for the history of this city—as I am sure all of us do. Across the centuries this great and beautiful city has been home to men and women who have transformed our world. And the base of an empire that at its height spanned the known world. It is the centre of a religion that touches the four corners of the earth. To speak of grand alliances and world changing events is nothing new here.

NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Today, I want to talk about the need to reform our international institutions in the light of the new global challenges we face. In particular, I want to focus on the transformation of NATO. Celebrating its sixtieth anniversary next year, and still vigorous in terms of operations—an alliance that new allies are queuing up to join and into which our formidable old ally, France, this week has announced it is ready to reintegrate fully.

I think it is fair to say that we have been very well-served by the institutions founded shortly after the end of the Second World War. The immediate post-war years spawned a remarkable new era in co-operation—with the foundation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, NATO and others. Across the globe there are few aspects of our work that have not been heavily shaped by these international institutions, and both our security and our prosperity have benefited hugely as a consequence.

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The post-war leaders of North America and Europe were true visionaries. But as Gordon Brown said in his Kennedy Memorial Lecture no-one “could have foreseen the sheer scale of the new global challenges that our growing interdependence brings: their scale, their diversity and the speed with which they have emerged: the globalisation of the economy; the threat of climate change; the long struggle against international terrorism; and the need to protect millions from violence and conflict and to face up to the international consequences of poverty and inequality.”

These new challenges have tested our international institutions and although they have shown that they can adapt and change, it is also increasingly apparent that they are starting to struggle with the new strategic environment.

It is not that they cannot cope that is self-evidently not true. But they are not as effective as we would like them to be. And relying on them as much as we do, and supporting them with as much money and effort as we do, their effectiveness matters to us deeply.

Besides their effectiveness there is another related issue that of internal efficiency. Over time all institutions build bad habits, cumbersome processes, working practices that are more hindrance than help. The great institutions that were set up after the Second World War have fifty or sixty years of accumulated habit and practice and a lot of it is bad. A habit gained or an interest vested is often a habit ingrained or an interest that no one can divest. They lack internal mechanisms that are strong enough to bring necessary change from within, even if those at the helm are themselves strong proponents of renewal. And if they work by consensus, these tendencies are often reinforced.

So we need to refresh our vision for the way these fundamentally sound institutions work for us. We need to ensure that they are equipped to deal with new threats and that they work more closely with each other to achieve this objective. And we also need to help them function better, through a clearer focus on what we need them to deliver. Improving working practices, measuring outputs and stripping away bad habits and vested interests.

The effort to achieve these goals needs to be led by us all in our dual capacities as beneficiaries and providers. I use the word “led” advisedly. This is an issue of leadership. We must not shy away from the opportunities that we have to make a difference, not just to our national security, but to international peace and stability. Effective and efficient institutions are a key part of this.

NATO REFORM

For those of us who have the privilege to work in defence, the pre-eminent international organisation is NATO. NATO is about common transatlantic values, indivisible security and solidarity.

All NATO Allies are in Afghanistan conducting the biggest and most complex mission ever undertaken by the Alliance

They are in Kosovo where NATO remains a vital bulwark for peace, at a time of continuing tension. Through NATO, allies play an extensive role in training and security sector reform, for which NATO has the most effective mechanisms in the world, bar none. You only have to look at Eastern Europe to see why that is the case.

At the same time, the Alliance continues to grow with new members and new partnerships. The Bucharest NATO Summit in April was attended by some sixty nations and leaders of key international organisations. In facing problems with global reach, NATO is demonstrating a commitment to work with partner institutions and nations around the globe.

These are not the symptoms of a moribund organisation. Nevertheless, I am concerned that doing these things is more of a struggle for NATO than it should be. And if it is a struggle for NATO as a whole, then it is a struggle for each individual member state as well.

Three years ago, in 2005, my predecessor as Defence Secretary, John Reid, spoke at this Workshop. Then, he said that “If NATO is to prove its continued relevance on the global stage, it must seize the process of Transformation with both hands.” I think that, with Afghanistan, with Kosovo, with international security sector reform, NATO is proving its continued relevance. But now we need to consolidate those gains, and look long and hard at where reform is needed most urgently.

I think we can all agree that reform should take us towards three clear objectives for NATO:

Well-planned and well-managed operations;

An ability to help identify and deliver the capabilities needed to support both current and future operations; and

A framework of partnerships that will allow us to work with others who share our interests and can contribute to them including as part of a more comprehensive approach.

Well-Planned and Well-Managed Operations

Operations are central to NATO’s purpose. And Afghanistan is our most important operation. Through this NATO operation, we are reinforcing our collective security at home, and giving Afghanistan the chance to build a secure and hopeful future for its people. But the requirements for success in Afghanistan also match very closely NATO’s requirements for change in its approach to delivering collective defence and security more generally. Operations there are the main driver for transformation. Afghanistan is forcing us all to change the way we approach complex 21st Century threats with 21st Century means.

In the British Government, we have thought hard about our approach. Experience in Afghanistan has been hugely significant as a motor for many changes we have sought to make both in defence and in our wider determination to help international organisations deliver better. We are not alone. Canada, also in light of its experience in Afghanistan, has carried out a far-reaching analysis of its defence posture and priorities, including through the Manley Commission. An analysis which has reinforced Canada’s role as a stalwart and highly capable NATO Ally. The Netherlands and Denmark, too, have examined thoroughly their own transformation needs through their experience in Afghanistan, and so equipped themselves to deal with the complex challenges that we must now deal with in this new century.

I hope all Allies will grasp the need to use this operation in their own transformation. And NATO must do so too.

Ability to Help Identify and Deliver the Required Capabilities

Now, it is true that, in NATO, we have come a long way in recognising the importance of expeditionary capabilities in dealing with the broad range of threats the Alliance is likely to face. This is particularly true since the endorsement of the Comprehensive Political Guidance at the 2006 Riga Summit. We have developed the NATO Response Force as a means of deploying such capabilities.

But, there remains far too big a mismatch between our aspirations and what we actually deliver. The NATO Response Force is not getting the forces or capabilities it needs in order to carry out the full range of missions for which it was designed. As a consequence, there are concerns as to its longer term viability. We are lacking sufficient capabilities in key areas, such as strategic and intra-theatre lift. Capabilities which affect our ability to prosecute current and future operations in the way we might want. And that shortfall puts added strain on the forces and capabilities which are available.

As a measure of how we are doing to improve this situation, NATO has developed targets, including that 40% of land forces should be deployable. Eleven of the 26 Allies are still not reaching this target. If

all eleven were to do so, we could expect 34,000 additional deployable land forces for operations, including for the NATO Response Force.

I am glad to say that there is a gradual upward trend towards meeting this target – though the UK would like to see the target itself raised to a level which would allow us to provide fully for all our commitments. But I sometimes wonder whether the concept of improving usability in NATO is not embraced with much warmth by some Allies. Indeed, in some quarters, it is an exercise conducted through gritted teeth.

We cannot afford to be equivocal about transformation. Resources need to be switched away from non-deployable capabilities. The United Kingdom and other Allies such as France have sought to find innovative ways of developing such capabilities through initiatives to make more helicopters and strategic lift aircraft available for operations. But there is no getting away from the fact that these capabilities require investment, and that means proper investment in defence and proper prioritisation on the things that we need most.

We need to help the Alliance understand better its real priorities, and then encourage it to focus and organise itself to deliver them most effectively.

We also need to be sure that resources – money, of course, but even more importantly, people and their ability to think and act – are being used efficiently against the priorities: operations, capabilities and partnerships.

I am not sure that today I could claim the Alliance is either clearly focused on the things we most need, or on delivering them as efficiently and effectively as possible.

I could point to a non-deployable command structure that is scarcely optimised for the type of operations we now conduct; or to a rigid committee structure and culture which inhibits cross-cutting thinking and advice and is disinclined to emphasise delivery. It is hard to prioritise investment decisions, which still tend to be driven too much by potential equipment solutions than by an analysis of capability requirements. The budgetary consequences of our decisions are not as clear as they should be at the moment of decision.

We need to help NATO take a fresh look at how it is organised to deliver. Driving change in consensus-based organisations is notoriously hard and vulnerable to special interest lobbies. NATO Defence Ministers have a particular responsibility to give political leadership in this task – I use the word leadership again – putting the interests of the organisation as a whole above the parochial.

A modernised NATO emphatically is not about doing less with less or somehow cutting down what we desire to do. It is about doing properly what already we have said we need to do, by making better use of the resources which Allies are ready to commit. And a well-managed and well-focused Alliance is far more likely to attract investment for the long term.

A Framework of Partnerships

Modernisation is also about letting NATO show us how it can add more value to the sum of the 26 Allies. NATO's great reservoir of knowledge and expertise about national capabilities, for example, should serve as the basis for new ideas for fostering initiatives between Allies, to deliver capabilities we need. We should be much more open to working with partners to deliver these capabilities. I am delighted with the work we are already doing with Ukraine on helicopters, for example. And the NATO-EU Capability Group shows how we can work more closely with others in many other fields.

The third pillar of NATO's transformation, that of partnerships, is a very important one.

Globalisation brings new threats and challenges. But it also brings new partners who share our values and interests in tackling them. NATO has had huge success in building bridges and relationships with

like-minded partners. And Afghanistan is, again, testament to that with 14 ISAF partners working with us. Our relationships with our ISAF partners; with the Government of Afghanistan; with key neighbours like Pakistan; and through the NATO-Russia Council are vitally important.

But we have been slow to adapt our own working practices to make it easy for our partners to work with us. Australia is a key ISAF partner which, sadly demonstrated by the Bali bombings, has common purpose with us in tackling extremism in Afghanistan. Australia has committed significant numbers of troops who put their lives on the line with us, and yet it has been hard work for Australia to get its say in our collective approach and planning in NATO. It is wrong that our partners have to struggle so much to work in proper partnership with us—a classic case of process defying common sense—but not the only one, alas.

The need for NATO to work alongside other organisations, especially the United Nations and European Union, is equally strong. The fact that they cannot is a victory for dogma over pressing operational need. It is incomprehensible to me, the Defence Secretary of a country in all three organisations, that we should have such difficulty in working together. I do not belittle national concerns which conspire to make co-operation so hard, but I do not accept that our armed forces should be expected to pay the price for this on operations. The prize of the U.N., NATO and the EU working properly together alongside other international and regional organisations is more effective operations.

I have said what I think it is we need in a transformed NATO—well-managed operations with the capabilities and the partnerships to deliver them and the level of ambition we have set ourselves in NATO. I have also mentioned some of the challenges, such as structural inefficiencies, and opportunities to make progress, notably in learning from our collective experience in Afghanistan.

POLITICAL WILL AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION

But there is a further, underlying issue which frustrates our ability to meet these three objectives. We must, in NATO, address the issues of political will and public perception.

The public and politicians of many European NATO Allies do not yet see expeditionary operations and capabilities as directly linked to their defence and security. Trust me, they are. NATO is in Afghanistan taking on extremism and the roots of that extremism because it is a grave and proven threat to our public and to the security of every citizen in every NATO country, from Istanbul to New York. The tentacles of this extremism have spread far and wide, but its roots have been in the Taleban-protected training camps and safe havens of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, NATO is acting for our collective defence in its truest and noblest sense.

The inclination to re-focus on patrolling the home turf is deeply ingrained, but deeply flawed. And the accompanying notion that providing much needed security outside NATO's core area somehow competes with or detracts from our collective defence is to ignore the reality that they are the same thing, requiring the same kind of forces.

NATO and its Allies need to focus harder on making the case for change: we have one set of forces which can be used for crisis response or for collective defence under Article 5; our defence will often need to happen far from home; increasingly we shall need to work more closely with others—international organisations and partner nations—in delivering a broader vision of security. We, as the political leaders, must be the agents for that change.

I do not see the challenge as fundamentally different from explaining why we need to act on climate change, or take action to avoid shortages in key natural resources. Globalisation means we need to lift public attention beyond the 'here and now', beyond our respective back yards. Climate change does not just affect the Arctic; security is not just about guarding the garden gate. Our publics need to know that

defence and security are enhanced by flexible and expeditionary forces; that we can rely on NATO, so equipped, to deliver wherever and whenever a threat might dictate. It is our duty to tell them that.

So public perceptions of how NATO provides for our collective defence and responds to crises now have to change further. And it is the responsibility of elected politicians to get this message across, not to fuel with money, men and machines we can ill-afford to mis-allocate perceptions of threats which collectively we have agreed are no longer there.

CONCLUSION

I think that Defence Ministers can contribute hugely to make internal change in NATO happen. That is why I have proposed to the Secretary-General that, in September, in London, we hold a special meeting purely devoted to NATO's transformation and how we can help it move forward. There are some practical issues and some very political issues that we need to consider. I am clear that we will not transform NATO overnight. But I am equally clear that it is time to switch off autopilot and engage with the real issues.

I am a strong believer in the long-term business case for this Alliance. NATO has strategic patience and institutional depth in managing operations that we should never underestimate. As a focus for bringing our armed forces together and promoting their interoperability, NATO has no peer. And in developing a more comprehensive approach with partners, NATO has a huge role and opportunity to harness defence into a broader international approach to security.

We now need to endorse the modern vision of NATO as an expeditionary Alliance, capable of acting to provide security at home, on our periphery or further afield. An Alliance in which we are ready to invest. And we need a NATO that will put that investment to most productive use.

We all need to take on the mantle of leadership. We need to remind ourselves, our fellow politicians, and our people that this is not purely a theoretical exercise. This is about being more effective on the ground, whether in the fields of Kosovo or in the dust of Afghanistan, so that our collective security, and the stability of the world, can be more firmly guaranteed in these uncertain times.

Chapter 3

Threats to the Black Sea Region and to Global Security: Turkey's Efforts to Achieve Peace and Stability

His Excellency Vecdi Gönül¹

First of all, I would like to thank the Italian Minister of Defense, Mr. Ignazio La Russa; the director of the Center for Strategic Decision Research, Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon; and all the other sponsoring institutions and contributors for holding the 25th International Workshop on Global Security and for extending an invitation to me to address this distinguished audience.

ELEMENTS OF GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION

At the moment, the world is going through the pains of change and transformation. Conventional threats and risks are being replaced with an environment of uncertainty, and asymmetric threats that we are unaccustomed to, such as terror, fundamentalism, the exploitation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal immigration, climate change, and water and energy scarcity, have taken the place of the evident military threats of the Cold War era. An important characteristic of these new risks and threats is that no nation has enough power and capacity to cope with them alone. Consequently, coordination and cooperation have become more important than ever before for international security.

In addition to changing global tendencies, the emergence of Asian countries such as China and India, which have rapidly growing economies; the rise of the Russian Federation as a prospective superpower; the suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) by the RF; the Missile Defense System in Europe; and the “frozen conflicts” and ongoing disputes, particularly those in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, are having a clear political-military impact on the developing security environment.

CHANGES IN NATO, THE EU, AND ESDP

From the Baltics to the Black Sea, NATO is the most noticeable security actor. With the end of the Cold War, NATO successfully achieved its goal of collective defense of its member-countries within the scope of its 1949 founding charter. Now, NATO is making great progress regarding its assets and capa-

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bilities as well as its operational competence. It adopted a new strategic concept and made significant changes in its military command and force structure. In addition, NATO accepted several former Warsaw Pact countries, including Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic countries, as NATO members. Twenty-four other countries remain in NATO's field of interest and are involved in the organization as Partnership for Peace members. After including Croatia and Albania, an invitation to the Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue is reached. At the Bucharest Summit, NATO members also clearly stated their agreement about the prospective NATO membership of Ukraine and Georgia.

As an evolving organization, NATO keeps taking on additional roles in order to meet continuously changing risks and prevailing instabilities. Turkey endeavors to support all of the tasks and roles assumed by NATO to the maximum possible extent. NATO has always been perceived not only as a security organization but also as an important political tool because of its deterrence aspects. However, we should not forget that the essence of this organization is collective defense, namely Article 5.

NATO is on the way to becoming a global organization. Enhanced cooperation with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and Argentina, under the auspices of "Contact Countries"; with Gulf countries, as a result of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative; and with Mediterranean Dialogue countries has expanded NATO's domain considerably. In addition, the mechanisms established under such NATO arrangements as the Individual Cooperation Program, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and the NATO-Russia Council continue to serve as useful tools for extending regional security cooperation.

European governments have responded to this new security environment by adding a security and defense dimension to the European Union as well as by bringing in new members and boosting internal security cooperation. The European Union is the second most important security actor from the Baltics to the Black Sea, and has been improving and enlarging since the 1950s. It became a union with the Maastricht Treaty and continued its progress with a series of foundation treaties, the last of which was the Lisbon Treaty. This treaty, I must say, proposes an enhanced EU defense capability that seems to duplicate many of the functions of NATO, particularly NATO's collective defense clause, Article 5.

Since its creation almost 10 years ago, the ESDP has also made significant progress and become an effective tool in crisis management, mostly for civilian missions. It constitutes a growing dimension of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and has room for development with the view of making it more active, capable, and coherent.

TURKISH EFFORTS TOWARDS SECURITY AND STABILITY

As a member of NATO for almost 56 years, and with the longest borders with the Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War era, Turkey has clearly demonstrated her commitment towards the ESDP by actively supporting and contributing to its improvement from the outset. Turkey has indeed been a leading non-EU European ally in terms of participation in the ESDP operations. In terms of the geographical scope of ESDP operations, the Balkans have been a central theater. Indeed, preserving and promoting security and stability in this region are of vital importance.

At this point, I would like to express my country's clear support for the Comprehensive Approach. It will facilitate the creation of a more sound framework and contribute to the better and more effective planning and execution of current and future operations that involve interaction with a wide variety of actors and factors in the theater of operations. Regarding the EU, there is already a mutually agreed upon framework between the two organizations. For other non-NATO actors, there is a need to formalize relations as well, but while seeking better interaction with them NATO should preserve its role as the main security organization in the Euro-Atlantic area. The long-term success of the Comprehensive Approach

is only possible if all major actors have the same basic understanding of this concept. We are pleased to observe that other international organizations such as the U.N. are beginning to discuss the issue in the same vein as NATO.

SECURITY AND THE BLACK SEA REGION

I would now like to draw your attention to the Black Sea region, which has gained greater significance during the last decade because it has become one of the most important energy corridors of the world. The Black Sea has a set of unique features. It is a gateway to three important strategic areas—the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea—and because of its strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, the Black Sea was one of the first avenues for trade and diplomacy.

The Black Sea maritime domain, the Turkish straits, and the Turkish mainland, by means of pipelines, are now major mediums for transporting Caspian, central Asian, and Russian energy resources to world markets. As a consequence, the amount of tanker traffic along the Black Sea and Turkish Straits has increased remarkably. Approximately 145 million tons a year of oil that originated in the Black Sea basin are transported through the Turkish straits—in other words, 3 million barrels of oil are being transported every day to global markets by 25 to 30 tankers. Forty percent of this amount, which is expected to reach 70% by 2020, is brought to Europe. This makes the issue of energy transportation security even more important for both regional and global players.

Another characteristic of the Black Sea domain in the post-Cold War era is the changing status of the countries in the region in terms of their memberships in different international organizations. Today, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria are NATO members. The Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Georgia also have a variety of relationships with NATO through specific frameworks. Bulgaria and Romania are new members of the EU, the last of the international organizations to reach the Black Sea region. Turkey is currently a candidate for the EU.

Because the Black Sea is an important region for stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area, many regional cooperation schemes exist, including the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) in the political-economic field, the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR), the Black Sea Coast Guard and Border Control Cooperation Forum (BSCF), Confidence Building Measures, and the Black Sea Harmony operation in the military field. Regional cooperation coupled with more wide-ranging interaction with the Euro-Atlantic area is the key to a more stable and secure region, which would have positive effects on the whole of Eurasia.

Currently, we believe that the Black Sea maritime domain provides a generally stable environment, contrary to some other parts of the world. However, countries within regions usually strongly wish to cooperate, and can be models for the world in maintaining stability and peace.

GLOBAL THREATS AND AREAS OF CONCERN

The attacks of September 11 underlined the fact that in today's ever-shrinking world, no country is immune from terrorism or other types of threats that have global and truly terrifying dimensions. The terrorist attacks that extinguished the lives of dozens of innocent civilian women, children, and students in Istanbul (November 2003), Ankara (May 2007), and Diyarbakir (January 2008) are not any different from the attacks in New York, Madrid (2004), or London (2005). Eliminating these threats requires a multidimensional approach that cannot hope to succeed without a genuine collective effort.

Currently, the threat posed by the PKK/KONGRA-GEL terrorists based in the north of Iraq represents the single biggest security challenge facing Turkey. The PKK seeks survival through extortion, human trafficking, drug and weapons smuggling, and homicide. The fight against this organization,

which poisons and abuses European as well as Turkish youth, is a responsibility not only of Turkey but also of our friends, partners, and allies.

Long-lasting disputes and conflicts in neighboring regions of Turkey have great impact on global security as well. In this context, addressing the general situation in Iraq is of the utmost urgency. The security environment has improved although it is still very fragile. We are doing everything we can to promote political dialogue among different political factions and ethnic and confessional groups.

We are also doing whatever we can to support Iraq's difficult transition to becoming a sovereign, democratic, and prosperous nation at peace with itself and its neighbors. The enlarged process that Turkey pioneered, which brings together both the neighbors of Iraq and the P-5 and G-8 nations, will continue to be an important mechanism in developing regional support for the challenges facing Iraq.

In the context of the Middle East, efforts to break the perpetual cycle of violence, revive the peace process, ensure security for Israel, create a state for the Palestinians, and promise a lasting peace for both countries are all high priorities, given that the question of Palestine lies at the core of all ills in the region. Turkey is the only regional country that has good relations with both sides, which could help pave the way for eventual peace and stability. Developments over the past few years and indeed the past few months have shown how delicate the situation is and how high the cost of inaction can be.

Lebanon continues to be in a very fragile state. By contributing to UNIFIL II, Turkey has shown its interest in and desire to help strengthen the Lebanese government as it strives to solidify its nationwide control. Syria is also one of our important neighbors and Turkey is also actively engaged in trying to ensure that Syria is included in the equation that leads to peace in the region. The impasse in the ongoing search for a diplomatic solution to the question of Iran's nuclear program and the ramifications of U.N. sanctions is another factor aggravating regional tensions.

Afghanistan has always been close to Turkish hearts. However, the nation-building process there is running into major difficulties. Politically, militarily, and economically, Turkey supports international efforts to help the Afghan people meet the challenges they face. Having assumed command of ISAF twice and now running a PRT in Wardak Province, Turkey continues to significantly contribute to fostering stability in this troubled country. Afghanistan will be a test case for our ability as a community to bring stability, security, and prosperity to distressed states around the world.

For the first time in its history, NATO has been active in a theater of operations that is more than 5,000 km from its headquarters in Brussels. It has acted in an exemplary manner in the Afghan context through the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The deployment in Afghanistan of SEEBRIG, the Multinational Peace Force South-East European Brigade, was another step that showed the Euro-Atlantic community's resolve to extend our support and assistance to conflict areas with whatever means available.

TURKISH EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

In line with its increasing contributions to international peace, security, and stability, Turkey has put forward its candidacy for one of the non-permanent seats at the U.N. Security Council for the term 2009–2010. Because Turkey has not been represented in this body since 1961, its election, in recognition of its growing responsibilities, will only be fair and will also give a boost to its efforts to help realize the goals and vision of the United Nations.

One of the most important missions the new circumstances have given to Turkey is promoting peaceful coexistence, tolerance, and cooperation between different cultures. In the post-September 11 world, a debate over a possible clash of civilizations has increasingly occupied the global agenda. In this context, Turkey is cosponsoring with Spain the Alliance of Civilizations initiative under the auspices of the

United Nations. This project aims to promote dialogue and cooperation among countries from diverse cultural backgrounds and to counter extremism of all types through collective efforts.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As we express at all occasions in which security issues are discussed, Turkey has been following its motto of “Peace at home, peace in the world.” We also believe that, with today’s global conditions, the principle “Peace and security are either everywhere or nowhere” should be mutually understood. It is clear that improving our efforts and implementing them effectively depend greatly on the good will and cooperation of the international community. In this regard, it is my hope that this workshop will support our efforts to improve mutual cooperation against global security problems.

I would like to conclude with a statement made by our leader Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, who emphasized the importance of international cooperation by saying: “We should consider humanity as a single body and a nation as one of its organs. Pain on the tip of a finger is felt by all other organs.” Therefore, we should see all nations as part of a single body and then take the necessary precautions.

Chapter 4

From Shared Values and Mutual Interests to a Common Vision

Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola¹

THE SPEED AND SPAN OF CHANGE

This Workshop presents a great opportunity, not only to meet friends, but also to exchange views on the many challenges to global security and the compelling need for new approaches and strategies to address them. We need to have a serious debate on all of the key issues. Of course, government ministers—who are much more influential than I am—will also debate and discuss these challenges. Nonetheless, I think that each of us has a responsibility to think through all of the key issues and especially the need for a new strategic concept based on a common vision for the transatlantic relationship.

What is “new” in the world we are now facing? More than anything, it is the speed and span of change. While humans have always dealt with change, the speed and span that we now face are extraordinarily greater than in the past. And since human beings tend to adapt to change rather slowly, the problem is serious.

THE DRIVERS OF CHANGE

Most of the drivers of these changes are familiar to you, although some of them may not seem to be military in nature. Nonetheless, they do have important military implications.

Pressures on the earth’s ecosystem. First of all, the human pressures on the earth’s ecosystem are tremendous. They are driving energy stresses, resource stresses, climate change — if you believe in climate change, and global warming — if you believe in global warming.

Demographic growth. The numbers are impressive: At the rate the earth’s population is growing, we will be adding several billion people within fifty years.

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Increasing income inequality. And with all this, there is clearly a growing gap between the *haves* and the *have nots*. Among the *have nots*, increasingly large numbers of people have absolutely nothing. Living in extreme poverty, they present another huge stress on our planet.

Information technology. Information technology is not just a better or faster way to communicate. In fact, the information technology revolution is totally changing the way that we, as humans, develop knowledge. It is truly a revolution.

Loss of sovereignty. Finally, there is what I call “the dilution of sovereignty.” Each of our nations now yields a part of its sovereignty to some form of new order. And this is rather like a two-edged sword. In many cases, the benefits of the new order more than compensate for any reduction in sovereignty. In other cases, however, the consequence may be stressed or failing states.

These various drivers have profound implications for what we consider to be the traditional security risks and challenges—i.e. terrorism with weapons of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation, or the radicalism of ideologies or religions. In fact, these more traditional risks are emerging as the direct result of the drivers that I have mentioned above.

TOWARD A COMMON VISION

Once we have understood these fundamental drivers of change, we are forced to ask, “Where does this revolution lead?” First of all, it brings us to a world where security problems are incredibly more complex than ever before. Accordingly, a new problem-solving approach—which we typically describe with such terms as the *comprehensive approach* or *multilateralism*—is needed. In a very broad sense, I agree that this is the right response. Yet, we need to better understand what *comprehensive approach* means and what *multilateralism* means:

The comprehensive approach. What does comprehensive approach mean? According to my perspective from the chair that I have occupied at NATO for just a few weeks, it appears that everyone does seem to understand what comprehensive means. Yet, after some months at NATO of trying to lay out a comprehensive approach policy, we do not yet have complete agreement on exactly what it involves.

Multilateralism. Similarly, what does multilateralism mean? Of course, it is clear that multilateralism implies the assumption by international organizations of much more responsibility and influence as to decisions and actions. On the other hand, are the principal organizations that we know today—NATO, the European Union, the United Nations—the right response in their present forms? Probably not. Most likely, they need to adapt and to evolve.

Therefore, what is the next step in achieving greater comprehensiveness and more multilateralism? In the NATO community, we tend to say that we share common values and common interests—although we might sometimes argue as to what is truly common. While I definitely believe in these shared values and interests, we must move well beyond them: We must seek to achieve a *common vision*. Without it, we cannot achieve the benefits of our shared values and interests nor can we implement policies to defend or protect them

As to NATO, this means that the Alliance really needs to adapt—which is not the same thing as transforming. While transformation is mentioned every day in Brussels, what is the purpose of transformation? How do we want to transform? In which direction should we transform? These are the kinds of fundamental issues that we need to grapple with.

THE NEED FOR A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

For a long time, I have argued that NATO needs a new strategic concept. This is not because I especially enjoy writing exercises or the drafting of documents. In a multilateral organization like NATO, the process of writing and developing a new strategic concept will cause people to think about what we need to do; it will stimulate new ideas; and it will be a tool to renovate our common vision of shared values and interests.

Moreover, it will help us rejuvenate the covenant between the two sides of the Atlantic, which have both changed a great deal since the founding of the Alliance in 1949. (Next year, we will celebrate the Alliance's sixtieth birthday.) The U.S. has changed, and Europe has changed—especially because of the European Union. The recognition of these changes should be the starting point from which the new strategic concept will evolve as a kind of exercise involving academics, administrative officials, military, and, above all, our political masters.

This will be an important exercise that will help us forge together a new vision, which we desperately need. It is the foremost challenge that NATO now faces, and I am looking forward to this debate to begin—the sooner the better.

Chapter 5

Key Address: The Search for Global Security

General Vincenzo Camporini¹

THE SEARCH FOR GLOBAL SECURITY

It is sometimes beneficial to consider the origin and the meaning of the terms that have become magic passwords in the public debate. One of these terms is security and I propose to you to consider the power of this concept in the history of mankind.

The term comes from Latin and it means “without worry.” Even a superficial analysis reveals that security, or better, the search for security is at the origin of most of the forms of violence. Since the early days of history, even the most brutal aggression has its roots in the search for security: I feel unsecure because I do not have access to commodities which I consider essential, therefore I challenge those who have it. Even World War II was justified in this way: Hitler wanted the “vital space” for the Third Reich, the space which was needed to make Germany feel secure.

Why do I tell you this? Simply because I want to warn you against the belief that the use of the term security is sufficient to grant legitimacy and legality to any action and intervention. It is therefore necessary to qualify the term and we may feel better and more comfortable if we add the word “global,” which may also be used ambiguously, if I pretend to feel secure in every field, regardless of the feelings of the rest of mankind, but which may also indicate a wider and possibly universal share of a state of security, where no one fears to be deprived of the resources believed to be vital for his own subjective welfare.

I need not tell you that today this is utopia since we all fear to lose vital resources: energy, water, food, house, life or even only a pleasant weekend. And this is true for the individual as well as for the communities, small or large as they may be. Therefore a real global security may be searched only by trying to grant everybody what is felt as a need, a mission which may seem impossible but which is the only one worth the effort in times when the consequences of a drawing in a paper in Copenhagen inevitably is the direct cause of several killings in the Philippines.

No geographical limits, no time limits, because IT makes any time to become real time; no borders between disciplines since even flower cultivation may, and indeed has become a factor. Biology, cybernetics, climate—whether it changes or not—everything may become a threat. Hence global threats become the challenge for global security.

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THE DISPLACEMENT OF VIOLENCE

Most striking has been the inversion—some might say perversion—of the traditional definition of modern war provided by Carl von Clausewitz (*On War*, 1873) as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will,” and as “not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means.” Looking at what happened on 9/11 it was very hard to identify a diplomatic counterpart to discuss with!

The shock produced by the initial attack eroded the foundations of a democratic civil society. I do not have the ambition to change what von Clausewitz wrote; however, previous definitions are not in line with contemporary changes achieved by globalization, terrorism, and advances in communication technology that lead to a displacement of violence, and an increased targeting of civilians.

The threat shuffle reflects shifts in the level of analysis as well as the perspective of the observer. It demonstrates implicitly as well as explicitly the increasing importance of *chrono* and *bio* over geo-politics and immediacy elevates the potentiality of the threat too.

Many of the threats do not cause global conflicts in and of themselves. Rather, it is the complexity and combinations—the phase shifts—of the threats that often lead to violent conflict and global insecurity.

THE POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF NETWORKED TECHNOLOGIES

Just as a system is more than the sum of its parts, a network is more than nodes, hubs, and connected agents of power. Defined by Kevin Kelly as “organic behavior in a technological matrix,” a network produces effects as well as conveys information. A network can be a force multiplier as in net-centric warfare or networked terrorism.

Networks are critical to media, cultural and economic flows. Post Cold War, post 9/11, we have witnessed the emergence of competing sources of power, heteropolar networks, in which different actors are able to produce profound global effects through interconnectivity.

Varying in identity, interests, and strength, networked actors gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, using networked IT to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing, for instance, not only how war is fought and peace is made, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of war and peace.

The “West” and I mean NATO and EU might enjoy an advantage in surveillance, media, and military networks; but the rest, including fundamentalist terrorist groups, criminal gangs, and anti-globalization activists, have exploited the political potential of networked technologies of information collection, transmission, and storage.

Does the potential risk posed by negative synergy, cascading effects, and unintended consequences outweigh the actual benefits of networks?

FAILED AND FAILING STATES AND THE COMPLEXITY OF GOVERNANCE

Failed and failing states provide a potential refuge for transnational terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, pirates as well as drug and human smugglers. They are breeding grounds for refugee crises, political and religious extremism, environmental degradation and organized criminal activity. Thus even if a failed state has little significance in the traditional sense of strategic resources or geographical position, it will take on greater strategic importance in the future by virtue of the potential base it offers to powerful non-state actors.

Allow me now a small digression. One threat which is not always considered with proper attention is the increasing complexity of governance: we often talk about failed states, entities with no defined and

stable authority. But what happens in our countries, in our societies? Do our political masters today have a proper amount of authority? Are they not progressively prisoners of localism on one side and of an evanescent public opinion on the other? Isn't an indefinable bureaucracy hampering any serious attempt to act any reasonable plan to reform? Are we not heading towards a somehow anarchic society?

Just questions for sure, but questions which need an answer.

OTHER FACTORS OF RISK FOR THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Water will likely play an important role in the reconfiguration of the future security environment. The UN estimates that by 2050, "at worst 7 billion people in sixty countries will be water-scarce, at best 2 billion people in forty-eight countries" (water for people, water for life, pg.10). Water scarcity, combined with shortages of food and medicine in underdeveloped and developing countries can severely threaten human security.

Lack of energy sources, especially oil, will also be a major concern to many states. Increasing oil consumption in relation to dwindling reserves will lead to a significant reordering of strategic interests throughout the world.

The Middle East, already vital for its oil reserves, will become more important as demand increases. Similarly, other areas including parts of Africa, the Caspian Region, South China Seas, and numerous equatorial areas have already increased in strategic importance.

The proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear WMD equalizes the risks and political power across the globe by reintroducing the risk to the military infrastructure and civilian populations of Western nations in North America and Europe on the one hand—on the other, it poses new security threats to states invested in maintaining the status quo and their identities as responsible states. Of even greater concern is the very real possibility that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands of terrorist groups. In particular, the threat of nuclear terrorism combined with the possibility of irrational suicidal behavior carries ambiguous implications for the delicate nuclear balances of the Cold War.

NATO-EU RELATIONS

The U.S. and EU are presented as both models of stability, freedom and prosperity and as agents of transformation with a vocation to change the world in their own image.

In fact, it is not strange that there is also a basic convergence on European and American assessments of the principal threats to these common values. Both the NATO security strategy and the European security strategy converge on identifying terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, and failing states as representing the major challenges. Where there are differences, they are more of emphasis and prioritization than of substance but, in essence, they describe the same external world and provide the same basic strategic threat assessment.

Taking from the latest NATO Summit at Bucharest, "NATO-EU relations cover a wide range of issues of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, the development of coherent and mutually reinforcing military capabilities, and civil emergency planning... We recognize the value that a stronger and more capable European defence brings, providing capabilities to address the common challenges both NATO and the EU face. We therefore support mutually reinforcing efforts to this end. Success in these and future cooperative endeavours calls for enhanced commitment to ensure effective methods of working together. We are therefore determined to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organizations, to achieve

closer cooperation and greater efficiency, and to avoid unnecessary duplication in a spirit of transparency, and respecting the autonomy of the two organizations.”

Renewing the auspices of a more tight cooperation between the two organizations, I think that the revision of the NATO Strategic Concept and the European Security Strategy should go along hand-in-hand in answering the basic questions for security:

Security is for whom, from what, and how?

What are the priorities, to what threat, and why?

How do we assess factors of immediacy and duration, perception and lethality?

This aspect is crucial both from a political and operational perspective when a top-down approach to the issue is considered.

Transatlantic relations are a key element of the common threat assessment, as well as the relationship with Russia, which, whether one likes it or not, will be a vital ally in the next decades.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In closing, I wish us all success in seeing the new challenges for what they are and thinking of the way we can address those, possibly not for our generation’s benefit but certainly for the benefit of our sons and daughters and our grandchildren.

Chapter 6

Opening Remarks: An Industrial View On the International Security Scenario

Dr. Giorgio Zappa¹

I am really glad to welcome you in Rome. We are honored that the 2008 edition of the Global Security Conference is being held in the city where Finmeccanica has its headquarters. Finmeccanica, as you know, is one of the major international groups operating globally in the aerospace defense and security sector and is one of the world's leading groups in the field of helicopters and defense electronics. Now that we recently purchased a U.S. company, Finmeccanica has three major markets: Italy, the U.K., and the United States.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO

The 2008 international scenario in which global industrial companies like Finmeccanica play shows specific phenomena that can be grouped into two main categories. In the first category, we have the well-known dynamics related to the changes in the geopolitical equilibrium. In the second category, we have globalization issues that are becoming very important. There is also growing diversity, both in the type of players—new actors such as the Briga countries, sovereign funds, international organizations including NGOs, transnational corporations, and terrorist groups—and in the type of methods and strategies adopted to pursue actions, violent or non-violent, based on lobbying or seeking support from the public.

The growing instability in the contemporary international context gives new shape to the defense industry, whose new role involves the need to ensure not only homeland security but economic security. The effect of this change includes a continuing attempt to improve the quality and the innovation of products already in use and to set up new commodities for the global market. If the defense industry does not reach these goals, it will probably miss an important opportunity.

The emerging concept of security, which includes homeland security or territorial control, now represents a top priority for us. Facing the current international scenario of instability, it definitely has many implications for the high-tech industry. The post-September 11 environment dramatically highlights

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Western countries' weaknesses and their increasing demand for security. At the same time, it is involved in an accelerated process for developing new technology able to improve collective security standards. These new systems, whether already available or still being tested, are instrumental to responding to any possible threats. They have been identified as integrated operative missions, civil and military missions such as border control, transport security, sensitive infrastructure protection, and energy and procurement security.

THE NEED FOR NEW MEASURES TO ENSURE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

This environment produces two side effects. One, there is a need to undertake specific measures to ensure the operational capability of the police and armed forces, civilian protectors, and firefighters. Two, to provide security to citizens, we need to increase technological capability in terms of telecommunications, transportation, services, IT systems, and the integrated components in every public administration sector committed to this task. We must also invest in developing a few selected areas in order to maintain the industrial system at the highest level of high-tech.

Finmeccanica, for example, is present in the everyday life of many people. System integration and technology innovation are the keystones of Finmeccanica's success, as they are of other international companies' competitive edge. For this reason, Finmeccanica invests about \$1 billion a year in research and development activities—14% of revenues—which puts Finmeccanica in the best position in the international high-tech sector. We are, in other words, investing in strategic technology, anticipating market needs and customer expectations, and announcing industrial efficiency with the objective of improving our competitive advantage and cooperating with other key players—states, international organizations, institutions, and armed and paramilitary forces in the new global scenario.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, I would like to wish you all the best at this important event. I really care about this initiative and I have cooperated with its creation and organization since the first workshop. I believe that even greater attention should be paid to this kind of event to promote the importance of the topical issues it discusses.

Part Two

His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze
Vice Prime Minister of Georgia

Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov
Russian Federation's Ambassador to the EU

Chapter 7

Georgia's Role in Euro-Atlantic Security

His Excellency Giorgi Baramidze¹

Iwould like to use this opportunity to speak very openly in this very frank and open atmosphere to provoke a frank discussion. As our distinguished Turkish Minister of Defense said, I would like to speak about the pain in one of our body's organs, a country that suffers from the challenges and problems, some of them objective, some of them artificially created, that we face today.

THE EFFECTS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY ON GEORGIA

It is difficult not to agree with the theme of our workshop: "Global Security in Crisis, the Urgent Need to Find Strategies That Work." Georgia today represents one of the challenges of global security, and unfortunately is on the front line of these crises. Russia's recent foreign policy has adversely affected Georgia, but its policy goes far beyond our country. It is not simply aiming at annexing our territory, an unacceptable act in the 21st century, and at depriving Georgia of its democratic development and Euro-Atlantic integration. It is challenging the entire civilized international community, targeting the division of Europe, the defeat of democratic values, and the realization of imperialistic ambitions.

It must be understood that the West's appeasement policy does not work. The only way to reverse the Kremlin's extremely dangerous venture, which includes blackmailing, confrontation, provocation, and bullying, is a clear, united, firm, and active response from the European Union and the United States. Once Russia realizes that its aggressive policy will not be tolerated, it will become more pragmatic, therefore more constructive.

RUSSIAN ACTIONS AGAINST GEORGIA

In the spring of 2008, Russia conducted a series of increasingly hostile and illegal acts against Georgia. It has long maintained low-grade conflicts on our territory through the support of separatist rebels who conducted ethnic cleansing in the early 1990s, something that was recognized by the OSCE three times and by the United Nations.

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However Russia's goal clearly shifted after the NATO Summit in Bucharest. Despite agreement of the member-states to grant Georgia and Ukraine membership at some point in the future, the Russian Federation wrongfully interpreted NATO's refraining from giving Membership Action Plans to our countries as a sign of success of its blackmailing policy. It then used the time before the December ministerial as a window of opportunity to reinforce this success by shifting to a bluntly offensive strategy in Abkhazia Georgia, unambiguously aiming at de facto annexation of these Georgian territories.

If allowed to go further, Russia would redraw the map of Eastern Europe and risk an armed conflict. Rather than fulfill its role as a peacekeeper and a mediator in Abkhazia Georgia, Russia has become a party to the conflict. Withdrawing from the 1996 CIS embargo that banned weapons transfer to the separatist rebels in March; extending legal recognition to Georgia's separatist territories with the April 16 presidential decree; shooting down in Georgian air space an unmanned and unarmed surveillance drone of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia on April 20, which was confirmed by UNOMIG; and introducing the Russian Ministry of Defense's so-called railroad troops in May all offer clear evidence of Russia's intentions.

Russia no longer even pretends to be performing peacekeeping duties. Instead, its new operation is of a clear military nature. Managed by the Russian defense ministry, the operation aims to enable large-scale military movements by reinforcing Russia's military infrastructure in Abkhazia Georgia. Unfortunately, Russia's actions have virtually eliminated the prospects of a peaceful conflict-resolution process, since they feed the separatists' sentiments and ambitions. The more aggressive Russia has become in Abkhazia, the more rigid the separatist rebels are.

GEORGIA'S HOPE FOR A RUSSIA-GEORGIA PARTNERSHIP

Georgia long has sought to constructively engage Russia in remaining an important partner for Georgia. But in 16 years, these efforts have failed to deliver any meaningful progress. Our government was hopeful that President Medvedev would introduce a new spirit into the relationship. However, within days of assuming office, he was responsible for policies that sharply escalated the tensions in Abkhazia Georgia, including an introduction of the so-called railway troops. Nevertheless, Georgia remained hopeful that the St. Petersburg meeting would allow us to overcome this deadlock. Again, however, President Medvedev refused to pledge to refrain from acts that clearly undermine Georgia's sovereignty. On the contrary, after the meeting, Russia's defense ministry cynically announced it would keep the railroad troops in place for at least two more months until their work was done.

Georgia has responded with restraint to Russia's provocations, and has consistently thought to act in consensus with the international community. In accordance with its unambiguous legal right, the government of Georgia is offering a very clear alternative that can constructively lead to a final resolution: a joint international effort to finally establish viable peacekeeping and negotiating formats in order to resolve the conflict on its territories within a reasonable time frame and in an appropriate contemporary manner. Security on the ground and mediation at the negotiating table must be ensured by the international community. A non-military police operation in Abkhazia Georgia will create a solid basis for peaceful conflict resolution. However, Georgia remains open to alternative international arrangements if agreed upon during consultations.

WORKING WITH THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

In any new peacekeeping format, Georgia will seek to retain and reinforce the role of the United Nations. In addition, we strongly believe that Russia should be an active and constructive part of this process if it so chooses. The government of Georgia will continue to vigorously pursue a direct dialogue

with the Abkhaz separatists in order to reach a consensus on how best to settle the conflict within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia. As per our President Saakashvili's peace plan, any settlement would be internationally guaranteed to provide as wide autonomy as possible for Abkhazia and to ensure the reintegration of the Abkhaz community into the unified Georgian state.

Finally, aggression against Georgia is a logical link in the chain, and we must not be blind to it: the murder of Litvinenko in the heart of London, the imposition of an economic embargo on Poland, the cyber-attack against Estonia, President Putin's speech in Munich and his statement in the NATO-Russia Council about Ukraine's statehood, energy blackmailing of the West, and so on. The Euro-Atlantic community is capable of preventing further developments like these, but to do so it is necessary to develop a common constructive strategy. Now is the moment of truth—no matter how difficult it might be, we need to demonstrate how united and effective we can be in resolving global security challenges and defending our common values and principles.

Chapter 8

The Fragmentation of Security and the Need for A New, Legally Binding Security Treaty

Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov¹

The topic of this panel contains, if carefully read, an element of paradox. It addresses political perspectives on global security while focusing on a specific region—from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Representing the only country that stretches from the Baltic to the Black Sea and far beyond, I would like to make a point that we have been discussing on numerous occasions, including at last year's workshop, whether geography matters when we speak of security. Indeed, we are living in a globalizing world, in a virtually global economy. Most of the challenges that we face today are of a global nature, starting from the recognized process of redistribution of wealth and economic activity from the so-called old world to Asia and other continents; the shift of financial power—the two most important currencies in the world are still the U.S. dollar and the Euro, but most of the dollars and the euros are accumulated neither in the U.S. nor in the European Union; climate change—it can only be perceived and handled as a global problem; migration; and of course terrorism.

THE SECURITY SPACE FRAGMENTATION

So what we see is an obvious discrepancy. Living in a globalized world, we still address security issues, particularly those of hard security, or military security, from an outdated baseline perspective of viewing security in geographic terms. As a result, we witness attempts to address new security challenges with tools of the mid-20th century. Moreover, what we see today is the fragmentation of the security space in the Euro-Atlantic area. Today, there is an acute deficit of strategic formats. Yes, one might pose the counter-argument that we all belong to the OSCE, and I would agree that the OSCE could have become an appropriate format to address security challenges in this broad European sense which also includes North America on the one side and Central Asia on the other. Unfortunately, the OSCE has failed in this historic mission. Nine years ago, I was present at the famous Istanbul Summit of the OSCE which most people now remember from tiny bits and pieces like bilateral arrangements concluded on the sidelines of the summit. Much less often, the main product of the summit is remembered: the Charter of European

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Security. One can only wonder why. My answer is that, unfortunately, some OSCE participating states in the West chose not to allow the OSCE to evolve in a really comprehensive security format.

Instead, what we see today is a continuing tendency to shift responsibility for pan-European Euro-Atlantic security to closed alliances dominated by military bloc mentalities. It may seem strange to an outsider that, with the Cold War now long over, some of its instruments are still in place. Moreover, they are presented and described as the cornerstone of security for the 21st century. We often hear that NATO enlargement has expanded the area of stability in Europe. Let me quote some figures coming from a well-respected source: the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. During the last ten years, military expenditure in new NATO member states has increased by 162%. Compare that with only 62% in the Middle East with all its problems and 4% in Western Europe. If this is considered an indication of increased stability, then I believe something is wrong in that logic.

I will stress that NATO enlargement not only does not contribute to stability but on the contrary leads to destabilization. I believe that one might only mention a single country, Ukraine, to see how divisive the prospect of NATO integration is in Ukrainian society.

Another element that also illustrates the continuing fragmentation of the security space is the third ballistic missile positioning area—famous or infamous depending on your point of view—in Poland and the Czech Republic. I would describe this as an attempt to deploy an untested system of questionable reliability against a non-existent threat. Moreover, it is no credit to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union that this is being done by two EU member states venturing a deal with a third country that is not a member of the EU behind the back of their EU partners.

TOWARD A NEW LEGALLY-BINDING SECURITY TREATY FOR THE WHOLE EUROPEAN SPACE?

CFE was mentioned here and I expect it to be mentioned again. We have been hearing some emotional assessments regarding the fate of the CFE, a lot of pretty words describing it as a cornerstone of European security. Yet, it was followed up by ratification in only four CFE participating states, one of them being Russia. NATO member states—unfortunately under false pretenses—have chosen to procrastinate on the issue. But it is not only the CFE. The OSCE has produced a lot of additional elements to arms control and security. What about the principles of military self-restraint? What about confidence-building measures? What about transparency? I believe we need to take a broader look at European security in an area described as stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, while avoiding the creation of different levels of security, respecting the right of some countries to neutrality, and providing additional guarantees that principles of international law are respected. We should prevent further dilution of legal limitations on the use of force. We should ensure territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. Instead of recreating a new iron curtain from the Baltic to the Black Sea, let's consider something totally different: A new legally-binding security treaty covering the whole European space. As President Medvedev stressed in his recent speech in Berlin, this proposal that was put forward by the Russian Federation is a reflection of its concern over a deepening legal vacuum in the area of European security. I invite representatives of countries that are gathered here around this table to give this proposal a serious consideration. We believe that only an open and frank discussion of each other's concerns may lead us to resolve all the issues that are arising in the Euro-Atlantic security space. Russia does not have any hidden agenda. We are prepared for such an open and frank discussion. We believe that it is the only way to move forward the project of a greater Europe.

Part Three

Ambassador Stewart Eldon
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom on the North Atlantic Council

Ambassador Munir Akram
Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations

Ambassador Jean-Marc de la Sablière
French Ambassador to Italy

Her Excellency Eka Tkeshelashvili
Foreign Minister of Georgia

Ambassador Stefano Stefanini
Permanent Representative of Italy on the North Atlantic Council

Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Ambassador Boguslaw W. Winid
Permanent Representative of Poland on the North Atlantic Council

Chapter 9

Dealing with Regions in Crisis: The Case of Afghanistan

Ambassador Stewart Eldon CMG OBE¹

Recently Des Browne gave you a British view of NATO transformation and the way we can ensure that the Alliance becomes an efficient and effective provider of security in the 21st century. In these brief remarks I will move from the strategic to the operational, concentrating primarily on Afghanistan.

OPERATIONAL NEEDS IN AFGHANISTAN

The first point I'd like to make is that, as with so many of our current crises, there is no purely military solution to the situation in Afghanistan. To achieve success, the whole international community must mobilize together. The spectrum ranges from NATO, the hard end of security, through the EU and national contributions in areas such as governance, the fight against corruption, and the rule of law, to the U.N., NGOs and other development agencies. In short, we need a comprehensive approach, which must encompass the region as well as just Afghanistan.

The second thing I want to say in this forum is that we must be honest about what we are doing. In essence, the international community is engaged in support of the government of Afghanistan in a major counterinsurgency strategy. The Afghans must lead—it is, after all, their country—but the more we can tailor our support behind the government's efforts to exercise its authority fully throughout its territory, the more successful we will be.

THE SECURITY SITUATION

Against this scenario, it is sometimes tempting to focus exclusively on the security aspects of the situation—certainly the media tends to encourage this and not to report on the real successes in other areas. However, despite the casualties we and others suffered recently, the security situation in Afghanistan has improved. The Taliban's leadership has been targeted successfully, and recent operations in Southern Helmand severely disrupted their training and lines of communication.

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Ambassador Stewart Eldon CMG OBE is the United Kingdom Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

This has had two principal effects. First, the insurgents' sphere of influence has been reduced. Nine-tenths of the security incidents are now confined to one-tenth of the country, and the rest is relatively peaceful. Second, and crucial in this context, the Taliban's ambition has been reduced from insurgency to terrorism. Increasingly their focus is now on intimidating Afghan communities, coercing the vulnerable into becoming suicide bombers, and carrying out brutal and indiscriminate attacks on the international community and, above all, ordinary Afghans. These tactics pose a different but serious challenge, and we must adjust our efforts to deal with them. As with all counterinsurgencies, the progression of clear, hold, and build should be followed.

This implies establishing a long-term and comprehensive framework for security, political, social, and economic development in support of Afghanistan. It implies increasing Afghan leadership. And it implies increasing support where the Afghans need it most.

ELEMENTS OF A LONG-TERM, COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK

The first key element relates to the Afghan Security Forces. Training of the Afghan Army is going well, and the army is now involved in a leading role in over 80% of NATO's operations. Over the next few months we will need to discuss with the Afghans whether long-term targets for the size of the Afghan National Army are correct and, if not, whether a larger force (for example, of 100,000) is supportable over the longer term.

The Afghan Police is a second critical element and ultimately more important in terms of lasting stability. Here the picture is less good. With current resources the first round of police training under the U.S.-sponsored district development program will not be completed until 2013. This is too late, and more resources are needed. We very much welcome the fact that Italy and other governments are looking at what more they can do to help. The efforts of the EU Police Mission are also critical, focused on national policing standards, higher-level training, and the rule of law.

To hold and build, governance and development are essential. These areas stray far outside NATO's mandate, but support, for example, from the PRTs, will be essential to ensure sustainable local government structures and development. We need to get the right people in place—Gordon Brown has proposed establishing a corps of deployable civilians to help in conflict and post-conflict environments. An important balance must be struck between direct aid delivery (for example, for reconstruction) and more strategic development activities implemented through Afghan structures. NGOs and bilateral donors also have important roles to play and need to feel out their relationship with the military. In due course, we need to think through whether PRTs are the most appropriate mechanisms for aid delivery in areas where security permits a more traditional approach.

CN AND COIN

Although I cannot do justice to the complexities of this subject in the time available, I do want to cover two specific issues: Counternarcotics (CN) and the delivery of civil effect in a counterinsurgency (COIN) context.

CN is vitally important in an Afghan context. The links between drug traffickers and the insurgency are painfully clear: the Taliban rely on drug money to finance a high proportion of their operations. The relevance to NATO's role is also obvious. CN strategy is a long-term business with many strands and must remain under Afghan lead. But NATO is now considering what more it might do to support the Afghan National Drugs Strategy in terms of, for example, targeting laboratories that produce material to feed Taliban coffers.

Each country has its own approach to delivering civil effect. In eastern Afghanistan the U.S. has over many years built up a sophisticated approach to reconstruction and development based on a military backbone of PRTs and other enablers. This is working well, not least because a relatively limited geographical spread and (by Afghan standards) a relatively sophisticated infrastructure make it easier to achieve results. It also helps that traditionally U.S. military commanders have had ready access to development and reconstruction funds.

The U.K. approach shares all the basic principles of COIN but differs in some practical respects. In Regional Command-South (RC-S) the territory is larger, less populated, and less developed; central government has had little, if any, influence. In the British context, reconstruction money is delivered through international development mechanisms rather than through the military, although in many cases the military deliver, and we have just announced the deployment of an extra troop of Royal Engineers to support our PRT in Lashkar Gah by undertaking quick-impact projects in support of the local community. In addition, we will attach civil-military cooperation officers to each of our battle groups and will form military stabilization teams on the model of the ad hoc team that we deployed with great success in the wake of the reoccupation of Musa Qala.

We have also appointed a two-star civilian to head the PRT in Lashkar Gah and to take command of British assets in Helmand (except insofar as they are dedicated to ISAF and remain under the NATO military command chain). The objective is to achieve more coherent delivery of civil effect against the background of a difficult security situation. I hope Roger Weissinger-Baylon will invite me back next year to tell you whether we got it right.

Chapter 10

Afghanistan, Pakistan, the U.S., and NATO

Ambassador Munir Akram¹

The present situation in Afghanistan and the frontier regions of Pakistan is the result of a number of developments that have taken place since December 1979. The process of radicalization in the region was the outcome of a series of strategic mistakes, including the use of Islamic extremists in the war against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

EVENTS THAT HAVE LED TO THE CURRENT SITUATION

After September 11, when the United States intervened in Afghanistan, Pakistan had advised against using the Northern Alliance (which was largely a non-Pashtun coalition) to oust the Taliban regime from power. Our advice was not heeded. In October 2001, the Taliban left Kabul and dispersed to the south and the east, back to its home areas. Those in the Taliban were not militarily eliminated or defeated.

But Afghanistan's south and east stayed mostly dormant and neglected until 2003. It was only after the physical ingress of NATO into the region that the insurgency seriously commenced. Between 2003 and 2006, the insurgency became organized in five command countries led by, among others, Mullah Omer, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Mullah Dadullah, and Gulbedin Hikmatyar. The spread and intensity of the insurgency was the result of several factors:

1. Natural (Pashtun) local sympathy for the largely Pashtun Taliban
2. Further alienation of the Pashtun tribal leaders because of indiscriminate bombing and military tactics resulting in civilian casualties; political exclusion, especially after parliamentary elections; Tajik and non-Pashtun control of the Afghan National Army (less now); disenchantment of the common people/villages because of counterinsurgency tactics; the absence of development; corruption and injustice, especially at the local level; selective destruction of poppy crops; and growing insecurity (being caught in the cross-fire).

Cross-border support from FATA (Federally to the insurgency (mainly recruits, rest, and regrouping) was only a partial and arbitrary cause of the insurgency. Its major location and motivation was and remains within Afghanistan.

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At the time of the workshop, Ambassador Munir Akram was Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO STOP CROSS-BORDER INFILTRATION

Pakistan has taken several measures, including 1,000 check posts, over 100 military operations in FATA, and capturing or killing 2,000 Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders/commanders, to check cross-border infiltration. While these measures had considerable impact on cross-border movement, the security environment in FATA and in neighboring “settled” areas deteriorated sharply. In 2007, Al-Qaeda and some Taliban-linked groups turned on Pakistan and its security forces, and there were more suicide bombings in Pakistan than Afghanistan that year, with 2,000 civilian casualties. The main result was greater popular alienation from FATA’s “forward strategy.” Paradoxically, within FATA and NWFP, there was also popular disenchantment with Islamic militancy. The February 18 elections led to the success of the secular, Pashtun candidates of the ANP even in FATA.

PAKISTAN'S NEW STRATEGY

The new government is committed to adopting a new strategy to (1) end suicide bombings, (2) pacify FATA, (3) halt the spread of Taliban and militant influence, and (4) continue to cooperate with and support the stabilization of Afghanistan. Negotiations to halt the violence have been opened at several levels. The cause of violence in each of the FATA agencies is different. In the Swat district of NWFP, for example, the underlying cause is land disputes and the demand for speedy justice. The most critical negotiations relate to South Waziristan, where Behtullah Mehsud and the “Pakistani Taliban” are located.

The concept of these peace deals is consistent with long-standing tribal customs and traditions, placing collective responsibility on the tribes for the maintenance of law and order in their areas. Of course, the tribal leaders have to bring the insurgents active in their area into these peace agreements. The implementation and effect of these agreements will be slow. No doubt, there will be periodic reversals. However, the strategy is comprehensive, and contains military, political, and economic elements. The local militias, especially the F.C., will need to be strengthened and equipped to assume larger security functions. The Pakistan Army will be located in identified positions and posts and respond to security threats as and when required.

The widespread assertions that the peace talks with FATA tribes and militants have led to an increase in cross-border attacks in Afghanistan are at best premature. The rising incidents in Afghanistan take place mostly at a distance from the border. As well, fighting always escalates during the spring and summer. In response to these concerns, specific clauses are being added to the agreements, especially within South Waziristan, committing the tribes to prevent cross-border attacks and to expel Al-Qaeda elements and other foreigners.

ISSUES PAKISTAN FACES

While there have been well-publicized complaints from coalition commanders about the rise in cross-border attacks, Pakistan too has many reasons to complain. At the operational level, Pakistan confronts the following difficulties:

1. Insufficient check posts and troops on the Afghan side of the border: Pakistan has established 1,200 check posts, and there are less than 100 on the other side
2. Inadequate real-time intelligence-sharing by the coalition/Afghanistan
3. Coalition/Afghan National Army incursions into Pakistan territory
4. Not being supplied with the equipment requested by Pakistan for counterinsurgency purposes (night vision equipment, UAVs, electronic surveillance, helicopters)

5. Inflow into Pakistan/FATA of foreign fighters—Uzbeks, Chechens, etc.—from and through Afghanistan

6. Attacks on Pakistan territory, especially artillery and aerial attacks (without warning or coordination); one of the most serious was a recent attack on Pakistani check posts that killed 12 Pakistani soldiers

At the political level, we also face several problems with the Afghan government and, at times, with coalition partners, including:

1. Nonrecognition of the border by Kabul (if there is no border, how can there be “cross-border” movement?)

2. Opposition to border control measures, e.g., fencing of parts of the border, the distinction of biometric I.D. cards to check 40,000 daily legal crossings

3. The reluctance and refusal to relocate Afghan refugee camps close to the border on the other side (as a means of reducing the cross-border problem and allegations regarding “safe havens” in Pakistan)

4. Indian consulates in Kandhar and Jalalabad being involved in activities negatively affecting Pakistan’s security and stability

5. Provocative statements by Afghan leaders and officials blaming Pakistan for all of Afghanistan’s security problems, including the recent atrocious threat from Karzai to intervene in Pakistan territory

6. Threats mainly from U.S. legislators to cut off “assistance” to Pakistan and unjustified delays in reimbursements

PAKISTAN-U.S. RELATIONS

Pakistan-U.S. cooperation is currently strained. The political and operational challenges being confronted in the campaign to eliminate terrorism and to stabilize Afghanistan need to be addressed urgently through strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the United States. The U.S. and NATO also need to review their strategic objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan and to redefine “success.” They will: 1) not be able to transform Afghanistan overnight into a modern democracy; 2) not be able to change the conservative Islamic ideology and beliefs of the people of Afghanistan; and 3) not be able to eliminate or ignore the major power components in Afghanistan, especially the Pashtun tribes. The new strategy will need to be truly comprehensive, including political, economic, and military components.

The political strategy should aim at reconciliation. It should be designed to 1) isolate the violent extremists from the moderate, non-violent, and non-involved majority; 2) win hearts and minds through practical assistance (health, food, housing, agricultural support); 3) build peace through grass-roots measures, district by district, village by village; and 4) utilize traditional modalities, for example, the Jirga system, for dispute settlement and accommodation.

The economic strategy should utilize the “power of finance” to win the cooperation of tribal and local leaders, have urgently needed and locally required reconstruction and job-creation projects as the priority, improve transport and communications, encourage local entrepreneurship, and find a viable solution to the poppy problem, for example, buy up the crops of small farmers.

The military option should remain the option of last, not first, resort. While the larger presence of coalition forces may be required in the short term, given Afghan antipathy to foreigners, these forces should be progressively replaced with strengthened elements from the Afghan National Army, especially local militias. The major military targets should be Al-Qaeda terrorists, hard-core militants, and criminal elements, not part-time (Taliban) fighters.

None of the components of this strategy will work unless governance and the system of justice are improved throughout Afghanistan.

Chapter 11

A Look at the Crisis Regions: Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Africa

Ambassador Jean-Marc de la Sablière¹

Everyone here is able to gauge the importance gained by the U.N. through peacekeeping operations carried out since the end of the Cold War. Today there are over 100,000 peacekeepers deployed in 18 different missions, at an overall cost of \$7.5 billion. But although this massive engagement by the United Nations has had structural and operational consequences for the organization, in my remarks I am going to focus on the importance of cooperation between the U.N. and regional and subregional organizations, which are ever present on the ground alongside the United Nations, to meet the expectations of the international community.

U.N. COOPERATION WITH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Over the past 15 years or so, the U.N. has increasingly cooperated with several regional organizations on more than one continent. These include:

The African Union and subregional organizations ECOWAS and IGAD, to carry out operations solely in Africa: in Sudan, in the Great Lakes region in Burundi, in Western Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire), and, shortly, in Somalia

The Organization of American States, in connection with the events in Haiti

The European Union, to lead operations in Europe (Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia) but also in Africa (twice in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Chad/CAR)

NATO, in Europe (the Balkans), in Afghanistan, in Iraq (training), and also in Sudan (to provide the logistics needed to support the deployment of UNAMID troops)

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Ambassador Jean-Marc de la Sablière is the French Ambassador to Italy. He was formerly the Ambassador of France to the United Nations.

This cooperation has been undertaken in many different ways. A quick look at the operations carried out over the past few years shows that these ways have included:

What I call “staggered” operations, in which the U.N. takes over from a regional organization (Burundi, Liberia)

Joint or hybrid operations, such as UNAMID, which is currently being led in Darfur by the African Union and the U.N. in an original joint way

Operations led by several organizations or states—though there may be a single global mandate, these operations are highly complex because different missions are deployed in the same area but report to different decision-making centers; in this connection, the EU has intervened twice to provide temporary support to a U.N. operation in which it was unable to tackle specific events on its own (ARTEMIS and EUFOR DR Congo) and is presently leading a security-building operation in Chad (EUFOR, Chad/CAR) in support of a U.N. mission (MINURCAT)

Logistics and training support, which the EU provides primarily to the AU

The importance and usefulness of this kind of cooperation, especially between the AU and the EU, was acknowledged in a statement by the president of the Security Council that was issued on November, 6, 2007, welcoming, above all, the precious role played by regional organizations, not only in crisis prevention, but also in seeking a political settlement for the crises once they have broken out. In March 2007, the Security Council had already underscored the fact that the African organizations were “well-placed to understand the root causes of the many conflicts in the area and to be valuable in their prevention and settlement, thanks to their profound knowledge of the region.” The fact that these organizations regularly appear before the U.N. Security Council for a joint assessment of the regional situations is a clear sign of their willingness to work together.

The United Nations also realizes that these regional organizations have an important role to play in carrying out operations to prevent the spread of destabilizing factors, specifically in combating light weapons trafficking and terrorism. Furthermore, they are essential partners in peace enforcement operations through their participation in post-conflict rebuilding programs.

Although at times the above modes of cooperation are plainly a negotiated political solution (for example, in Darfur), more often than not they are an inescapable need when strong pressures are brought to bear on the international community to take action and one organization alone is not enough to get the job done or to handle it effectively. The United Nations is still a political-military organization that is ill equipped to lead certain complex and demanding military operations throughout the entire world; it is up against the increasing problem of force generation. An organization such as the African Union, with its clear political mandate, has no military capabilities of its own, despite some progress. NATO has substantial military assets but clearly does not have universal legitimacy and is uncomfortable with the political-military management of a crisis. As for the European Union, it is often reluctant to be engaged.

STUMBLING BLOCKS TO FULL COOPERATION

Because we do not have a universal cooperation model we must adapt our instruments on a case-by-case basis. Hence, it is important to identify any issues that might arise to overcome them in the future and to avoid certain stumbling blocks:

The increasing recourse to regional organizations must not call into question the universal nature of the United Nations and its ensuing legitimacy. The Darfur crisis has shown how ineffective an overly regional solution can be. There are lines that cannot be crossed, of which the African Union is well aware, for it is not in the interest of Africans to encourage these tendencies. In addition, the primacy

of the United Nations, which gives it legitimacy or, at the very least, increased legitimacy, must likewise be safeguarded vis-à-vis contributing regional organizations such as NATO.

Cultural differences must be well understood. Thus, DPKO operates in a very decentralized manner. To the contrary, NATO and the EU are pyramidal organizations, with a very strong top-down political-military control structure. Reconciling these kinds of organizations on the ground is not an easy task. KFOR has had to take emergency action to deal with the consequences of a decision essentially made locally by the UNMIK commanders, in accordance with the guidelines coming from New York. The main problem was not so much the decision itself; rather, it was with the communication between the two organizations. Each of the parties concerned must make an effort to adapt.

In this respect, recent operations have shed light on the need to pursue and enhance the military upgrading of DPKO. The extremely complex U.N. operations need to be able to report to a staff structure in New York, however light. This is what has led to the idea of setting up a New York-based military cell to interface with DPKO, to meet the expectations of the European armies engaged in the UNIFIL II operation. Decisions are now being made in New York to upgrade the military expertise of the United Nations, thereby facilitating cooperation with organizations such as the EU and NATO.

Generally speaking, the political coherence of an operation must be guaranteed when political, military, police, and rebuilding efforts are divided among several partners. In this respect, once it is engaged on the ground, the U.N. should clearly be in complete charge of leading the mission within the framework of a global political-military strategy. This has not always been the case, and we have had to acknowledge that in the operations carried out in Afghanistan.

The EU's potential as a U.N. partner may still be enhanced. In fact, the European Union has solid civilian-military capabilities, making it unique and enabling it to intervene in every phase of a crisis, from prevention to settlement and peace enforcement. It is also able to deploy a rapid and viable reaction force, which we saw in the DR Congo and Chad. But the EU must want to do this.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

My fundamental conclusion is that to enable cooperation, we must understand one another and know what our capabilities and limits are. Hence, we must foster an ongoing discussion and coordination effort aimed at improving cooperation between the U.N. and regional organizations. Objectives and mandates must also be clearly defined. Although a great deal has been achieved, much remains to be accomplished.

On the basis of its experience serving peace, France advocates pragmatism in choosing the organizations that are best suited to supporting the United Nations. It wishes to adapt the rules of operation within the United Nations as well as between the United Nations and the regional organizations. Finally, it wants the EU to take on an active role in facing up to these challenges, thereby meeting the expectations of the entire world.

It is in this spirit that we will hold a forum in November 2008 on U.N.-EU cooperation. This forum will contribute to our discussion on strengthening the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

Chapter 12

Georgia: International Commitment and Engagement

Her Excellency Eka Tkeshelashvili¹

The fact that Georgia volunteered to make a presentation on “Strategies for Dealing with Regions in Crisis—Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine-Lebanon, and Africa” reflects the direct stake we have in these countries and is quite important symbolically. Our participation and presentation clearly show that there are no longer places in this inter-related world that can be called remote, and no longer regions or situations in crisis that do not carry significant implications for global security. In Georgia, we understand this very well and believe that every member of the world community must make its own contribution to stability and peace throughout the world.

Although Georgia is a small country with problems of its own, our beliefs are matched by our actions. For example, we have a 2,000-man force on the ground in Iraq—the second-largest per-capita contingent on the ground there. We also will be contributing to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Since we have no caveats for this mission, we will also be involved in the training operations in Afghanistan and view this as an important contribution to the major effort of the international community. The synergy between the different organizations involved in Afghanistan is crucial and the contribution on the ground by every member-state of those organizations is essential as well.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT AND ENGAGEMENT

Is there a good model that can serve us well in different situations? We all understand that there cannot be one ready-made recipe for every situation, because each case is specific, different objectives may need to be reached, and crises may require a different approach in terms of the involvement they require. But in the crises we addressed through this panel, there is one key element: It is a long-lasting and effective international commitment and engagement. For the model to work, comprehensiveness and synergy between various contributing organizations are also crucial. During the discussion we heard good examples of that and how essential these factors are. In addition, although ensuring security is the foundation for building lasting peace and stability, efforts must also be made to rehabilitate and develop our economies and, even more importantly, democratic institutions.

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Her Excellency Eka Tkeshelashvili is the Foreign Minister of Georgia.

THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY

Another issue that needs to be discussed is how democracy can be the glue between nations and their minorities in different situations. Within a country or region, what kind of democratic framework can be offered to different constituencies that will permit them to create durable peace and inclusiveness, so that no one feels left out of the prosperity and development of the country or region? Once a formula has been identified, it can be developed to foster genuine reconciliation and inclusiveness as well as promote economic growth in the particular area. Neighbors can also play an essential role by offering constructive contributions. We should keep in mind that such possibilities can be implemented on the ground.

From our own perspective and experience with crises in parts of our country, we believe that an approach of this type can be a working solution, both for the regions that we talked about today and for the world at large. As we all know, crises have the potential to spill over and affect global security. Today, the effectiveness of the efforts undertaken by the international community as well as cooperation between the different parties involved in these crises are key factors that we need to think about. Achieving long-term stability and security in troubled areas of the world is essential, because we cannot expect that frozen situations or periods of political chill in some of these countries will not worsen in the future.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In conclusion, I believe that if we can combine our efforts and pour our energy, attention, and resources into providing security, financial means, human resources, and training for local institutions, we will create the very basis upon which stability and security can be established.

Chapter 13

International Crises and Failed States

Ambassador Stefano Stefanini¹

In this forum, last year I stressed that engagement, namely NATO's engagement, makes the difference. I remain fully convinced of it. Afghanistan is a case in point. I fully agree with Ambassador Eldon on Afghanistan being NATO's first priority. But I want to make a broader point and connect what we are doing in Afghanistan with the various crises we are dealing with—Ambassador de la Sablière gave us an impressive list of crises in which the U.N. is involved. We have to identify exactly what we are doing. Yes, we are fighting a country insurgency in Afghanistan, but we are also trying to do what the Afghan government at this point in time is unable to do.

Then my broader question is: “is there a common thread throughout the various crises we are dealing with—in the Middle East, in South Asia, in Africa, and elsewhere?” My answer to that is very simple: We are dealing with “failed States.”

THE EFFECTS OF FAILED STATES

Without underestimating the specificities of each country or crisis, the crises we are referring to happen in a context of collapsing State authority, weakening institutions, lack of governance and of rule of law. I. e. they happen where there is no “State”, or no State that we are able to deal with, be it Somalia, Afghanistan or the Gaza strip. To different degrees to be sure, institutions as we know them, not only the Ministries but also the basic institutions of communities—the schools, the army, the police—are melting down or significantly degraded. All these situational crises have greatly affected the international community—each is different but they have in common the fact that in each one of them we find ourselves faced with a lack of responsibility and a lack of accountability.

Recently, Admiral di Paola discussed the Westphalian order in crises, but, Westphalian order or not, any concept of international relations, let alone of an international order or system, is based on the assumption that we can hold someone responsible for what happens in any given geopolitical entity or piece of land, be it a government, a regime, a dictator, a party secretary-general, or even a tribal chief. When we do not have a clear interlocutor, even if it is an enemy, then we have a problem. To me this is the essence of the problem of failed States. Any of them represents a security threat, a threat to *our* security.

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Ambassador Stefano Stefanini is the Italian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

If we think about it thoroughly, many of the threats that we identify—terror, extremism, proliferation—in some respect are effects rather than causes of the collapse of state authorities in significant parts of the world.

We entered the twenty-first century with many misgivings about failed States, especially because the record was mixed—a failure in Somalia, quite a success in Bosnia. To be sure they come in all shades of grey rather than in black and white, including in the frozen conflict format, where you have a piece of land where it is not clear who is in charge. I could give you a list of the different levels of failed States we have just in the geographical area that is being underlined—I mentioned Somalia, Afghanistan and the Gaza strip, and I could add Lebanon. One major difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is that in Iraq we might have underestimated the possibilities of immediately empowering the Iraqis, while in Afghanistan we overestimated the capacity of the Afghans to take charge. And in Pakistan, the peace accord established by the Islamabad government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), can only give us concern to the extent that it too creates a lawless situation in that region.

ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF FAILED STATES

If we agree that the collapse of the State is the mother of all crises, at least in this category, let me sum up with some quick thoughts on how we should deal with it.

1. First, we must be very clear about the issue is that we have to deal with so that we can “attack” the existence of failed States, attack the “failure” not the State, to try to put an end to the situation.

2. Second, and this has been said by various speakers, we must share the burden. That is what we say at NATO—we say that NATO cannot do it alone. We say share the burden, both in terms of division of labor and also in terms of coordination when we act together. This applies both to organizations and to nations.

3. The third point, and I think this is a case in which political correctness can be an enemy of common sense, we have to be realistic about “ownership”. If a State is failing, we cannot just say, “We give you ownership.” To whom would we give ownership? If there is no capacity for governance, we must first build governance; then we can have a handover. The prospective owner must be first empowered to “own,” An election by itself will not do it. If I may briefly digress, this is what the EU even more than NATO is trying to do with Kosovo—it tries to avoid having a failed State in the middle of the Balkans. That is why I find the Russian attitude toward this situation rather shortsighted, since what we are trying to do, mainly through the EU, is just to avoid a problem.

4. My fourth point, again, is that we have to do away with some political correctness. It is clear that reconstruction needs security and that security without reconstruction will not last. We then have to put aside the orthodoxy about separation between the so-called military and the so-called civil arena. This kind of separation—the military does not do nation-building, development assistance agencies or NGOs do not cooperate with the military—is simply self-defeating, both nationally and internationally. This is difficult to internalize especially for NGOS, but it is the only way forward in this field. Security (“clear and hold”) must go together with assistance (“build”). How we do it is relatively unimportant but do it we must. Security must be provided to and must be accepted by whoever does reconstruction.

5. My fifth point, which Italian Chief of Defense General Camporini made very clear, is that we have to talk to our people—we have to create constituencies. What we are trying to do when we deal with failed States is a hard sell domestically, because it is not clear to anybody that providing peacekeeping in Lebanon or sending troops to Chad or suffering losses in Afghanistan is also in our own national interest and for our own security. To this end we have to build constituencies, we have to make the case with public opinions and with Parliaments, both at home and in the countries in which we operate.

Chapter 14

Russia's Support for NATO in Afghanistan: Some Issues

Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky¹

A lot has been said about the importance of conflict settlement and especially about Afghanistan's settlement. Allow me to add a Russian perspective on the settlement of Afghanistan because, to my mind, that is the most difficult problem to solve.

SUPPORTING NATO OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

We understand that a counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan has key significance for NATO. To some extent, it is a test of NATO's ability to correspond to the global role it wants to play. We believe that the presence of international forces in Afghanistan and operations performed there are very important for the security of Russia as well. We also realize that if the Alliance's operation fails and extremists come back to power in Kabul, the consequences will be hard to predict.

Destabilization of Russia's central Asian neighbors would create a dangerous conflict potential along the southern border of our country. That is why Russia supported this NATO operation from the very beginning and supports prolonging the international security assistance forces in Afghanistan, which are an important component of the international community's efforts to restore peace and stability in the country. In spite of the fact that the Russian Federation does not participate in Afghanistan operations directly, our country is ready to continue rendering all possible support to ISAF and the Afghanistan national army as well.

As I said at the initial stage of the operation, we provided our U.S. partners with all the information we had, including maps of minefields, and we also helped to equip forces of the Northern Alliance. I now repeat that there are no plans to send Russian military to Afghanistan because of understandable reasons. At the same time, we will assist post-war restoration of the country and participate in solving its social and economic problems as well as prevent the development of international terrorism and the spread of drugs.

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A BALANCED AND FLEXIBLE APPROACH FOR AFGHANISTAN

It has already been said that despite the considerable time that has passed since the failure of the Taliban regime, the situation in the country causes concern. Unfortunately, we cannot yet speak about real improvements in the environment there. Frankly speaking, the influence of the central government is limited to the Kabul area—the new Afghan authorities still do not control other parts of the country. As for the country's economy, it exists only because of foreign donations and the opium trade. But the growth of Taliban activity is even worse than that.

In our opinion, there can not be only a military solution to the Afghanistan problem. A balanced and flexible approach that takes into account both the realities of the country and the mentality of the Afghani people is necessary. So we welcome NATO's complex approach to the solution of the Afghani problem. There is no doubt that integrating military and civil components and achieving more effective coordination of international efforts are the only ways to provide stability in the country.

A process to restore Afghani statehood and economy should be supported by effective military efforts. Here again Russia is ready to render assistance such as professional training of Afghanistan's army personnel as well as arms and military technical equipment deliveries and maintenance. Russia has already granted weapons and equipment in the amount of about U.S.\$200 million to President Karzai's government.

ISSUES WITH PROVIDING SUPPORT

Unfortunately, our efforts to assist the Afghan government sometimes encounter obstacles that we find difficult to explain. For example, the pilot project of providing Russian aid and counsel concerning professional training of drug-fighting structures in Afghanistan and central Asia has stumbled. When we question Kabul's refusal to send Afghan cadets to a drug counter-action course (a joint Russian aid and counsel project in Domodedovo), we hear explanations that Afghans behaved inadequately. The main argument concerns the opening of the Ministry of Interior Academy in Kabul, where necessary training is to be conducted. If that is the case, let's stop the project if Afghans do not want it.

Another example involves the agreement on providing military-technical assistance to Afghanistan, which expired in January 2006. We notified the Afghans in advance that, according to Russian legislation, continuation of that kind of assistance was possible only after a corresponding request from the Afghan government. However, we still have not received any such request. Unofficially, we receive signals that there are plans to reequip Afghan forces with Western-made arms and equipment. If so, it should be said clearly: Thank you, we do not need this kind of assistance. But knowing about Afghan adherence to Russian-made weapons, I doubt that such reequipment is possible, at least in the short term.

Another point is that the final documents from the last NATO summits make no reference to such an organization as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In fact, the organization has great experience in drug-threat counter-action, especially in Afghanistan. I think that developing cooperation between CSTO and NATO, which had dealings with security matters on both sides of Afghanistan's borders, would be mutually beneficial.

Certainly we know of the Alliance's principal position not to deal with CSTO as an organization but to address its members on an individual, case-by-case basis. I am not going to elaborate on that, but my strong belief is that it is a mistake, especially in Afghan matters. I am sure that developing real cooperation with counter-regional organizations such as CSTO and perhaps the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can play a positive role in the stabilization of the situation in the region, including terrorism and drug-threat counteraction. It would be useful to build up interaction in the area between old international organizations, especially those already involved in Afghanistan.

Chapter 15

An Overview of Regions in Crisis: Afghanistan and Iraq

Ambassador Boguslaw W. Winid¹

I must admit that it is difficult to address the very comprehensive theme of this panel. It concerns several crisis regions, which are different in terms of background, political and geographical situations, actors involved, and the level of engagement of the international community. In order to make addressing this theme a bit easier, I have decided to focus on Afghanistan, which is a key priority for NATO and for my country. Then I shall say a couple of words on Iraq and, finally, make two general points about Poland's contribution to crisis response operations.

I am not going to talk about progress on the ground in Afghanistan. I think it is visible, and the Bucharest Summit as well as the International Conference to Support Afghanistan that was held in Paris recently proved it so. I am going to outline a few factors that, in my personal view, are critical if NATO and the international community are to succeed there. Although these elements are related specifically to the situation in Afghanistan, I believe they can be applied to other conflict regions as well.

SUCCESSING IN AFGHANISTAN

Enabling Afghan Leadership and Ownership

An Afghan official used to say, "Afghanistan is a strong nation, but a weak state." That is why our central objective must be to assist the government of Afghanistan in establishing a sustainable and functioning state. We must help Afghans in different areas: in developing and strengthening their institutions, improving security situations, and fostering reconstruction and development efforts. Also, as we support the armed nation-building in this country, the Afghan people must remain at the center of our strategy.

In assisting Afghans, we must not forget that our presence in Afghanistan is at the request of the government, which sets the tone for key activities and priorities there. Therefore "Afghanization" must be a key word in our mission. We have to do our utmost to understand the Afghan people's own perspective and see the challenges from the point of view of Kabul, not Warsaw, London, Rome, or Madrid. That is why documents developed by Afghans, such as the Afghan National Development Strategy, must

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become key guiders as we conduct this mission, and that is why our aid should be channeled through Afghan government structures. This is the best way to achieve sustainable progress and the best value for the money.

Obviously, a key task for NATO is to assist Afghan authorities in building the hallmarks of an effective and sovereign security sector, namely, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Only Afghan-led forces can ensure the rule of law in the longer term.

I believe that ISAF has been advancing on these fronts, especially in training the army. The ANA continues to grow in both size (in 2009 we are aiming for 70,000 trained Afghan soldiers) and capability and is being given greater responsibility in planning and executing operations. We hope it will progressively take over lead security responsibility in the country, starting with the Kabul area during the summer of 2008, as announced by President Karzai.

Promising signals are also visible in our national area of operation. When my country takes over security responsibility for the eastern Afghan province of Ghazni later in 2008, we will closely cooperate with soldiers from a brigade headquarters and two infantry battalions in the Afghan National Army.

Nevertheless, let us be under no illusion that progress can be artificially accelerated. We are in for a long haul. However, sooner or later the country will be on its own. Training Afghanistan's security forces is our best exit strategy.

Ensuring Necessary Capabilities and Resources for the Mission

General David Barno, commander of the American forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, once said that successful counterinsurgency in this country was 20% military effort and 80% nonmilitary. I do believe that's true. As we often say, "There can be no lasting security without development," and the Taliban can only be defeated in the long term by better governance and more development in Afghanistan, rather than through purely military means. Therefore, we need greater progress on the economic front, in reconstruction, improvements in governance, fighting narcotics, and so on.

However, the Alliance's mandate concerns security. As we put a great deal of emphasis on development, reconstruction, and governance, we should not neglect the need to contribute sufficient resources to ensure NATO's successful operation. We need to fill the remaining troop shortfalls (including OMLTs), provide necessary enablers (helicopters), and, last but not least, for effectiveness of the overall mission, we have to attempt to reduce or eliminate restrictions on the use of national forces. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs and my boss Radoslaw Sikorski once said, "To give without caveats is to give twice."

If we are to succeed in Afghanistan, we must continue the military effort. Let me stress that failure to mobilize resources in support of our joint endeavor in this country would show that only unilateral actions matter. It would strike a blow not only at NATO, but at the concept of multilateralism in general.

Making Operational the Comprehensive Approach Concept

The comprehensive approach has become a buzzword. In its essence, it means that NATO, as an organization, cannot in many cases (and Afghanistan is one of them) achieve its aims all on its own. As a result, we need partners, including other international organizations and NGOs. And we need better coordination among them all to impart greater effectiveness and coherence to stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Of course, those who advocate coordination must also be willing to be coordinated themselves, and I think NATO is ready to do that.

A leading role in this area needs to be played by the U.N., and I believe that Kai Eide, Special Representative of the UNSG, is the right person to make the difference there. At the Bucharest Summit and at the

Paris conference we noticed the willingness of other partners to increase their engagement in Afghanistan. The EU, for instance, is committed to substantially increasing its efforts, and recently decided to double the number of experts working in its police mission in the country. Right now, the most pressing challenge for the entire international community, including NATO, is to assist the Afghans in preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections.

Improving Our Strategic Communications

If we cannot convince the public and the media that our strategy is working, NATO's mission is doomed to fail. First, we have to, at a minimum, maintain the support of the Afghan people for our efforts. Second, we must improve the image of the mission among our own publics. Of course, support for ISAF's mission varies from country to country, but, make no mistake, no country is fully immune from having its public become disillusioned with the involvement of troops in a conflict so far away from national borders.

Poland is a good example of this. I must acknowledge that my compatriots' support for our mission in Afghanistan remains modest, to put it mildly. However, Poles well understand the obligations that stem from being a member of the Alliance, and therefore there are no serious calls for withdrawal of the troops. However, the small and conditional level of support by our public could have a negative impact in the longer term.

That is why we, as NATO and as nations, need to communicate more effectively our goals, accomplishments, and remaining challenges in Afghanistan to the Europeans and North Americans who foot the bills. We have to enhance our capacity to counter extremist propaganda and, last but not least, we need to train more military public affairs professionals. An important step was taken with the endorsement of the ISAF Strategic Vision and the Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan at the Bucharest Summit. Now, it is time to implement their provisions.

Because of time constraints I am going to stop talking about Afghanistan now, but I want to acknowledge that there are other important factors that define our level of success in that country. Among them certainly are how to foster good-neighborly relations, especially with Pakistan; how to improve counter-narcotics efforts; and how to promote the political reconciliation process in Afghanistan.

SUCCEEDING IN IRAQ

As U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon recently put it, "Iraq stepped back from the abyss." Despite the fragility of the situation, there is growing optimism in this country that progress is at last being made in security, thanks to both the U.S.-led coalition and Iraqi efforts. Cease-fires in Sadr City and Basra are still holding, and the Iraqi government claims some success in clearing al-Qaeda from the city of Mosul. There is hope that Prime Minister Maliki's government will push ahead with political reconciliation among Sunni Arabs, Shia, and Kurds while continuing to clamp down on both Sunni and Shia extremists. We can also see more constructive engagement of Iraq's neighbors and partners in the region. Continuing this approach remains essential to achieving peace and stability in Iraq and in the region as a whole. In addition, provincial elections scheduled for autumn 2008 should be seen as an important milestone in the political process in Iraq.

We have also witnessed positive changes in the Iraqi province of Diwaniyah, which is still controlled by the Multinational Division Center-South under Polish leadership. We believe that after a long stabilization process that involved close cooperation with the local authorities and the Iraqi Security Forces, the desired level of safety has been achieved. Now, it is time to hand over complete responsibility for the province to its authorities and the Iraqi forces. This process has already been initiated and should be com-

pleted in July 2008. This moment will become the beginning of a new reconstruction stage in the province and will influence the situation in all of Iraq. We are very proud that the 8th Iraqi Army Division, which was trained by our forces, is among the best units in the country.

POLISH CONTRIBUTIONS

Previously we decided that having our troops participate in stabilization and peacekeeping operations would become “*la spécialité de la maison*” and an important tool of Polish foreign policy. Thus, my country is playing an increasingly larger role as an important European peacekeeping power in the world. In fact, Polish troops are engaged in each and every region in crisis that we discussed today. We have a growing presence in Afghanistan—recently we deployed an additional 400 people, thus increasing the size of our contingent to 1,600 troops. In August 2008 we are sending eight additional helicopters as well.

However, our engagement in the coalition force in Iraq is coming to an end. As of October 2008, Poland will pull its remaining 900 troops out of that country. However, we will slightly increase our participation in the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (this is the mission in which the Italian carabinieri team provides training to the Iraqi National Police).

We are also participating in a major EU-led military operation in eastern Chad and the northeastern area of the Central African Republic. This mission is tasked with providing security in the region, allowing the delivery of humanitarian aid as well as the protection of civilians and U.N. personnel there. The deployment of our soldiers is underway. Once completed, the Polish contingent, with 400 troops and 2 helicopters, will become the second biggest in size only to France’s contingent. A Polish officer has been appointed the deputy commander of the EU mission.

Finally, Poland continues a long tradition of participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions. Currently, we have 500 soldiers deployed in the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon as well as more than 350 troops in the U.N. Disengagement and Observation Force in the Golan Heights, between Syria and Israel.

The Reasons Poland Is Committed

Polish commitment to international peacekeeping is not guided solely by national interest. There are many other factors that influence our decisions: Allied obligations and the readiness to contribute to transatlantic burden-sharing in security and defense, willingness to support our partners in need, contributing to the fight against terrorism, and our strong belief that it is imperative to assist a country in making the transition from failed state to a democracy. In Poland, we also have a historical tradition of men going abroad to fight in other countries’ wars of liberation—“For your freedom and ours.” Our efforts to help Afghans and Iraqis remain true to this tradition.

Dispersal of Polish Troops in International Peacekeeping Operations

Poland obviously gives priority to NATO operations; more than half of our troops deployed abroad are participating in Alliance activities. However, as I mentioned, there are Polish soldiers in U.N.-led as well as EU-led missions. In particular, the latter are of increasing importance to us. We perceive the European Union as a second pillar of our security, alongside NATO, and therefore Polish engagement in EU missions is growing. Recently, my country’s authorities decided to join Eurocorps and to make a brigade-size unit available to it. Our soldiers and policemen are also deployed not only in Chad but in EU missions in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Afghanistan. We also took part in the operation in Congo in 2006. I think this trend will continue in the future, in Africa, the Middle East, or elsewhere.

Part Four

Dr. James Tegnalia
Director, U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Mr. John C. Rood
U.S. Under Secretary of State

Ambassador Robert Joseph
Former U.S. Under Secretary of State

Ambassador-at-Large Grigory V. Berdennikov
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Mr. Joseph A. Benkert
U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Mr. Peter C.W. Flory
NATO Assistant Secretary General

Ambassador Jiri Šedivý
NATO Assistant Secretary General

Chapter 16

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation

Dr. James Tegnalia¹

Of all the challenges to global security, none is greater than the need to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. According to the recently released report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the near-term threat of a WMD terrorist attack is grave and action needs to be taken urgently to prevent such an attack from occurring. According to the executive summary of the report:

“Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in terrorist attack somewhere in the world by 2013.”

In fact, the need to prevent WMD proliferation is one of the key motivations not only for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also for the concern over Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear technologies, and many other serious issues. In order to discuss the threat, I have assembled a panel of senior U.S., NATO, and Russian officials: Mr. John Rood, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security; Amb. Robert Joseph, his predecessor as the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security; Ambassador-at-Large Grigory V. Berdennikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Mr. Joseph Benkert, U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs; Ambassador Jiri Sedivy, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning; Mr. Peter Flory, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment; and Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The panel has been asked to address issues including (a) How do different countries view the risks of WMD proliferation? (b) Which threats seem to be the gravest? (c) Is a nuclear device (or radiation bomb) the principal concern—or are countries more worried by chemical threats, biological threats, or even high explosives? (d) Within governments, is it possible to rank or prioritize the risks, or are there simply too many differences of perception among ministries and agencies—or do priorities simply change too rapidly in response to a steady stream of unexpected news and shifting public reactions? (e) What

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approaches, including strengthened intelligence, seem to work best? (f) Should risks be addressed at remote distances, the view of some countries including the U.S., or should the highest priorities be domestic? (g) Are current approaches effective or have they merely been fortunate?

Since these speakers are among the leading international experts, I refer you to their workshop presentations, which appear in the chapters below. I believe that you will find them provocative and insightful.

Chapter 17

Combating Nuclear Terrorism and WMD Proliferation

Mr. John C. Rood¹

TODAY'S THREATS

Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the danger that terrorists may succeed in their effort to acquire these incredibly lethal weapons, represent the defining threat of our age.

Irresponsible states are pursuing the capacity for weapons of mass destruction. North Korea has conducted a nuclear test, launched long-range ballistic missiles, and engaged in the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities to other rogue states. Iran continues to support terrorist groups, to engage in sensitive nuclear activities in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions, and to aggressively develop ever more capable ballistic missiles. Syria also sponsors terrorism and came very close to completing a clandestine nuclear reactor, in violation of its IAEA obligations, that appeared designed specifically to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.

As these repressive governments pursue weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, responsible states in their regions may be tempted to pursue their own weapons programs in self-defense, raising the specter of a cascade of proliferation. Clearly, the Nonproliferation Treaty regime that has served us well for almost 40 years is under great strain.

Severe though the threat from state proliferation is, the one from non-state actors is equally daunting. On the supply end, despite our success in shutting down the A. Q. Khan network and in strengthening international tools against non-state proliferators, many continue to ply their deadly trade wherever and whenever they can, through both illicit activities and manipulation of the legitimate worldwide economic and financial system. We also continue to deal with the aftermath of Khan's activities through support for prosecutions of key network figures by a range of countries as well as other efforts to mitigate the threat posed by the spread of equipment and knowledge by that network.

Meanwhile, on the consumer end of the supply chain, terrorist groups continue to seek weapons of mass disruption or mass destruction, including the ultimate threat of nuclear weapons. That threat will only be compounded if leading state supporters of terrorism like Iran or Syria succeed in their own proliferation efforts.

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THE RESPONSE

The terrorist attacks on September 11 underscored the new threats we face and that the institutions of the Cold War were not sufficient to provide security. Nowhere is that more evident than in meeting the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD and terrorism.

I am pleased to say that the international community has made major strides since September 11 in combating WMD proliferation and nuclear terrorism. We have strengthened long-standing nonproliferation tools like the International Atomic Energy Agency and assistance programs to reduce and secure weapons of mass destruction, related materials, and technologies. We have also made new use of traditional international instruments, enlisting them for the first time in the fight against weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the strong council resolutions against Iran's and North Korea's programs, and the General Assembly's International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism are good examples.

Finally, and most notably, we have developed new instruments, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Under their auspices, the vast majority of the international community has united to counter proliferation and nuclear terrorism through innovative action that takes advantage of existing legal authorities and growing cooperative relationships.

Despite that progress, much more remains to be done by the international community to prevent irresponsible states and terrorists from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. We must continue to strengthen existing tools and develop new ones. We must also recognize that proliferation is truly a global threat; no region is immune.

In countering the threats posed by WMD proliferation and potential terrorist use of these weapons, we need to employ a systematic approach of "defense in depth," which involves:

- Securing the potential sources of weapons of mass destruction

- Dismantling the facilitating networks that could supply WMD weapons to rogue states and terrorists

- Interdicting illicit transfers of dangerous weapons, materials, technology, and knowledge as they move through the avenues of global commerce: land, sea, air, and cyber-space

- Disrupting terrorist efforts to acquire WMD materials and to turn them into weapons of terror

- Strengthening our defenses against a potential WMD attack

- Deterring the use of these weapons against any of our nations

Let me now discuss briefly each of these elements.

REDUCING AND SECURING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

At the end of the Cold War, former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, materials, and expertise appeared to present the greatest proliferation threat. Through U.S. programs initially sponsored by Senators Nunn and Lugar and subsequently through partners' efforts under the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the United States, Russia, and other partners have marked major achievements in reducing former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related materials and securing those that remain. The United States and Russia are on track to meet the goals set in 2005 by Presidents Bush and Putin at Bratislava to complete security upgrades at all identified Russian nuclear warhead and fissile material facilities by the end of 2008.

Since its inception in 2002 at Kananaskis, the G-8 Global Partnership has been central to expanding and accelerating our work to reduce and prevent the proliferation of former Soviet weapons of mass

destruction, related materials, equipment, and expertise. While that work is not yet finished, the Global Partnership must now address global WMD threats. Expanding the scope of the Global Partnership to address WMD threats worldwide is among our highest nonproliferation priorities for the upcoming G-8 Summit. By expanding the scope, the G-8 will provide concrete resources for our shared objective of fighting terrorism and proliferation around the world, including our commitments under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. We hope that the G-8 leaders will explicitly expand the partnership at the July 2008 summit so that we can work together in 2009, under Italy's G-8 leadership, to attract new Global Partnership partners and resources and better coordinate our global activities.

As its name implies, the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is already very active in reducing and securing nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. GTRI has returned to Russia over 500 kilograms of Soviet-originated highly enriched uranium from vulnerable sites around the world. It has also shut down four civilian research reactors using highly enriched uranium and converted another 13 to operate on low-enriched uranium. Further, GTRI has upgraded physical security at 600 facilities in over 40 countries that contain high-risk radioactive material, containing over 9 million curies.

In addition to securing nuclear and radiological materials at their source, we are also working with other nations to improve our capability to detect and therefore better prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials through programs like the Second Line of Defense, which has put in place detectors along the southern tier of the former Soviet Union. We are also working with the Megaports and Container Security Initiatives, which put detectors at major ports. We have also deployed nuclear material detectors at ports, airfields, and land crossings in the U.S.

As an increasing number of states turn to nuclear energy in light of the growing cost of other energy sources and growing concerns about avoiding greenhouse gas emissions, we must play an active role in ensuring that states pursuing the economic and environmental benefits of peaceful nuclear energy are moving forward in a manner that does not increase proliferation risks. In 2007, Presidents Bush and Putin issued a Joint Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation that aims at assisting states to acquire safe, secure nuclear power, encouraging proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies, and presenting viable alternatives to the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. Ambassador Berdennikov has been working closely with the U.S. Special Envoy for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Ambassador Jackie Wolcott, to implement the ideas set forth in the Joint Declaration.

A key element in this effort is persuading states not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing. In this regard, the United States, Russia, other partners, and the IAEA are all working on means to ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel should there be a disruption in supply, to encourage states to choose the international fuel market in lieu of acquiring indigenous enrichment and reprocessing technologies. The United States recently signed Memoranda of Understanding with Jordan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia in which each of those governments set themselves as counter-examples to Iran by expressing their intent to choose the international market rather than pursue enrichment and reprocessing. We are also seeking to set tough criteria on enrichment and reprocessing transfers at the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

CUTTING OFF PROLIFERATION

A key requirement for the international community is to interdict proliferation shipments before they reach their intended destination. A landmark in that effort was the creation in 2003 of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). As you know, PSI is designed to be a flexible complement to formal treaties and nonproliferation regimes.

Since 2003, PSI has grown substantially, both in terms of the number of nations that participate and in the depth and sophistication of its activities. In May 2008, I was pleased to host, in Washington, D.C., a meeting of the group, which included over 90 partner-nations. A declaration was adopted that notes the developments of the last five years and reaffirms the commitment of PSI participating states to respond to new proliferation challenges. This meeting also served to share information about PSI and to revitalize states' active participation in it.

Since PSI's inception, partner-nations have successfully conducted dozens of interdictions of sensitive materials bound for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles while they were en route to countries like Iran and Syria. The interdictions were handled in a manner that is consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks. PSI nations continue to build the capacity of partners to act in a coordinated fashion. For example, PSI partners have conducted 35 exercises involving over 70 nations to improve interdiction capabilities around the world.

Much PSI activity is very quiet; successful interdictions are usually not publicized. A major exception was the October 2003 interdiction of the BBC China, which carried A. Q. Khan-supplied centrifuge components destined for Libya. That cooperation, involving the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, was an important factor leading to Libya's abandonment of its weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missile programs and to the dismantling of the A. Q. Khan proliferation network. Today, Libya has come full circle, abandoning WMD and long-range ballistic missiles as well as support for terror. In fact, Libya is now a participant in PSI.

The activities of the A. Q. Khan network also highlighted the importance of global economic, financial, and law enforcement action to counter the global sources of support for proliferation. One response was United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, requiring all member-states to criminalize proliferation by non-state actors and to adopt and enforce effective export controls. The recent renewal of Resolution 1540 for another three years, with a focus on international financial transactions, demonstrates its continued importance. With Resolutions 1718, 1737, 1747, and 1803, the Security Council also acted to deny international financing to North Korea's and Iran's WMD and missile programs.

The United States and several friends and allies have also taken firm national action to disrupt the financial flows that feed proliferation. With the adoption of Executive Order 13382 in 2005, President Bush authorized targeted financial sanctions against proliferation networks, modeled on those against terrorist networks. To date, the United States has designated 52 entities and 12 individuals under this Executive Order.

COUNTERING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Recognizing the need for a multilateral approach to countering the threat of nuclear terrorism, Presidents Bush and Putin launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in July 2006. Less than two years later, the initiative grew to include 73 partner-nations, including all 27 member-nations of the EU as well as both the IAEA and EU as observers. Member-states are committed—on a voluntary basis—to countering nuclear terrorism by building partner-nation capacity across the elements of physical protection, detection, search and confiscation, denial of safe haven, law enforcement, response, and investigation.

Just before this workshop, on June 16–18, I was in Madrid, Spain, where I led the United States delegation to the fourth meeting of Global Initiative partner-nations. Over 50 partner-nations participated. At that meeting, we discussed the program of work activities that have been conducted to date on subjects like regulation and detection of smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, law enforcement cooperation, and conversion of reactors of highly enriched uranium that can be used in a nuclear weapon to

low-enriched uranium. We also reviewed the first two exercises conducted to date under this initiative: a table-top exercise conducted by Spain simulating an RDD attack on a city and a large-scale field exercise in Kazakhstan involving over 900 troops, intelligence, law enforcement, and other officials.

Another key point that we discussed at the meeting was enhancing public and private-sector cooperation to mitigate the risk of nuclear terrorism. The private sector controls and operates the bulk of the facilities and technology for the movement of people and material around the globe. This supply chain includes airports, ports, railroads, telecommunications, banking and finance networks, and other key infrastructure that terrorists might exploit. In Madrid, we hosted a panel with private-sector and local government representatives on ways to integrate the private sector with ongoing efforts to combat nuclear terrorism through a variety of activities. Partner-nations agreed to develop additional plan-of-work activities and exercises that promote private-sector cooperation with national, state, and local governments to combat nuclear terrorism.

Looking ahead, partner-nations will expand the counterterrorism work of the Global Initiative. Morocco has done excellent work in the Global Initiative on denial of terrorist safe haven and in countering the root causes of terrorism. Partner-nations in Madrid committed to deepening participation by further integrating the counterproliferation and counterterrorism communities. Partner-nations will also strive to develop additional robust capabilities for attribution, nuclear forensics, and detection of nuclear materials.

DEFENDING AGAINST WMD PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Even as we expend maximum effort to deny irresponsible states and terrorists access to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, we must be prepared to defend ourselves should they succeed. Improved chemical and biological defenses are essential for this. Another central requirement for defending against potential WMD attack is effective missile defenses. Such defenses discourage proliferation, give us an important tool for deterring a WMD attack delivered by missile, and give us a means to defeat an attack if necessary.

The number of states possessing ballistic missiles has nearly tripled in the last three decades, from nine in 1972 to over two dozen in 2008. The presence of missile defenses undermines the ability of irresponsible states to use the threat of ballistic missile attack to coerce states and actually makes it far less likely that an adversary would ever use missiles during a conflict. We are working closely with NATO, and particularly with Poland and the Czech Republic, to augment cooperation on missile defense. We are pleased that the NATO Alliance has reached a consensus on this important issue as embodied in the communiqué from the recent NATO Summit in Bucharest, which recognized:

- The threat facing the Alliance from WMD and ballistic missiles
- That missile defenses are an important element of a broader strategy to counter this threat
- That the U.S.-led system offers substantial protection of Allies
- That the Alliance should explore options for expanding coverage for NATO member-states

NORTH KOREA AND IRAN

Lastly, let me touch on the challenges posed by North Korea and Iran. In the case of North Korea, we are pursuing implementation of agreements we reached at the Six-Party Talks, which call for North Korea to abandon all existing nuclear programs and its nuclear weapons. We have made progress through

the disabling of facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, but the tough work of verifying North Korea's declaration and its proceeding to dismantle its nuclear programs remains ahead.

In Iran, we are also pursuing diplomatic action within a group of six nations, the P5+1. This group recently made a renewed offer of incentives to Iran. We continue to urge Iran's leaders to accept this generous offer, meet the requirements of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions, and sit down to negotiate with these six countries. If Iran does not accept the proposal, we will pursue the other track of our dual-track approach and increase pressure on the regime, including through sanctions.

The possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran represents a profound threat to the security of the United States and other nations around the globe. We therefore continue to encourage nations to reevaluate their dealings with Iran. Now is not a time for business as usual. Given the stakes and the commercial risks posed by Iran's deceptive financial and trade practices, countries should carefully scrutinize their financial and other commercial dealings with Iran.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

We can take considerable pride in all we have done collectively over the past few years to combat the threats of WMD proliferation and nuclear terrorism. But pride must never mean complacency or satisfaction with the status quo. Even as we have strengthened international norms and actions against proliferation and terrorism, state and non-state proliferators have reacted with defiance and efforts to devise new proliferation pathways to replace those that we have cut off. They must not succeed.

I would like to end with words spoken by President Bush in 2002. They remain as true today as they were then, and will surely continue to remain true for the foreseeable future:

Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. . . .History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.

Chapter 18

Proliferation Threats: Thinking in Today's Context

Ambassador Robert Joseph¹

Thank you very much for the opportunity to be part of this very impressive conference. I think I am unique on the panel in the sense that today I speak as a private citizen and it may be for that reason that just before we began the panel discussion, Dr. Tegnalia asked me to summarize the various talks, including Under Secretary Rood's lunch address, and to provide a foundation for a very active discussion.

Normally, trying to summarize a series of presentations like we have had this afternoon would be mission impossible but I think that all the panelists have done such a superb job in laying out the issues concerning both the threat and the response associated with proliferation that I will be able to limit myself to five points.

THINKING OF PROLIFERATION THREATS IN TODAY'S CONTEXT

We need to think about the proliferation threats and our response to those threats in the context of the twenty-first century security environment. Three principal challenges have been emphasized in the discussions today:

The first challenge is the challenge from states who are seeking weapons of mass destruction nuclear, chemical, biological and the means of delivering, including ballistic missiles. These include Iran and North Korea, other names, such as Syria, have been mentioned in our discussion. This is not an exhaustive list.

The second challenge comes from non-state actors. There has been an emphasis on terrorists who are seeking weapons of mass destruction, not to use them as weapons of last resort as we used to think about them during the Cold War, but actually to use them as weapons of choice against civilian populations. The other side of the non-state actor challenge that has been mentioned is the supply networks and standing out in that context is A. Q. Khan. With his associates, A. Q. Khan provided non-stop shopping for not just enrichment, not just the blue prints and the centrifuges for enrich-

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ment but also the warhead design, something that I think you have all been reading about most recently in the news.

The third challenge is the need to ensure that the expansion of nuclear energy is done in a way that reduces the risks of proliferation and specifically the need to discourage—we hope stop—the spread of sensitive technologies associated with enrichment and reprocessing. These challenges of course are all unrelated. I personally believe that if we fail with North Korea, if we fail with Iran, we are much more likely to have that cascade of proliferation that will stem from the expansion of nuclear energy around the globe and the access to sensitive materials in the context of nuclear terrorism will also grow.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Each of these major proliferation challenges requires a comprehensive approach.

For the first two, for states and non-state threats, we need to build what has been called the defense-in-depth or layered defense against the proliferation threat and this begins of course with *prevention*, eliminating materials, securing materials, interdicting materials to ensure that proliferant states or terrorists do not gain access to these capabilities.

But we know that we are not going to be one hundred percent successful in prevention. We know that from our experience. So we need a second layer of defense and that second layer of defense is *protection*. We need to protect against the threat and here we need new capabilities again for the 21st century. We have talked a lot about missile defense in that context, not a missile defense that would threaten Russia but a missile defense that would be sized appropriately against Iran or North Korea, the type of missile defense that the United States and our allies here in Europe as well as our allies in Asia are building.

We also have talked about some of the capabilities that we require for biological and chemical threats including better detection and medical counter-measures. We also need new capabilities for the 21st century for nuclear terrorism. Here we need to emphasize the capability to detect the movement of nuclear materials or nuclear weapons, the ability to provide for forensic capabilities that will give us the ability to attribute where those materials may have come from. All of these, I think, play into both deterrence and defense aspects of this second part of our comprehensive or layered defense.

And the third part has been referred to as response or consequence management, a critical capability that is being addressed by the Alliance.

As for the comprehensive approach needed for the third challenge, challenge from the spread of nuclear energy, shaping the future of nuclear energy in a way that is less likely to contribute to proliferation has been described by Ambassador Berdennikov and John Rood earlier and I will not comment any longer on that.

USING ALL THE TOOLS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POWER

In our comprehensive approach, we need to employ all of the tools of national and international power and statecraft:

Diplomacy both bilateral and multilateral;

The economic or financial tools that we have talked about—this runs from everything from sanctions to the disruption of proliferation transactions in the international financial market;

Intelligence—Intelligence is a consistent theme that we have heard from our speakers. In the context of Intelligence, we have had some spectacular successes and I would put Libya and the unraveling of the A. Q. Khan network in that category. We have also had some in my view again as a private citizen, some spectacular failures and Iraq WMD stands out in that regard. We need to learn from these experiences—both the successes and the failures. We need to improve our ability to collect and to analyze Intelligence, and to share Intelligence in appropriate channels. We must maximize the use of Intelligence and minimize the factors that would weaken our ability to understand and act on the threat.

We also need to use our scientific and technical tools: We have talked about that in terms of detection and attribution and some of the new capabilities that we need for this new century.

And we also need to take into account and this has not been raised, the need for a strong, credible, safe, and reliable nuclear deterrent. Extended deterrence is a major non-proliferation tool that if undermined, could very much lead to additional proliferation in a number of regions including Northeast Asia and in the Gulf, two regions that are vitally important to all of us.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

International cooperation is key despite the prevailing caricature of the Bush administration. We have heard time and time again from these presenters about new initiatives that have been undertaken:

In 2002, the Global Initiative of the G8 to provide more funding, billions of dollars more, for non-proliferation assistance programs, the non-Lugar type programs.

In 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an important tool mentioned by a number of speakers.

In 2004, U.N. Resolution 1540, which also came from the Bush administration and was supported by Russia as well and by other states.

In 2006, the U.S. and Russia got together on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

There was reference made to last year's statement of the two presidents in July, again shaping the future of nuclear energy, trying to encourage countries to forego the option of enrichment and reprocessing, forego the sensitive technologies that are associated with proliferation in exchange for a very attractive deal, in exchange for fuel assurances, in exchange for resolving some of the very difficult issues associated with the back end of the fuel cycle. It is a very innovative approach that will rely not just on the U.S. and Russia, but on all of the suppliers and the beneficiaries as well.

So there are a number of very important initiatives out there.

THE DEMONSTRATION OF POLITICAL RESOLVE

The last point I would make is that no matter how innovative we may be, no matter how good our capabilities may be, we will not succeed without resolve, and especially the demonstration of political resolve over time. And here I would state that we need to demonstrate resolve with countries like Iran. Iran is an incredibly complex problem, but I think we know what we need to do with regard to Iran. The problem is that we have a series of very difficult choices—there is no easy choice. Every choice that is out there for dealing with Iran in an effective way entails costs but we must be willing to pay those costs.

And finally just a note on Russia given that it has come up in discussions both yesterday and today. In my view, which I am sure we all share, we need to ensure that there is mutual respect in our relationship

with Russia. We need to build on opportunities with Russia: the Global Initiative and the Nuclear Energy Initiative are two cases in point of where our interests coincide. But we also need to deal with Russia with a sense of resolve, resolve in the context of a commitment to our principles: our principles of democracy, of human rights, of national sovereignty, and of territorial integrity. We cannot move away from a principled position and enforce that position with resolve.

Chapter 19

The Need for New Approaches: Some Informal Proposals

Ambassador-at-Large Grigory V. Berdennikov¹

OPENING REMARKS

Other speakers have touched upon the emergence of non-state actors on the weapons proliferation scene. Another challenge is the fact that the development of nuclear energy, its renaissance, may cause serious proliferation of nuclear technologies and materials.

In my view, given the very rapid rise of oil prices, more countries in the near term will opt to develop nuclear energy, an undertaking that is becoming more and more competitive. In principle, this is a welcome development, and, if managed properly, could be a blessing for mankind. But one should not forget that the edge between the peaceful uses of nuclear power and its military grade is very thin. For example, the same technological process for uranium enrichment is necessary for the production of nuclear fuel (if you wish to stop at 4 % of enrichment) and produces a nuclear explosive (if you continue to enrich it to 90%). The same is true for the technologies that reprocess spent nuclear fuel, which could lead to the separation of plutonium.

The problem of sensitive nuclear technologies is compounded by the fact that they are perfectly legal under the existing nonproliferation norms, provided they are used for peaceful purposes and are under the IAEA safeguards. But it is clear that if the sensitive technologies appear in additional countries, the stability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime could be undermined.

THE NEED FOR NEW APPROACHES

For us in Russia, it is also clear that we need new and innovative approaches to help resolve this dilemma. The former Russian president Vladimir Putin proposed some new approaches:

In 2000, he proposed trying to develop new reactors that would be proliferation safe, i.e., that would not produce spent fuel from which plutonium could be separated. Of course, such reactors should be competitive and should answer the economic, environmental, and other needs of states. We are glad that this initiative was taken seriously by the world community, and for a number of years a

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growing group of countries has been working within the IAEA on its implementation under the INPRO project.

In January 2006 President Putin put forward another idea that deals with the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, that is, the enrichment process. He proposed an initiative to develop the Global Nuclear Infrastructure, including the establishment of an international uranium enrichment center in the Russian Federation as a pilot project, and invited interested countries to join the center, which is situated in Angarsk in Siberia and was established by Russia and Kazakhstan.

Now Armenia is finishing procedures to join the center. The center is a joint-stock company based on a Russian enrichment facility, and the stock's owners own its product—low-enriched uranium (LEU). The enrichment technology is solely under Russian control. With such a scheme, non-nuclear-weapon states—the stock's owners in the company—are assured of a supply of enriched uranium for their nuclear power plants. At the same time, they have all rights to the profits that are earned as a result of the center's operation, in proportion to the stock they own. The door to join the center is not closed, and we welcome other non-nuclear-weapon states to join it. The government of the Russian Federation has decided to include the Joint Stock Company International Uranium Enrichment Center (JSC IUEC) in the framework of the Safeguards Agreement between the Russian Federation and the IAEA.

Another idea that we are actively working on and that flows from the idea of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle is the creation of a guaranteed physical stock of low-enriched uranium to be provided in cases in which states, for political reasons, can not obtain required uranium in the open market. We plan to create such a guaranteed physical stock totaling approximately two full loads of fuel for a 1000 MW reactor. Such stock would be kept at the Angarsk facility and would be delivered into the custody of the IAEA at the request of the DG, and then transferred to the state having difficulty, for reasons that are neither economic nor technical, obtaining fuel on the open market for its nuclear power plants. The idea is to remove the political element from the fuel supply chain and to base supply purely on market and nonproliferation criteria. That means that the guaranteed stock would be available not free of charge but at a current market price and that, in order to be sure of its supply, the receiving state would faithfully fulfill its nonproliferation obligations.

We think we should not require an official pledge from receiving states to not develop or possess sensitive enrichment technologies. Such a requirement, which goes beyond existing nonproliferation norms, in our view would only create a political obstacle for the implementation of the scheme. Instead, we hope that economic forces will compel receivers not to undertake highly expensive enrichment provided they are guaranteed that there will be no political breakdown of the fuel supply.

We are now trying to come to an agreement with the IAEA on how the scheme would work in practical terms, for example, which states could receive LEU from the guaranteed stock, how and when title transfer would be implemented, who would pay for transportation, and how the price for the LEU would be determined. This has not turned out to be an easy negotiating process, but we still hope it will be successful. We understand that we may have to first address the IAEA General Conference so that all the IAEA members can agree on the general principles of how the guaranteed physical stocks will be established and will function. Given the high level of apprehension among developing countries, this might take some time.

DEVELOPING THE 3 JULY 2007 U.S.-RUSSIA INITIATIVE

Another initiative that I would like to draw your attention to is the statement by the Russian and U.S. presidents that was made on July 3, 2007, on the development of nuclear energy and nonproliferation. We hope that this statement will help to create more possibilities in this period of nuclear renaissance for

working together worldwide, including with other nuclear-supplier countries. Practical work based on this statement will be greatly facilitated when the bilateral U.S.-Russia agreement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy goes into force. In our view the synergy of working together in this area could be very beneficial to everybody and to the nonproliferation regime.

Russia could bring to such a joint effort elements that are not often found elsewhere.

Our standing policy of building reactors abroad includes an offer to repatriate spent fuel.

We can offer financing for such projects.

We can provide nuclear fuel for the lifetime of the plant.

In our view, the area in which joint efforts are most needed is reflected in the July 3 statement, which speaks to making available safe and proliferation-resistant energy and research reactors adequate for the energy needs of developing and developed countries. It is a fact today that many countries would like to have reactors with medium and smaller power capacity, though 1000 MW reactors are now predominantly available. So we think it would be a good idea to make a joint effort to offer what customers really want. Such an effort would, of course, be a long-term one.

Chapter 20

WMD Proliferation: The Three Pillars of Prevention

Mr. Joseph A. Benkert¹

Let me begin by saying a few words about the threats, about how we are seeking to prevent the proliferation of these threats, and, in particular, the acquisition of WMD by terrorists in today's dynamic and changing environment. I want particularly to emphasize the importance of what we do in partnership with other nations. I assume that we agree that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses an enduring threat to our common peace and stability, that terrorist organizations seek to acquire and use WMD, and that there are a number of avenues terrorists can pursue.

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS THREAT

Chemical weapons (CW) can kill large numbers of people and cause economic dislocation, although the effects of these weapons are relatively easier to mitigate than those of other types of WMD. Terrorists can acquire CW from states, either directly or through networks of facilitators. They can also produce CW or use available toxic industrial chemicals in improvised CW devices. The Aum Shinrikiyo attacks in the Japanese subway several years ago and the insurgent use of industrial chlorine in improvised devices in attacks in Iraq today are cases in point. Chemical weapons can be a serious threat in the hands of terrorists, but they are also the weapons we have the most experience dealing with.

THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT

There is pretty broad consensus that biological and nuclear-related threats can cause the most harm and are the focus of concern. Biological weapons (BW) can conceivably cause more deaths than CW and have more lasting economic and social effects. Capable terrorists can produce BW in labs. More likely, however, terrorists acquire BW from states, either with their cooperation or from unsecured biological sources. BW are a concern because of the range of naturally occurring and man-made pathogens and the large number of places where they might be acquired or weaponized.

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THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THREAT

Nuclear weapons are difficult and expensive to develop, but would have grave and possibly spectacular consequences. A terrorist group might steal or be given a nuclear weapon, or such a group could acquire special nuclear material—HEU, plutonium—and build an improvised nuclear device. Finally, a terrorist could build a radiation dispersion device—an RDD, or a so-called dirty bomb—that uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive materials.

The risk of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon or material is a serious one. In the 1990s, there was a great deal of worry about “loose nukes” in former Soviet states. This is relatively less of a concern today for several reasons, including one that I will mention shortly. Today, we worry more about irresponsible states acquiring and supplying nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to proxy terrorists, a nuclear weapons state becoming destabilized and losing control of its nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists, and terrorists acquiring nuclear materials through networks of facilitators.

THE THREE PILLARS OF PREVENTION

What is to be done about these threats? The strategy for dealing with enemies who may not respond to traditional tools of deterrence requires that we build partnerships with nations who share our concerns about WMD terrorism. Building partnerships and partner capabilities to counter the threat posed by WMD terrorism is not optional. We, the United States, don’t have the resources to do it alone, and we won’t succeed if we try. Let me mention briefly three pillars for preventing WMD proliferation where partnerships matter greatly.

Dealing with the Sources of WMD

One pillar is preventing terrorists, and those who might facilitate their work, from getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction or WMD material by dealing with the sources of WMD. This includes supporting a range of multilateral nonproliferation regimes including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. It also includes national and international export control regimes such as Wassenaar. In addition it includes taking action in support of U.N. Security Council resolutions. It also includes bilateral and multilateral programs to help partner governments improve controls over weapons materials and expertise.

One example of such programs is the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR). CTR’s original and continuing focus has been securing or eliminating WMD at its source—particularly nuclear weapons and materials and chemical weapons in Russia and the other former Soviet states. But as we continue to make progress in securing nuclear materials, the focus of the CTR program, which has been successful, is shifting. We are increasingly focused on the threat posed by biological programs. CTR’s biological weapons threat reduction programs in several former Soviet Union states are doing two things: First, they are securing biological materials in central reference laboratories and improving accountability; and, second, they are developing threat agent detection and reporting systems. One particularly fruitful area of cooperation is exploiting the nexus between our biological program and public health, particularly in the area of disease surveillance.

The U.S. Congress last year approved expansion of the CTR program outside the states of the former Soviet Union. We are now evaluating options to make it a more nimble, global tool in the fight against WMD threats—nuclear, biological, and chemical. Our focus is also on moving CTR from an assistance program to a program of partnership and collaboration.

Stopping WMD in Transit

The second pillar is stopping WMD—and the materials necessary to create them—in transit. Interdiction is an essential component in our efforts to counter the proliferation activities of both suppliers, customers, and facilitators. Perhaps the most visible partnership interdiction activity is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). More than 90 countries on 6 continents have expressed their support for PSI's principles and participate in its discussions and exercises. Such exercises have helped improve cooperation among member-nations and processes for decision making regarding interdictions, an area in which we have made the most progress. But much remains to be done. We have not really addressed the air aspect of interdiction at all, and land border interdiction hasn't progressed much beyond portal monitoring. Even in the maritime area, where much work has been focused, we have much to do.

What we need to remember about stopping WMD on the move—interdiction in particular—is that the goal is rarely sinking the bad guys' ship or shooting down their plane. The goal of our interdiction policy is a systemic one—the goal is to raise the costs of proliferation that would-be proliferators must bear. If we achieve this, we can modulate proliferators' behavior and change the way they do business. We get there by applying pressure where we can, when we can, and by keeping it on.

Improving Intelligence

A third pillar in preventing WMD proliferation is intelligence. Interdiction, for example, is critically dependent on good intelligence. We need to cooperate on achieving a much better understanding of the networks that contribute to proliferation. Will criminal networks smuggling contraband be used to move WMD materials? Will the proceeds from drug trafficking fund WMD terrorism?

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I would like to note that preventing WMD proliferation is only part of what we need to do. We need to deter WMD use; defend our populations; prepare security forces to operate in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments; and mitigate WMD attacks, which other speakers will address.

I am going to conclude here now. But in our discussion, I will be pleased to talk with you about the role technology can play in detecting WMD, the use of off-the-shelf technologies to monitor and predict trafficking behavior, or any of the many bilateral or multilateral programs and initiatives geared to preventing the proliferation of the WMD. The work of NATO'S Senior Defense Group on Proliferation is but one such effort designed to build partner capability and keep the pressure on.

Chapter 21

WMD Proliferation—Threats and Response

Mr. Peter C.W. Flory¹

It is an honour to be here today to talk about NATO's response to WMD proliferation, and in particular, NATO's policy on missile defence as an element of the Alliance's overall strategy to counter WMD.

When Metternich was informed that his longtime rival, the wily French diplomat Talleyrand, had died, he is said to have remarked, "I wonder what he meant by that?" At April's Bucharest Summit, NATO leaders agreed on what I consider a balanced, realistic, and forward-looking statement on missile defense. I would like to organize my remarks around that statement and tell you a little bit about what NATO meant by that. In particular, I will try to give you some insight into the debates, discussions and considerations that led up to the Bucharest Declaration.

I think this context on how NATO arrived at that statement is important. When negotiations between the U.S., Poland and the Czech Republic on extending the protection of the U.S. missile defence system to European allies were first announced in January 2007, missile defence had not been on the agenda of most European governments or security experts since the end of the Cold War. Technical work on missile defence had continued at NATO and among experts in national capitals and industry. But at least at the beginning, the political debate in Europe that began last January had a pronounced Cold War era-tone and flavor helped, if that is the right word, by some very Cold Warlike statements from Russia. By the time we got to Bucharest, however, the debate had moved on in a very constructive manner and laid the groundwork for our statement in Bucharest and for our subsequent work.

The first element of the Bucharest statement was:

"Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations."

As the details of that assessment are classified, I cannot go into them here. What is important is that the 26 members of the Alliance looked at the intelligence on WMD and missile programs in Iran, North Korea and elsewhere, including Iran's nuclear program and its ambitious missile testing over the past few

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years, and concluded that these programs pose an increasing threat to the Alliance. This echoed NATO's findings at the Riga and Prague Summits.

While no one can predict with confidence the exact pace of Iran's missile and nuclear developments, there is an awareness among Allies that current trends are bringing more and more of NATO territory into missile range of Iran. There is also an appreciation of the fact that developing a NATO system to defend NATO territory against ballistic missiles, if the Alliance decides to do so, will take time, so delaying decisions until we have perfect clarity on the threat would involve risks.

I think the Bucharest Declaration also reflects an awareness that in addition to specific programs in specific countries of concern, there is also, at a more general level, a growing nexus or potential nexus between (1) the spread of dangerous capabilities, specifically ballistic missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and technologies, (2) political instability, and (3) extremist ideologies, in areas of importance to NATO and NATO members, that could pose a threat to the security of the Alliance. This approach is sometimes described as a "capability-based approach," focusing not only on identified threats, but on the broader question of how an adversary—any adversary—might fight, and what capabilities might be needed to counter such threats.

After noting the increasing threat, the Bucharest Declaration goes on to say:

"Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat."

One of the questions many governments asked themselves, after the U.S. proposal put missile defence back on the agenda in NATO, was, where does missile defence fit into the spectrum of traditional measures for combating the spread of missiles and WMD? For example, should it be addressed by diplomacy, arms control, non-proliferation regimes, and traditional military deterrence? For some, the question was, will missile defence undermine or weaken these traditional tools?

The answer NATO came up with was to recognize that missile defence is part of a broad, layered defence along with all the mechanisms I just mentioned. Most nations, of course, simply do not have the desire to possess dangerous, destabilizing weapons. In other cases, existing treaty and political norms, together with vigorous non-proliferation policies and diplomacy, have helped shape the balance of incentives so nations have abandoned the pursuit or possession of these weapons—for example Kazakhstan and Ukraine, South Africa, and Libya.

But these mechanisms have been unable to prevent some nations from defying the rules and norms. Not every nation agrees to be bound by treaties and agreements, and some of those that do, cheat. And it doesn't take a large number of nations like this to create a threat to others.

In this context, Alliance leaders concluded that missile defence could support traditional arms control and non-proliferation measures. In particular, by devaluing ballistic missile capabilities, missile defence can over time reduce the incentive to develop missiles in the first place.

Another consideration was the impact of missile defence on traditional deterrence. Here there is no doubt that traditional military deterrence will continue to play a vital role. But there is a growing concern that, in an era of dictatorial and/or extremist regimes that may not share our values or assumptions—and especially after September 11 redefined the limits of what might be considered "unthinkable"—traditional deterrence, while necessary, may no longer be sufficient. NATO nations also understand that some countries pursue ballistic missiles and WMD precisely because these can furnish an asymmetric means to counter traditional military strengths and deterrence.

Another element in this discussion was the potential value of defensive options in deterring or countering threats, for example, in the case of a rogue regime willing to launch an attack against an Alliance member, then use its own population as a shield to prevent a military response.

The impact of the proposed U.S. European Site was of course a critical element in our discussions. Thus the Bucharest communiqué continues,

“We therefore recognize the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets.”

When NATO Defence Ministers met in June 2007, they asked us the NATO staff to assess the implications for NATO of the planned U.S. missile defence system elements in Europe. This analysis covered issues such as, how much coverage and protection would the proposed U.S. site provide for NATO territory, and what would be the implications of the U.S. system for NATO’s ongoing work on territorial missile defence?

We did an extensive analysis and, on the first question, reached the conclusion I just cited: the European Site would provide a “substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles.”

As to the second issue, I probably need to review for you what NATO was already doing on territorial missile defence. (I will talk about NATO’s work on theatre missile defence shortly.)

As many of you are aware, at the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO leaders asked the NATO organization to examine options to address the “growing Ballistic Missile threat to Alliance territory, forces and population centres.” This led to the Missile Defence Feasibility Study, which was completed and approved in 2006. It concluded that missile defence for NATO territory was technically feasible within the assumptions and limitations of the study.

But this study did not include the U.S. missile defence system in Alaska, and it did not, of course, include the proposed Third Site. So we had to consider, how does the proposed U.S. European site change the results of the MDFS? Not surprisingly, the U.S. system has a substantial impact on the MDFS analysis, since the amount of NATO territory that a NATO system would have to protect would be substantially smaller than without the U.S. system.

On the relationship between the U.S. European site and NATO’s ongoing work, the Bucharest declaration went on to say:

“We are exploring ways to link this US capability with current NATO missile defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture.”

Here I need to give you a little more history on what we mean by “current NATO missile defence efforts.” NATO has been thinking and working since the 1990s on theatre missile defence for deployed forces (as distinct from the analysis of defense of NATO territory I just described). This work has its roots in the 1991 Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein used Scud missiles to attack military targets in Saudi Arabia—as well as using extended-range Scuds against Israel in a strategic gambit to bring Israel into the war.

This work culminated in an Alliance decision, following the Istanbul Summit in 2004, to develop the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence program, better known as ALTBMD, to protect deployed NATO forces against missiles with ranges of up to 3,000 kilometres. Through the ALTBMD program, NATO is developing a command and control backbone that will link sensors and interceptors to be provided by nations. We are expecting this system to achieve an initial capability in 2010-2011.

Based on the above findings, Allied leaders in Bucharest decided:

“... [b]earing in mind the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity, [to] task the Council in Permanent Session to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all

Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system for review at our 2009 Summit, to inform any future political decision.”

Here the language is pretty clear. In fact, the Conference of National Armaments Directors (or CNAD) had already prepared, in preparation for Bucharest, an initial technical report on architecture options for a NATO missile defence system, building on the proposed U.S. system, to provide coverage for those areas not protected by the U.S. system. The CNAD, which I chair, is working now to refine those options and to complete additional analysis that the nations have asked us to undertake in preparation for the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit. Specifically, we will look at or continue our work on debris issues, defence against shorter range missiles, including the potential threat of missiles in the hands of non-state actors, technical questions relating to C2 information exchange, and the performance of national missile defence systems in providing comprehensive coverage of NATO territory and population centres. This work will provide the capability options for the political-military deliberations leading up to discussions and possible decisions at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit next April.

At Bucharest, we also addressed the question of Russia, and Russia’s response to the proposed U.S. European site and the possible linkage of NATO and U.S. missile defence systems.

“We also commend the work already underway to strengthen NATO-Russia missile defence cooperation. We are committed to maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence building measures to allay any concerns.”

Our approach to Russia is an important part of our overall approach to missile defence, and I want to be clear, NATO wants to work with Russia to address Russia’s reasonable concerns. To that end, we have held a number of meetings of the NATO–Russia Council to discuss the issue of the U.S. site and territorial missile defence for NATO, including detailed briefings by the U.S. on its missile defence system and the proposed European site.

At the same time, Russia does not have a veto on Alliance decisions. And Russia has not, frankly, helped its cause by threatening Alliance members, or offering implausible arguments as to why Europe should not have the option of being defended against ballistic missiles – something Russian leaders have themselves enjoyed for more than three decades. For example, it doesn’t take an Einstein, as the Secretary General has said, to recognize that what the U.S. is proposing does not threaten Russia’s strategic deterrent forces.

Meanwhile, on the practical level, NATO is working with Russia to develop interoperability between NATO and Russian theatre ballistic missile defence systems and operators who might be deployed in adjacent areas of responsibility in a future crisis response operation. This work is generally going well. Most recently, this January we had a successful computer assisted exercise in Munich. On the other hand, Russian officials have been clear that Russia will break off this cooperation if NATO joins the U.S. in a missile defence system.

Finally, Alliance leaders joined in encouraging

“the Russian Federation to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals” [and expressing readiness] “to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.”

I think these statements show how serious we are, in NATO, in seeking to work with Russia to address Russia’s reasonable concerns, and potentially, to consider the linkage of U.S., NATO and Russian missile defence systems. It also shows that Allies recognize and support the efforts the U.S. has made in offering Russia options for missile defence cooperation.

In closing, as you have seen, the work we are doing on missile defense is a new chapter in NATO's almost 60-year mission of collective defense. As Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer said in Prague in May,

“the image of NATO as a mere fire brigade is too narrow. Yes, we must remain capable of responding to imminent threats. But we must also look ahead—we must scan the strategic horizon for potential new challenges, and we must develop common approaches to deal with them—making sure we take into account the time needed to develop those solutions.”

Chapter 22

The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction—What Are The Real Threats and How Should We Respond?

Ambassador Jiri Šedivý¹

One could argue that NATO's concerns about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are not new and that its response to this threat has been high on the Allies' political and military agendas since the days of the Cold War. However, it is also true that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and since the early 1990s, NATO's attention and concerns have shifted and broadened, and that in the last decade we have become increasingly concerned with the consequences of secondary proliferation and by the risk of use of such weapons by nonstate actors.

NATO'S RESPONSES TO THE THREAT OF WMD

One of NATO's first structural responses to these threats was initiated by the 1994 Alliance Policy Framework on WMD proliferation. This document stated that the principal nonproliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. At the same time we also recognized that political and diplomatic efforts may not always be successful and that we therefore also need a strong defense posture to protect ourselves and to respond to the possible threat or use of weapons of mass destruction. This dual approach that relies on both political and defense efforts has remained unchanged since, and I would argue for good reason, because it continues to be a solid basis for our future work.

The Alliance's Strategic Concept, adopted at the Washington Summit in April 1999, recognized "that proliferation can occur despite efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces." At that summit, we launched the WMD Initiative to respond to the risks posed by the spread of WMD and their means of delivery. As part of this initiative we further increased intelligence and information sharing among Allies, strengthened our common understanding of the risks and challenges facing us, and increased the ability of our forces to operate in WMD environments.

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NEW GLOBAL INITIATIVES

Looking beyond NATO's agenda and record, we note that a number of new initiatives have been launched and developed in recent years; for example, the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and the different Joint Actions of the Council of the European Union. Existing international instruments have also been strengthened. We have witnessed the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, efforts to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the entry into force and the move towards universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the OPCW, Ambassador Pfirter's organization, as well as the U.N. Security Council have been efficiently and relentlessly fulfilling their nonproliferation mission with a number of resolutions in recent years.

What the last decade tells us is this: There is no single solution to the proliferation challenge; no one has a single, ideal answer; and the proliferation threat is best met with the coordinated actions of the broader international community, combining the efforts of nations, international governmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations and encouraging the active participation of industry.

NATO for its part has developed a good working relationship with all of the above-mentioned institutions. Recently we undertook a number of activities related to Resolution 1540², we continue to support the implementation of the PSI, and we continue to follow closely the development of all other initiatives and nonproliferation regimes. Thus NATO is part of a growing global consensus that views proliferation of WMD as unacceptable in today's civilized society. We are indeed part of an ever-growing "network of networks" creating a web of denial and, we hope, stopping and rolling back illicit proliferation activities.

NATO PARTNERSHIPS AND OUTREACH ACTIVITIES

One of NATO's greatest assets in the present security environment is the different partnerships and close relationships that our organization maintains with many countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and Gulf regions, and around the globe. We have already put this asset to very good use in the field of nonproliferation. In fact, one of NATO's largest outreach activities is the Seminar on Proliferation Issues, which enjoys the high-level participation of more than 65 countries from 5 continents and a number of international organizations. This is an informal annual conference that started in Rome in 2004 and whose next session will be held in Berlin on November 13 and 14, 2008.

Another international activity, which we organized for the first time in 2008, is the CBRN Defense Table-Top Exercise, which gathered professionals from NATO and partner countries across the globe to exchange practical expertise in this field and discuss the possibilities for cooperation and mutual assistance. In the field of CBRN defense you certainly know that NATO launched five initiatives that were endorsed in 2002 at our summit, held in my hometown of Prague. Some of these initiatives formed the core of the CBRN Defense Battalion, which in 2007 was renamed Combined Joint CBRN Defense Task Force. These initiatives are largely implemented by NATO's military authorities, but organizational and

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For example, in 2007 the chairman of the 1540 Committee spoke in the Senior Political Committee and ASG/PASP returned in a visit to New York in December. A workshop on the implementation of the resolution was organized in Croatia on June 5 and 6, 2008.

political support is also provided by the WMD Center, which was established in 2000 and is one of the larger departments within my division.

We should also not forget an important contribution by NATO to the fight against terrorism—Operation Active Endeavor, the Alliance’s maritime operation in the Mediterranean. We are currently reviewing the deployment of CBRN/WMD detection capabilities onboard vessels participating in this operation, which will improve NATO’s maritime interdiction capability. We also watch with interest the related developments within the United Nations Law of the Sea’s WMD Interdiction–related protocols.

Although I am not aiming to make a complete account of NATO’s activities, I cannot omit our contribution to education and training in this field. We recently established a Center of Excellence in the Czech Republic that is especially devoted to the issues of CBRN defense. Interested national authorities may directly contact this center, which is situated in Vyškov. In addition, the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, and the NATO Defense College in Rome provide regular training on WMD issues and include partner nations in many of their courses.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The main message I want to pass on today is that we need to meet the proliferation threat with a joint and firm response from the entire international community. International organizations, backed by the unconditional support of all our countries, must continue to work together, possibly even more closely in the future, to attain our primary goal: preventing proliferation from happening or reversing it as early, rapidly, and effectively as possible.

Chapter 23

The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction—What Are The Real Threats and How Should We Respond?

Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter¹

OPENING REMARKS

It is a great pleasure to have once again the opportunity to address the International Workshop on Global Security. This annual event provides an important forum for debating issues that are of relevance to our contemporary security environment. I am sure that, as in the past, the results of the debate will contribute to bringing forward our common thinking on the possible solutions to the continuously evolving threats and challenges that the international community presently faces.

I am also particularly grateful to Minister Ignazio La Russa, the Minister of Defense of Italy, for supporting this meeting. His support bears testimony to his country's continued commitment to promoting a more peaceful and stable world, including as a reliable partner of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as it promotes the goals enshrined in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). As a tool that aims to eliminate forever the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, the convention represents a key instrument in the framework of the international community's efforts towards addressing the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

THE URGENT NEED TO IMPLEMENT THE CWC

Especially in the context of the current global challenges that arise from the possible misuse of dangerous materials for terrorist purposes, the threat of chemical terrorism cannot be underestimated. The ease of access to dual-use chemicals, and the readily available knowledge of the technologies required to manufacture chemical weapons, make them a potential instrument of choice for terrorists. At the same time, as much as the chemical industry is a core industry in our contemporary world, one whose products sustain modern life and progress, we have to make sure that advances in this area are exclusively used for the benefit of mankind and never diverted to cause unspeakable suffering.

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Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter is Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The full and effective implementation of the CWC represents an effective as well as an urgent response to these challenges. The convention aims to achieve complete chemical disarmament and to ensure that chemistry is solely used and developed for the benefit of mankind. It sets up a comprehensive and universal regime without gaps, exceptions, or strategic reservations. The strength of the convention lies in the fact that all of the state-parties' rights and obligations are granted and applied equally as much as it rests on the establishment of a stringent international verification mechanism aimed to promote compliance and confidence-building among its parties.

The creation of an effective and reliable global verification system that operates in a nondiscriminatory and multilateral manner provides assurances on both the disarmament process and the legitimate chemical industry activities that are of direct relevance to the nonproliferation of chemical weapons. The crucial goals of disarmament and nonproliferation are complemented, under the convention, by the objectives set out in Articles X and XI of the convention, which give state-parties the right to receive assistance and protection against chemical weapons and to foster international cooperation in the field of peaceful chemical activities by the state-parties.

OPCW PROGRESS

Today, we have come a long way towards realizing our mandate under the convention. Whereas in other areas of disarmament disagreement and lack of political will are hindering the delicate process of eliminating the most inhumane means of destruction ever conceived, the OPCW is progressing steadily towards realizing the vision of a world free from one of them—chemical weapons.

One hundred and eighty-four states are presently parties to the convention. Such general acceptance by a large majority of the international community is evidence of the collective and firm resolve to achieve the elimination of all chemical weapons from our world and of the importance that states attach to this crucial disarmament and nonproliferation treaty. The disarmament agenda is making important progress, with about 28,500 metric tons, or over 40% of the 71,000 metric tons of declared chemical weapons agents already destroyed, and with all chemical weapons production facilities deactivated.

The OPCW systematically verifies the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and the destruction or conversion for peaceful purposes of former chemical weapons production facilities. At the same time, a system of industry verification through data monitoring and on-site inspections that provides additional assurances of nonproliferation has been set up under Article VI of the convention. Since its entry into force, OPCW inspection teams have carried out more than 3,300 inspections at approximately 1,250 military and industrial sites in over 80 countries.

As an organization, the OPCW promotes a philosophy of dialogue, compromise, and confidence-building among its members. This allows true multilateralism to nourish the intergovernmental process in our policy-making organs. Last April, the organization went through a successful exercise of diplomacy, the second of its kind in its relatively brief history. At the Second Special Session of the state-parties conference to review the operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, our member-states reached consensus on a number of issues of key importance to the future of the convention and that are crucial for realizing a world that will be forever free of the threat of chemical weapons.

BECOMING A NONPROLIFERATION ORGANIZATION

One of the areas on which the conference concentrated its attention is the consideration that, as we approach the completion of the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles, the OPCW will gradually shift its emphasis from being mainly a disarmament body to being primarily a nonproliferation organization. While continuing to implement effectively its regular verification program, the organiza-

tion will also dedicate particular attention to preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons; keeping abreast with developments in science, technology, and industry that might affect the convention; and ensuring the effective implementation of the regime relating to the transfer of chemicals. It will be important for the Secretariat and the OPCW as a whole to be ready for this new stage in the life of the organization.

In regard to industry verification, it will be crucial to continue developing the regime in a way that balances the underlying risks while ensuring adequate levels of verification of all chemical facilities that can be inspected. In particular, there is justifiable concern about the adequacy of the present level of inspections at a specific category of facilities—what we refer to as Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs)—which, because of their technological characteristics, could be easily and quickly reconfigured for the production of chemical weapons.

One additional challenge that we face in implementing the verification regime set up in the convention is keeping abreast of advances in science and technology, where progress has given us unprecedented prosperity and opportunities for the economic growth of all nations. Yet when misused, the same knowledge can become a cause of unimaginable destruction and misery. It is greatly important that we study new developments in science and technology to help us understand what they mean for this convention and regarding their implementation.

We expect these matters to receive close attention from state-parties, especially through their support of the work of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board and its temporary working groups. The continuing cooperation of scientists and chemists worldwide, as well as of the chemical industry, is also vital to our success, including in terms of spreading among those communities a culture of responsibility as a key tool for ensuring that progress in chemistry is used exclusively for the benefit of mankind. In this important area, the OPCW is working with the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) with a view to finalize specific codes of conduct. As I mentioned earlier, our contemporary security challenges include the need for greater cooperation to combat international terrorism.

In the area of chemical weapons, the deadly consequences of their use has unfortunately been demonstrated in practice on more than one occasion. We are all well aware that toxic chemical compounds can be acquired throughout the world. The know-how for producing simple chemical weapons is widely available, as recent instances in Iraq in which chlorine was used in terrorist attacks have tragically shown.

Without in any way departing from its specific mandate and competencies, because it has unique technical expertise and a model way of supporting state-parties in their implementation needs, the OPCW can significantly contribute, especially within the United Nations Security Council's action under Resolution 1540. This resolution imposes an obligation on all U.N. member-states to adopt a series of concrete legal and administrative measures to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. Regarding chemical weapons, the requirements of Resolution 1540 coincide with the obligations enshrined in the convention.

For its part, the convention requires that all state-parties put in place legal mechanisms that would deny access to chemical weapons and toxic chemicals by persons, groups, and other entities. If effectively implemented, the convention will be an essential tool to help prevent the use of toxic chemicals for illegitimate purposes.

PROVIDING ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION

The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted on September 8, 2006, by the U.N. General Assembly, has made clear the international community's expectation that the OPCW will support collective efforts to eliminate the scourge of terrorism. It has also recognized the role of organizations such as the

IAEA and the OPCW in such areas as capacity-building for protection and assistance against weapons of mass destruction.

Indeed, in the face of increasing threats of terrorism, the salience of OPCW programs in the field of assistance and protection has also increased. As we face this scourge, the organization will need to continue to improve its own capability to effectively respond to requests for assistance. The OPCW therefore continues its endeavors to effectively mobilize the international response that would be required in situations in which chemical weapons had been used or were threatened to be used. As part of our efforts in this context, the full national implementation of the convention as envisioned in its Article VII is not just an imperative for the sake of compliance but, increasingly, a useful additional tool for each country's security, especially since it provides a regulatory framework that would deter any use of toxic chemicals by anyone who intends to perpetrate crime or terror.

It is also crucial for us to achieve universal adherence to the convention at the earliest possible time. The conference has reiterated that universality of the convention is essential to achieving its objective and purpose, which is to eliminate the threat of chemical weapons comprehensively and without exception. The realization of this goal will remain elusive so long as there exists even a single country that possesses both the capability and the intention to retain the chemical weapons option.

Fortunately, we know that most of the 11 remaining states have not joined because they are simply constrained by a lack of resources. At the same time, though, we know that our task will not be easy because non-party-states in such areas as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula justify their resistance to joining because of a number of considerations relating to the political and security situation in their respective regions. It will be crucial for us to continue to work with these countries to bring them into the OPCW family at the earliest possible date.

Our member-states have shown remarkable goodwill and dedication in building a strong and vibrant multilateral organization. They have done this work through policy-making organs and also by fully utilizing the opportunities the OPCW offers as a forum for consultation and cooperation to resolve issues and provide guidance for better implementation of the convention and its goals. Our member-states have made an invaluable contribution not just to the practical functioning of the OPCW, but to the overall confidence-building process that is indispensable for the eventual success of the convention.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although we have good reasons to be satisfied with the work of our organization and to remain fully supportive of its continued efforts to fulfil its mandate, it is also vitally important that we ensure not only the full and effective implementation of the convention, but also its ready adaptation to our fast-changing world and to the challenges, both technical and security, that it generates.

Part Five

General Karl-Heinz Lather

Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)

Admiral Mark P. Fitzgerald

Commander, U.S. Navy Europe and Allied Joint Force Commander, Naples

Ambassador Tacan Ildem

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Ms. Renée Acosta

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Lieutenant General James Soligan

Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command Transformation

Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall GBE KCB FRAeS

Former Vice Chief of Defense Staff, United Kingdom

Chapter 24

From the Balkans to Afghanistan: Dealing with the Challenges

General Karl-Heinz Lather¹

We have been in the Balkans since 1992, supporting UNPROFOR and enforcing the no-flying zone. During an operation that was called Deny Flight, NATO aircraft helped UNPROFOR protect its forces and served as a deterrent to the then-warring parties. In 1994, cooperation between the United Nations and NATO intensified, and NATO aircraft conducted close air support and air strikes on selected targets.

The security situation in Bosnia Herzegovina worsened in July 1995 with the fall of the U.N. Safe Havens, Srebrenica being just one of them. NATO was then asked to conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions with heavy weapons and then, during Operation Deliberate Force, which was conducted between the end of August and mid-September 1995, we flew a total of 3,515 missions. This operation was crucial in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table at Dayton and, at the end of 1995, bringing all NATO nations together with 18 non-NATO nations, including Russia. A force of 54,000 troops was provided in IFOR to provide a safe and secure environment for the implementation of what we call the General Framework of Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Several years later, NATO air power was used again in Kosovo. The Kosovo crisis reached a peak in the middle of 1998, when large-scale violence led to hundreds of civilian casualties and the displacement of nearly 300,000 people from their homes. International efforts over the following months failed to reach a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. Despite efforts to maintain a cease-fire, with international observation and verification supported by NATO, the humanitarian and security situation continued to worsen.

In the spring of 1999, NATO made a unilateral decision to intervene to bring about the end of the humanitarian crisis and to stop violence and repression. We made air attacks against selected targets in the former Republic of Yugoslavia in order to compel compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions and force withdrawal of their force from the province of Kosovo. Mandated later by the still-in-place U.N. Resolution 1244, NATO-led forces dedicated by Operation Joint Guardian were

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deployed in Kosovo, where they still are. And you heard the number where we currently stand. Now, what can we learn from all that?

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF FORCES

In the area of command and control of forces, it is necessary to have a robustly resourced force from the very beginning of each peace enforcement operation. This is essential, not only to deal with the challenges in theater and to demonstrate the resolve of the international community to implement the relevant peace agreement but also to ensure that critical military capabilities are met from the outside. If unfilled, such critical shortfalls are likely to remain for some time and will place those serving in operation theaters at additional risk, including risk of life. Unity of command is desired and is demanded from the military from the outset. However, in the case of an alliance of nations, it must be recognized that nations will rarely give full command of their forces to the operational commander. Forces will arrive with restrictions, both upon the deployment and their people's employment. These restrictions or caveats place limitations on the operational and tactical commanders. It is imperative that these limitations be fully understood by all in the chain of command and that action is taken often at the political level to insure that over time these restrictions are minimized or ideally fade away or are removed. With rules of engagement being developed as part of each operation's plan, some participating nations might be more restricted because of constitutional or political reasons or constraints. Once again, such differences need to be harmonized to ensure that forces can coordinate and act unanimously throughout the theater of operations.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

The second point is the need for situational awareness. That is a key element of the successful implementation of the military aspects of any peace enforcement operation, and insures that commanders at all levels maintain situation awareness. This point is vital not only for commanders to know where they are in relation to other units but also to understand their environment to the fullest extent.

At the beginning of an operation, maintaining situational awareness will largely be in the hands of regular military units supported by intelligence elements that are organic to them. However, over time, when general compliance has been achieved, there is the opportunity to reduce what one could call the hard edge of the military profile and move to operations that are intelligence driven. Lessons learned in Bosnia-Herzegovina and I think in Kosovo clearly demonstrate the utility of small teams like liaison and observation teams that discreetly carry their side-arms and are deployed to local municipalities to meet, talk to, and understand the people and, of course, to report to the chain of command. Understanding how individuals feel about particular issues and when preemptive action might be needed by the military to ensure that the military element of the operation maintains the initiative is key.

NON-MILITARY TASKS

My third point is that international peace forces deployed to a crisis reaction operation must be aware that they may have to fulfill non-military tasks. We do not like that. Each operation is conducted under an internationally approved mandate and, for Alliance operations, the tasks that a force can conduct are detailed in the relevant operation's plan. Should new tasks arise, as currently is the case for KFOR, then NATO as an organization may decide that they can be undertaken.

While NATO forces generally do not undertake nation-building tasks, it is important that the local governments and security institutions of the country in which NATO forces operate are brought to maturity as quickly as possible and that indigenous capabilities and capacities are developed. During the

initial stages of operations, forces must be capable of maintaining a safe and secure environment if necessary, up to the use of lethal force. However, as operations develop, the maintenance of the environment gradually must be guaranteed through the use of non-lethal means. In KFOR, and earlier in SFOR-IFOR, the biggest challenge was to build up crowd- and riot-control units' capabilities to deal with demonstrations, disturbances, and civil unrest. In some cases in which KFOR troops contributed, nations had to change national legislation to allow their forces to be equipped and trained for that task. Once achieved, this capability became what I think is a very powerful and effective deterrent. Also in Kosovo, KFOR had to secure and has to secure many patrimonial sites of religious and cultural significance. Given the sensitivity of the parties in Kosovo to these sites, we think the use of military force for this purpose is appropriate, although manpower intensive, because it helps to calm emotions and the situation.

MISSION HANDOVER

At some point in time, we become ready for the mission handover. Normally, peace support operations follow a similar routine: preparation is first, deployment is second, then execution, and then redeployment. The center of gravity for us lies in the execution phase, which could be further split into a number of stages pending the specific situation. Based on the assessment of the overall situation in the theater, leaders might decide to conduct a mission handover to other organizations. The best timing is foreseen at the end of the deterrent-present stage—which Mark Fitzgerald alluded to as well—just before moving into what we call minimum presence posture. The latest example of such a handover was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when, at the completion of SFOR, NATO handed over to EU ALTHEA and left behind only a minimal footprint in the country. Our experience tells us that such a handover has to be planned very carefully, including the important tasks of the various organizations, the delineation of such tasks, intelligence sharing, and providing access to historical data.

COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

The last point is the need for cooperation with other organizations. International peace forces are not usually deployed alone; a number of international governments and non-governmental organizations are deployed as well. Each of these organizations addresses specific target areas and develops its own mostly independent lines of operation. Experience tells us that there is really a need to coordinate all these activities in theater, to deliver a comprehensive and even-handed approach to the conflicting parties. NATO commanders are instructed to routinely maintain good relations with the heads of other organizations in the area. Recently, we developed the concept of liaison and observation teams in Bosnia-Herzegovina and liaison monitoring in Kosovo. The purpose is not only to deal with representatives of the local populations but also to coordinate with other organizations working in the same area. That is of mutual benefit to all parties concerned.

Chapter 25

Operations in Kosovo and the Balkans

Admiral Mark P. Fitzgerald¹

When we first started addressing what we would talk about today, Roger proposed the crisis in the Middle East, and I said that we needed to broaden the topic to Europe, because there is a direct link between and a direct impact on both. Since my headquarters spans those regions, I thought this would be a good opportunity to show you some of the things that I think have worked and some that have not over the course of not just the six months I have been in command but the 10 years we have had troops deployed in these regions.

ACTIVITIES IN KOSOVO AND THE BALKANS

Regarding what we do in Naples, Karl-Heinz Lather pretty much told you the breadth and scope of those activities, but particularly what we are doing in Kosovo, where we have 16,000 troops on the ground and forces from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 trying to maintain safety, security, and a safe environment. We also have Iraq, where we are trying to bring in the NATO Training Mission to educate and westernize a military that is fighting a war of insurgency there, and we have Operation Active Endeavor, where we are now performing both counterterrorism and counter-WMD missions in the Mediterranean.

When you look at the resources that we have allocated in Kosovo, the 16,000 troops do not begin to tell the tale, because I think everybody here understands that it requires a 3 to 1 or a 4 to 1 mixture to maintain that kind of troop level. So we are talking about tying up 60,000 to 80,000 troops in Kosovo that we may need in other places for other missions. For example, in Bosnia there are 2,500 EU troops. The quicker we can draw down the large expenditure of troops the sooner we can start to use that excess capacity in other places where we probably need them. So we need to start thinking about how the European crises are impacting the crises in Asia.

When I look at what has happened in the Balkans over the last few years, I think of how we have brought Croatia and Albania into NATO, as Ambassador Ildem talked about, and how we are pretty close to getting Skopje in there. And when I see that Bosnia is signing up with PfP and trying to gain MAP status, that Montenegro is coming along, and that Serbia is participating in PfP, I see the trend towards col-

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lective security on the EU side. I also see how the signing of Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) is supporting economic stability. That is where the Balkans are heading, so my headquarters is trying to figure out how we can provide the leadership to get that security sector reform piece—enabling the rule of law, making the military subservient to political leadership, those kinds of things—in place. The headquarters in Skopje, Tirana, Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Pristina are also looking at how we can best help those militaries and those governments come to grips with those kinds of issues. We want to instill NATO/western principles and organizations through SSR officers to get that reform accomplished.

How successful have we been? If you look outside Kosovo, we have about 259 NATO officers and administrators deployed throughout the Balkans, and the net Balkans output to places like Iraq and Afghanistan is about 758. So we are starting down the path to getting the Balkans to become a net exporter of security, and not just grinding up troops and have them pinned down there. I think that is a good-news story.

When you go to Kosovo, though, you start to get to the root of the problem. We have been there for 10 years; the situation is what I would call stagnant on the economic side of the house, with the highest unemployment in Europe—58%—and GDP growth just starting to come up, now at 7%, though it has been relatively flat. Inflation is up to about 13%. Electricity is the lifeblood of the country, but there has been no new infrastructure put in there, and the people are still living with 1950s and 1960s technology. Unemployment, personal income, budget deficits, GDP, all of those things are going to get us to a place where we can start to solve some of the problems in the country or else it will stagnate.

Money is coming into the country primarily from the diaspora outside the country. Pensioners on the Serb side get money out of Serbia; customs has had problems with this, and money is also coming in through foreign UNMIC and KFOR troops in the nation. The real issue in Kosovo in my view is not whether this is going to be a Serbian province or an independent country, but where are the people's next euros coming from? Where are they going to get some money? The corruption, the smuggling, everything is eating into that country's quest to become an independent state. That is where I think we have failed over the last 10 years. We have been able to institute a safe and secure environment; people in Kosovo now expect NATO troops to be on their ground and expect them to protect them. We need to start weaning the people from that and to start bootstrapping their economy so that it can get going. Balancing the military and economic investment will allow us to start moving towards a deterrent presence and start drawing down some of the troops, who we can then deploy in an emergency and start to get the economy going.

ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ

In Iraq there are similarities and differences. Our mission in Iraq is to train the military, the police force in that country, to get them once again oriented towards a more western-style military that serves the political masters. We have taken over the training at Rustamiyah, their national defense university, and we have put about 500 officers through the course. We have also sent officers from many countries for training there; we have trained the navy in Basrah, we have trained the members of the Air Force Academy, and we have brought the Italian carabinieri into the country and trained about 2,000 of their police officers. I believe this is all a very good-news story, and the police and the military have executed very well. They have not run from danger and actually did a great job.

When I look at the mission, I think that the way forward is to start broadening what we have done with the 160 people that are in country. We received direction from the Bucharest Summit. Prime Minister Maliki sent a letter that was accepted requesting additional training in areas like customs, forensics, and systems to enable technicians in the army, air force, and navy to do maintenance, as well as in skills areas,

NCO professionalism, and language training. All of those things will help further stabilize the country, which is another good-news story.

OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOR

I also want to talk about Operation Active Endeavor, because it started out to be an Article 5 operation but has ended up as much more than that. It actually has ended up as a very good theater security cooperation initiative in which not only NATO countries have participated but other countries now want to come in and participate in collective security. Countries including Albania, Georgia, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Russia, and Ukraine are all participating in that effort. We have also seen spin-off efforts in the Black Sea, such as Black Sea Harmony, not under NATO. These countries now have the ability to take this work and complement it with national priorities such as countering drug trafficking and countering illegal-alien smuggling, because our Article 5 operations are not charged with doing that. The intelligence we are gaining and our ability to pass significant information on to national command centers really resonates with those countries. Just as NATO's air policing efforts bore fruit in the past, our maritime policing efforts are starting to bear fruit now.

What will happen with data in the future? We see a couple of things happening. One is that, much like in aviation, in which the ICAO agency is able to paint a picture of the skies, technologies are now emerging that can do the same thing in the water, painting an international picture of where all of the ships are. This will give us much better insight into what is going on in the maritimes. As we talked about in a previous panel discussion, maritime-based missile defense capabilities will also soon start to resonate in this arena. So there is a lot of possibility there.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

There are three takeaways from what I have discussed, one from each operation. The first is that you have to have economic stability in order to have security, and we need to work on that. The second is that western values and western ways of operating militaries will be stabilizing forces in the countries. And the third is that nations want collective security beyond their national interest.

Chapter 26

Dealing with Crises in Europe and the Middle East

Ambassador Tacan Ildem¹

OPENING REMARKS

I am indeed pleased to be part of the distinguished panel that will discuss crises in Europe and the Middle East. The words of Charles Dickens, “It was the best of times; it was the worst of times. It was the spring of hope; it was the winter of despair,” in his novel *The Tale of Two Cities*, help us characterize the world today.

Although our session is about instabilities in Europe and the Middle East, there are instabilities present in a vast area stretching from west Africa to southeast Asia. Sadly, there have been times when parts of this geography have succumbed to open warfare, areas that were marked by instability and insecurity for many years. Conflicts in the Caucasus and the Balkans, with all their tragic human consequences, are still fresh in our memories. Today, very close to Turkey, violence in the Middle East seems to have no end.

However, there is also a brighter side, and we have reason to entertain hope about the future. The huge potential for multilateral cooperation both within and among different regions is enormously important. The east-west energy and transportation corridors are good examples. There are also examples of successful, established subregional economic and military cooperation mechanisms, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization, the multinational peacekeeping force for southeastern Europe, and the naval task force for the Black Sea, all of which were initially proposed by Turkey. Overall, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights are asserting their universal nature all over the world. I am going to focus on these specific topics.

SOURCES OF CONCERN

Since the Cold War ended, a great sense of security has taken hold in the minds of Europeans. But, according to Arnold Wolfer, security should be defined as “the absence of threats to

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Ambassador Tacan Ildem is the Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO.

acquired values.” This perspective may sound pessimistic, yet I find it useful. Speculations about a new Cold War, which would have a tremendous effect on Europe, particularly terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increasingly occupy our agenda, threatening Europe and our values as well as the rest of the world.

But that is not all. The present situation in the Balkans is a serious source of concern. Bringing about the independence of Kosovo was the culmination of a long, unique, and complicated process, and, to further consolidate stability in the region, we have to support Kosovo by all means as well as ensure the well-being of all the communities within its borders.

After the parliamentary elections in Serbia, we remain cautiously optimistic about the security situation in Kosovo. The determined presence and increased activities of KFOR have contributed to stability and security, but it is very important for all actors in theater to assume their responsibilities and respective roles.

While emphasizing the importance of developing a comprehensive approach to succeed in different operational terrains, we need to remind ourselves of the fact that not all international organizations share the same vision that we have at NATO. There is no doubt that for a comprehensive approach to be successful we need to not only create synergies among security, governance, and reconstruction/development sectors, but reach a clear understanding regarding the fulfilment of responsibilities by each individual international organization. When it comes to facilitating cooperation among international actors, perceptions regarding the role and value of “others” can constitute a barrier.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATO

It is a fact that whether NATO conducts operations in Afghanistan or in Kosovo, under the U.N. mandate, the U.N. tries not to be seen as associated with NATO, or at least there is a degree of hesitancy. The same is true for the NGOs active in those operational theaters, since they are concerned that their interaction with a “military organization” like NATO might tarnish their reputation. As to the EU, all I can say is that it seeks to initiate civilian missions after being certain of the safe and secure environment that NATO will provide and the substantial strategic support that it will render on the ground. Therefore, instead of considering NATO an organization on equal footing, the EU tends to take NATO for granted in whatever supportive role it is playing, as a sort of a “toolbox” or a subordinate body.

My country will continue with its strong contribution to KFOR and will participate in the EULEX mission, providing a considerable number of personnel. We believe that there is room for effective interaction between the international actors present in the theater, and, regarding NATO-EU cooperation in Kosovo or anywhere else, I believe that the framework that defines the modalities of such interaction is quite clear. It is only a matter of putting the mechanism agreed upon by other organizations to its full use.

SERBIA, KOSOVO, AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In addition to Kosovo, I would like to mention that Serbia is crucial for stability in the Balkans and should be part of the Euro-Atlantic community. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is of the utmost importance that this country not be negatively affected by the developments related to Kosovo, and we welcome the invitation extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina for intensified dialogue at the Bucharest summit. Last but not least, we hope to see Macedonia become a member of NATO as soon as possible.

To sum up, the Balkans as a whole continue to be high on our agenda because of their utmost importance to stability, security, and prosperity, not only in their immediate vicinity but throughout Europe.

ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND IRAN

In another part of the world, in the neighborhood of Turkey, a different kind of crisis prevails. The establishment of a lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East as well as the evolution of this geography into a stable and prosperous region are crucial. Two states, Israel and Palestine, should live side by side within secure and recognized borders. The situation in Iraq also deserves attention, for it will play an instrumental role in the future of the region. Clearly, positive developments in the Iraqi and Israeli-Palestinian situations will significantly improve the chances of rewriting the destiny of the Middle East.

On the other hand, the developments regarding Iran's nuclear program and the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons capability pose serious risks for stability in the region and beyond. Obviously, the Middle East does not need new sources of potential instability. In brief, regional governments have to act on many fronts at the same time.

FACING TERRORISM

In order to ensure global stability and security, good governance, transparency, and accountability should prevail and fundamental rights and freedoms should be upheld. We must not forget that these universal values are the product of the collective wisdom of civilized people.

While the current global landscape is rich in risks and threats, terrorism clearly stands out as a unique menace. Actually, it is neither a new phenomenon nor one of a temporary nature. The recent past has shown that no single nation is immune to this scourge, and, given its universal parameters, one should ask whether the international community is sufficiently involved in searching for strategies to be collectively implemented by all nations. We need to finalize the work on the comprehensive U.N. convention against terrorism and walk that extra mile to agree on a common and comprehensive definition in order to talk about common strategies to wipe out terrorist organizations and acts.

With the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we suddenly found ourselves facing an omnipresent terrorist threat at a global scale. At the Prague, Istanbul, Riga, and Bucharest summits, NATO condemned terrorism, whatever its motivations and manifestations. Today, terrorist organizations run comprehensive international networks, conducting all types of illicit criminal activities to finance, facilitate, recruit, and propagate, usually through legally registered outfits and non-governmental organizations. But can any one of our states afford to shy away from confronting terrorism so long as they themselves do not become a target? The clear legal and practical answer is no.

NATO SUCCESSES

NATO has many useful tools to positively interact with the region this panel is discussing. The Mediterranean Dialogue, for example, has developed in leaps and bounds since the Istanbul summit of 2004, where we decided to elevate our dialogue with participating countries to a level of genuine partnership. Key points in this successful program include:

The NATO training and cooperation initiative, which is in the beginning stages, is an important aspect of our improving partnership.

The individual cooperation program (thus far, Israel and Egypt have developed a program and Morocco is preparing one) is a tool with which partners can individually deepen their relations with NATO in areas of interest to them.

Trust fund projects within the Mediterranean Dialogue framework (Jordan and Mauritania) will bring our cooperation to new levels. This will not only improve the quality of life of individuals

who live in the area where the project will be in effect, but also enhance NATO public diplomacy efforts in the region as well. We look forward to the successful conclusion of all such useful projects.

As a Mediterranean country, Turkey strongly supports the Mediterranean Dialogue. We are well positioned and determined to contribute to it, building upon our existing bilateral military framework agreements and/or military cooperation agreements. We believe that a functioning partnership with Mediterranean countries constitutes one of the most significant investments that NATO can make for the future of our common security interests.

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative has also had considerable success since its inception at the Istanbul summit. Four years after its enactment, four Gulf countries—Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates—have acceded to it and expressed their intention to work with the Alliance on a mutually beneficial basis. They are participating with increasing numbers on a constantly increasing number of activities.

I would like to conclude by underlining that in this setting, where peace, stability, and prosperity hang in the balance, joint cooperation, solidarity, and political will as well as principles and values will be crucial for success.

Chapter 27

The Importance of Civil–Military Integration

General Rainer Schuwirth¹

Civil-military integration, or cooperation or coordination, continues to be a topical issue, although one might think that, after decades of U.N. involvement, some 14 years for NATO, many years for the EU, five years for the ESDP, and many years for NGOs, along with libraries of papers on Civil-military cooperation that have been produced in the EU since 2001, the theory might be exhausted and now be common practice. But that has not happened, which means that it is not working, or at least not working well enough, despite the fact that everywhere I go I hear, read about, and of course have experienced such things as the comprehensive approach, networked security, a wider approach to security, and effect-based operations.

But when you look into lessons learned, you find deficiencies in areas such as the quality of situational awareness; the seamless dissemination and sharing of information by actors; the scope, speed, and quality of interdisciplinary planning and decision-making processes; effective linking of political and operational (civil-military) action in a crisis area; coordinated information management up the chain of command; and coordination among international organizations, local actors, and NGOs.

Thus, it may be that those who decide to take action and encounter a CMO are not sufficiently clear about what is expected of them, or ways to improve any given situation, the requirements for doing so, and the costs in terms of engagement, duration, personnel, capabilities, money, progress, and setbacks. It may be that sometimes the target that the IC sets for itself is overly ambitious.

It may also be that the IC—regardless of the organization—has not yet turned postulates into realistic approaches, approaches that are coordinated right from the beginning and that divide the overarching strategic aim into areas tailored to the specific qualifications of contributing parties, which also set targets for those who will be helped to avoid everlasting dependency on support from the outside.

Could it be, at least in some cases, that “history” will be rebuilt or reorganized instead of our opening a fresh, helpful way ahead? Could it be that organizations that have only limited capabilities in particular areas are setting their stakes too high? Why is it so difficult to bring international organizations together in a coordinated or comprehensive approach? This panel and the audience are invited to address these issues and hopefully to come up with some suggestions how to do better in the future.

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General Rainer Schuwirth is the former Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

Chapter 28

Dealing with Crises in Iraq and the Middle East—The Importance of Civil-Military Integration

Ms. Renée S. Acosta¹

OPENING REMARKS

What I have to offer today is a different perspective, some information, a description of some projects underway, and some ideas for the future. I can plainly say that the world's richest nations are heavily dependent on the surging growth of the less developed nations for their, and parenthetically for our, future prosperity. I can also say that developing nations have obliged this dependence by opening their markets to trade and foreign investment on an unprecedented scale—look at the recently announced agreement between China and Angola. But as these markets open and expand, what is our responsibility?

All of us have responsibility: governments, the private sector, and NGOs. In the past those responsibilities were specific to each sector, and that is where the complexities lie. While governments have been traditionally responsible for infrastructure, safety, security, education, and so on, there is now a blurring of roles between governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations. This is well understood by those at this workshop.

At Global Impact, we developed a chart (see next page) that expresses our view of the “course of history” regarding humanitarian relief and development.

The desired end state is naturally the fourth quadrant: sustainability.


THE ROAD TO SUSTAINABILITY

We begin in the first quadrant, with the preferred route of prevention moving straightforwardly through development to sustainability. But as fate would have it, a situation develops and some early warnings emerge. This situation could be the south Asia tsunami, the Lebanon conflict, or the Myanmar or China disasters, to name just a few. So we all rally and hence we abandon development and move quickly to relief or, as expressed in the second quadrant of my chart, preparedness and relief. This involves scrambling for resources, locating resources, getting them to the location—all with little or no

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real coordination or preplanning. By using the term preparedness, we are being kind to ourselves. There is a flaw in the rush to provide aid. For example, in the aftermath of the tsunami there was enough money in contributions that the region could have leapfrogged to having schools wired for computers. Instead the area was rebuilt as it was, not as it could have been.



When the developing situation is a natural disaster, life is easier because we usually do not have those pesky political considerations. Of course this does not include Myanmar, which, as a savvy cab driver in D.C. observed, was a natural disaster that became a man-made disaster.

But let's suppose the disaster is political, or man-made, as we say in our world. Then the decision to offer help begins with "If we will help" rather than "When will we help." In the world of NGOs, the reason for the disaster is moot. For NGOs the only question is how to offer aid, and that aid is offered with a blind eye to the belief systems or actions of those in need. To others that aid could be considered "aiding and abetting the enemy." This is a real point of contention when it comes to working collegially with the government.

Now we are working in the second quadrant and moving to the third quadrant, representing rehabilitation. But we never make it to rehabilitation because of a short circuit: the money, the political will, the interest run out and we are back where we started, at the first quadrant. We are in a trap—development short circuits to early warning, preparedness, and relief and then cycles back to development. A case in point: In 2005 there were two high-profile international disasters: the tsunami in Asia and the earthquake

in Pakistan. These two events alone raised more than \$2 billion to help survivors, and as I noted earlier, the area was rebuilt as it was, not as it could have been.

Afghanistan is a perfect example of this cycle. Of the organizations Global Impact funds, 18 NGOs are supporting 58 programs, 2 of which have closed because of safety concerns. In Iraq, 6 organizations are supporting 17 programs and another 6 have closed because of safety concerns. Some NGOs feel that being identified with any government or the military of any country endangers their programs and their safety. On the other hand, in the toughest spots on earth, safety and security need to be provided—my earlier point about the role of government.

Back to the chart: NGOs are geared toward development and sustainability but the money and political will are not. What can happen with a developing situation is that the long history of working in a region is not recognized or respected by those entering in crisis mode and those relationships are not preserved for the aftermath, when sustainability can occur. It is the NGOs' relationships with local governments and with citizens and programs that create stability and the potential for sustainable development.

This happens again and again: The overlooked third quadrant. What we know for certain is that disasters will occur; those of us at this workshop could perhaps and with reasonable accuracy predict where one will occur and the nature of the event. But next time, let's use that awful crisis to push our accumulated resources and efforts to rehabilitation, giving us a better chance of sustainability. I submit that this is where the political will and the allocation of resources will make the biggest impact. It is where we will not only save lives but lift nations up to those who contribute to the overall good.

MAXIMIZING RESOURCES AND BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH GLOBAL REACH

To begin addressing the differing missions, views, and activities of all those concerned with delivering humanitarian assistance and stabilizing affected regions, Global Impact has developed a program named Global Reach. The mission of Global Reach is to maximize available resources to save lives and, most important, it is *supported by preplanning*. At this moment, Global Impact has memoranda of an agreement with the United States Southern Command, Joint Forces NATO, and a strong working relationship with the United States European Command. These working relationships allow the voice of the NGO community to be heard at the most senior levels of command and have resulted in exercise design, training and participation, and joint humanitarian assistance projects. The primary objective is to build trust and confidence. This program is built upon joint effort, and further along it is our intention to engage the private sector as well; they will, after all, profit from rebuilding.

The U.S. military's thinking about their contribution to all this is evolving as well. The military has traditionally focused on disaster relief missions, with relatively few activities associated with development and sustainability (save for their work involving "theater security" matters). That is changing. For example, the Navy's new Cooperative Maritime Strategy places real emphasis on developing the ability to generate longer-lasting relationships and partnerships with other countries through the use of naval assets. Global Reach works across all quadrants—preparation and relief and, increasingly, development and sustainability.

Part of the friction we have encountered as we launch Global Reach, *inter alia*, is the perception on the part of some NGOs that having the military move into development and sustainability will somehow upset their funding streams and control over their world. This speaks only to the reason to work on ways to do this successfully for all concerned, especially on behalf of those who need the help the most. By joining together, partnering organizations combine their resources and strengths, offset their weak-

nesses, and offer the strongest effort possible to provide assistance to those in need around the world. With a different perspective and a different mindset, we can overcome the differing missions, views, and activities to work together and perhaps make the biggest impact of all.

Chapter 29

Working with International Organizations and NGOs

Lieutenant General James Soligan¹

We have had a lot of discussions over the last two or three days about what needs to be done to resolve crises but I will focus most of my discussion on what is actually happening in NATO and the progress we are making. Then I will put a bit of a yardstick out there for some of the next steps that we hope to be able to accomplish.

THE NEED FOR COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

When I discuss a comprehensive approach, I am really focusing on the close cooperation and coordination that is needed among all the elements of the international response. That includes NATO military and NATO non-military personnel who will operate the military and government agency pieces, as well as NATO and international organizations and NGOs. My focus will be on NATO and government agencies and NATO and international organizations and NGOs, although I will also mention the way ahead, particularly at the Brussels and national levels, where change is needed in order to more easily plug into some of the non-NATO military contributions. I will look at how we are developing, implementing, and institutionalizing consultation, coordination, and planning between NATO and government agencies and between NATO and the IO/NGO community, in particular at the independent decision-making responsibilities of each. I believe it is really important to figure out how we can institutionalize the changes necessary to have separate but mutually supportive elements of this contribution as we move forward.

Because of the political difficulties of reaching consensus in Brussels, the guidance has been to start with a bottom-up approach, then go to the field and see what you can accomplish on the comprehensive approach, and then let that trickle up—the opposite of a trickle-down strategy. It is a trickle-up strategy of going out and accomplishing things on the field.

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BUILDING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

The cornerstone of a comprehensive approach is trust and confidence. It is really about person-to-person relationships. I have been working with Renée Acosta and Global Impact now for some 10 or 12 years. Our relationship started in EUCCOM, then continued in SOUTHCOM, then continued when we worked together when I was in Korea, and now continues while I am at Allied Command Transformation. It is that type of long-term relationship, that understanding of what each body does, whether it is a military body or an NGO or an IO or a government agency, and having respect for each other's domain that helps us work together effectively.

A comprehensive approach has worked pretty well in the field if we look at Afghanistan in particular, at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 26 of which are in the field right now. The nations and NATO have collectively recognized the need for the military and government agencies to work together and to interact with NGOs and IOs in the field in a comprehensive way. Admiral Fitzgerald told us about the liaison monitoring teams in Kosovo and the ability of those teams to be able to not only interact with the local population but to interact with the interagency international organizations and NGOs. We have seen a senior civilian representative in Afghanistan interact with the international community and the NGOs in a way that was never done in the past. We have reached very significant milestones and have made great progress in implementing free deployment training, in which we actually bring the IOs and NGOs from Afghanistan into the training at military headquarters and have them build their relationships before deployment. In that way they gain a good understanding of the local community leaders, the IOs, and the NGOs in the theater, before they move forward.

We have also implemented something called the civil-military overview. Recognizing the need for information sharing—for everyone to have a common picture of what is going on in Afghanistan—we have implemented a basic Web page design that receives information maintained and managed by the individual international organizations as well as ISAF. It provides commonly available information that informs each of the players about who and what and where something is going on in the theater. Recognizing the sensitivities of the NGOs and IOs to not be too closely associated with the military in some cases but also their need for a common view of what is happening, where aid is taking place, and what is going on in the PRTs, we have implemented a one-year test inside Afghanistan. Most of the people who are providing the information are from the U.N., the OSCE, and UNHCR.

AD HOC AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES

Obviously, in many cases, the challenges are ad hoc—the commander lands on the ground and says, Okay, who is here and what do we need to do? I believe that the actions that we have talked about will help minimize that situation, but we also need to institutionalize some areas of planning in order to work together more effectively. Admiral Fitzgerald mentioned the lack of agreement in the theater itself among the various organizations. I think these organizations make it work, but there is not a clear understanding, certainly at the higher levels, of roles and missions and responsibilities. NGOs in particular immediately jump to their higher headquarters and say, Can we do this? Then, because they do not have a strong relationship at the highest levels, the burden of responsibility stays on the people on the ground.

Some organizational challenges also go along with this issue. For example, if we look at the NATO Response Force (NRF), are Provincial Reconstruction Teams part of its built-in structure? Is the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) part of that construct? Should we really build that in, and what are the right relationships? For example, what is the right relationship between the SCR and the ISAF commander? Rather than working out these things on the ground, we need to come up with a plan for basic relationships and responsibilities ahead of time.

We have talked about the Joint Force Command and the Senior Commander (SC) level, but here progress is not as concrete as we would like it to be. Still, we should be thinking about a comprehensive approach at this level.

CURRENT INITIATIVES

Two years ago we implemented two initiatives. The first one has actually started to have some traction, and that is embedding IO and NGO cells inside the Joint Force Command headquarters as well as inside the Senior Commander level headquarters. At SHAPE the IOs are able to participate in the planning and the day-to-day business of the JFC. We still think there is room to do this at the SC level.

Clearly the EU already does planning, but how would other IO organizations interface? If we look at Darfur, what interaction do they have with JFC Lisbon and how can you build that relationship to increase awareness and planning ahead of time? At ACT we would like to see the EU, for example, develop capability with ACT staff to provide common command and control interaction and network-enabled capabilities. Today, we tell each other what we did, but we do not necessarily plan together the way ahead.

The second initiative, which we are going to reenergize in 2008, is based on conversations with some PERMREPS and General Mathis. It is the idea of having a civilian adviser who is the equivalent of a political adviser but actually is an international organization representative. This person would build the network of NGOs and IOs that would be available to the JFC and Operational Commander staffs and would interface with the international community in the field, just like a political advisor does. However, this person would also be available for training as well as for pre-planning and for building permanent relationships between international organizations and NATO. We had a very interesting discussion about this inside Brussels and we are going to introduce it again, because we believe the idea has proven itself in testing and has the ability to help us progress.

BRINGING A GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO A NATO-LED OPERATION

At headquarters in Brussels and/or at national levels, clearly there has been some progress. We have looked at the different nations; we have looked at all the government approaches. The U.K has the PSRU, Canada has Stabilization and Reconstruction Teams (START), and the U.S. has the State Department office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), but all of these have room for improvement. One of the key issues is how to bring the whole government approach to a NATO-led operation. A key challenge is not dealing with the military and all the government agencies but how to plan ahead of time so that all the nations can bring all of their power.

Another issue is who will actually lead a comprehensive approach in theater. Most people I talked to about this naturally defer to the United Nations. They say that it should either be the host nation government and/or the United Nations that leads a comprehensive approach. The U.N., however, does not see itself in that role. Jane Lute said that the United Nations will play a role, but only after the political parties have achieved some agreement that they in fact want the United Nations and the international community there, which, as you know, is not always the first step of peacekeeping. So I think one of the earliest and most important steps we need to take is to have an international community discussion about whether there is a comprehensive approach. Then we need to determine the framework and who should lead it.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To build trust and confidence, we need ongoing dialogue inside Brussels and inside country capitals about what a comprehensive approach should look like. Then we need to design the structures and processes to create it. We can start out with the military in the lead, and then the United Nations can pass a resolution to appoint a leader of the comprehensive approach. In summary, I would say that three steps need to be taken:

Build trust and confidence. The first is to recognize that the foundation for building success is trust and confidence. Trust and confidence are achieved through constant interaction, planning together, operating together, and being part of each other's staffs. The way you become an alliance is to put everybody together. We need to put people together and interact effectively.

Determine which organization is responsible for coordination. The second step is to determine who would be responsible for coordinating—the United Nations, the host nation, the government—and then allow the players to coordinate under that leadership and institutionalize change.

Sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.N. The third step is to move forward on an agreement in the Fall of 2008 by signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations.

Chapter 30

Crisis Management

Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall GBE KCB FRAeS¹

Prior to my retirement in 2005, I was the U.K. Vice Chief of Defense from 2001 until that time. In that position, I was closely involved with the aftermath of September 11 and the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. I would like to start my presentation by making a few general remarks.

THREE KEY ISSUES

First, we have not yet talked about one key word, which is money. In my view and experience, the availability of resources and money has been a key factor and, to some extent, has driven policy. Certainly it has driven policy in my own country.

Second, I would like to touch on political will. Over the years there has been strong U.K. access to the U.S. for historic reasons. The strength of U.K. access to the EU and Europe, however, is a very interesting question, because our prime minister, Gordon Brown, has a stronger European linkage in his mind than perhaps some of his predecessors had.

Then there is the question of events. In my 41 years of experience in the Royal Air Force, events drove the response. In some cases, such as the foot and mouth crisis, the firemen's strike, and other national events, there were choices to be made. Do we have enough manpower? Do we have enough resources? How do we deal with the events? In other cases—September 11 is a very good example of a time when something had to be done—we did indeed start off with a coalition of the willing, but then built from there into a stronger operation. The difficulty arises with things like equipment programs: It takes many years to buy new aircraft, new ships, and new tanks. Therefore, flexibility has to be built into those platforms.

THE CHALLENGES

Let me now touch on some of the challenges we face in preparing for particular events and for all operations.

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Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall GBE KCB FRAeS (Ret.) is a former United Kingdom Vice Chief of Defence.

Nature/Scale of the event. The first challenge involves the nature and scale of the happening or event that we are responding to.

Timeline. Does something have to be done today or do we have months or weeks for force generation to deal with the equipment fit on our aircraft or on our ships and to put urgent operational requirements in place?

Political will. At what point does a nation say, “This event is in my backyard” or “Because of our membership in this alliance we have got to respond to it”? How far across the world, in what nations, does something have to be done? And how does this tie in with the aspirations of the NGO participants who have a much wider global reach?

Peacetime structures. In 1996 in the U.K. we set up a Permanent Joint Headquarters. I sat in on a particular meeting in which two of the service chiefs said, “Over my dead body will we have a single joint headquarters; it will never work.” The fact is that it has worked, and several other nations have looked at what the U.K. has done and said, “This is not a bad idea, let’s do something similar.”

There is also the question of the strength of the peacetime structures, where you invest your scarce resources. One lesson we learned in the U.K. is that you do not invest money in attachés around the world to work with the diplomatic staffs at your peril. We did not have much attaché presence in some countries in and around Afghanistan. We had to parachute them in and they did a pretty good job at building relationships. I would like to pay tribute to the diplomatic staffs in the Foreign Office and in the Department for International Development (DFID) for the way they worked together on the ground.

Coalition. Who is in the coalition? Is it a coalition of the willing?

Media and public support. Is public opinion supporting a particular operation? There has been significant apathy in the U.K. regarding our operations in Iraq, yet much greater public support for the Afghanistan operation, where something has to be done for the good of that nation.

Intelligence. How much should we invest in intelligence gathering? With whom do we share our intelligence? I believe we got a lot better at intelligence gathering after September 11. Before that time, some intelligence sharing was taking place bilaterally. But in 2003, the U.K. set up a Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) where people from the various agencies responsible for dealing with terrorism work in the same room 24 hours a day and seven days a week. They are there to alert people when there is a need.

Managing after a conflict. How do we deal with conflict aftermath? The U.K. has put an awful lot of time, effort, and money into how to deal with the aftermath in Iraq once the war is won, no matter how long that war goes on. I think we have all seen the difficulty we had in the U.K. getting people to take a common approach in terms of time, energy, drive, and money, and how to improve on that. It is sad to hear that we are still worrying about electricity and about other basic things in Iraq despite the time we have had to deal with this as a nation.

THE REALITIES

I would now like to talk about the EU and NATO headquarters. I personally have no difficulty with the idea of a single headquarters to deal with NATO matters and with attaching an EU planning cell to it. I do have questions for our ministers, however, about a separate, stand-alone EU headquarters: How big would it be? What would its role be? Would it just do planning? Where would its resources—ships, tanks, airplanes, people—come from? How would it conflict with planning to respond to a crisis that almost certainly would be going on in NATO headquarters and in national capitals? How many staff cars would it have? How many drivers? How many national support elements would be attached to it? What would the cost be? Those are my concerns here, not the ideology of it, because we need to have some mechanism for joining in a far more intimate manner EU and NATO planning efforts.

The other realities that must be dealt with include:

Different cultures. There are differing cultures within nations, with some nations more upfront than other nations.

Urgent operational requirements. How many ships, tanks, and airplanes are fully equipped for operating in the heat of the desert (the temperature in Kuwait can be over 40 degrees Celsius)? High temperatures need cooling devices, and weapons rest to deal with the heat. In the U.K. we have dealt with NBC training and cold-weather suits, for the climate that we are used to, so it took us a while to get ready. There are also other hugely important things like body armor. How much money do you spend on body armor? How many sets do you need? Do you have a set for every man and woman who may go to war or do you have a set for those who are most likely to go to war? This was a huge political issue in the U.K. during my time as the vice chief. It did not represent a lot of money but it was something we had not given enough attention to at an early stage. I know that such lessons have been well taken abroad by the nations already.

Reserves. How many reserves do we need? What skill sets do they have? What is their readiness?

Peacetime readiness/Force structures. How many of your forces are at very high readiness? What is the cost of that? How many are back here at a month's readiness? What is the training bill that goes with readiness?

Rules of engagement. Different nations have different national priorities. Let me talk about just one example, the matching of dropping bombs from airplanes to potential targets and collateral damage. What is an acceptable degree of collateral damage when you are fighting a war? Is it the risk that no one will be killed other than the enemy? Is it the risk that 10 people may die if you hit the train on the bridge? There are clear guidelines and clear directions on this in the U.K. and they are never broken.

Manpower. What level of manpower do you have in peacetime? In the U.K. we have cut back in the army, navy, and air force over the years and rightly so, because, during World War II, it took about a thousand bombers to bomb Dresden with 10 people on each Lancaster. Today, the same effect can be achieved in a conventional operation with one or two platforms with standoff weapons from a great distance.

Role of civilians and the military. Is the peacetime force structure large enough? How do we deal with time away from home? What are the pressures on the families?

THE SOLUTIONS

There is a huge, crucial need in my view for peacetime training with the NGOs—with those headquarters wherever they are within the national capitals. It is also essential to get the top people involved in those training events. In the U.K.'s case, we were fortunate: The prime minister held certain types of exercise and we played down the chain. When the chiefs of staff met in London every day, the battle rhythm started at about 6:30, going through chiefs of staff meetings with all the players we needed and who were joining up around the table. Exercises are important, be they virtual or live.

The final point I would like to make is that all this needs to be joined up by good information, by common data, by common understanding, and, above all, by intraoperability.

Part Six

Mr. Alfred Volkman
Office of the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense

Major General Claudio Tozzi
Office of the National Armaments Director, Italy

Mr. Thomas Homberg
Corporate Vice President, EADS

Mr. Timothy Shephard
Regional Vice President, Northrop Grumman

Mr. Edgar Buckley
Senior Vice President, Thales

Dr. Scott Harris
President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin Global, Inc

Mr. Kent Schneider
President, AFCEA

Mr. David Patterson
U.S. Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense

Chapter 31

The Challenges of Using our Defense Industrial Base Effectively

Mr. Alfred Volkman¹

OPENING REMARKS

I would like to welcome you to the panel on the relationship between governments and defense industries in a global industrial base. To set the scene, Roger Weissinger-Baylon has made this a workshop on global security for many years. Of course, the one thought that always comes to my mind when I participate in these workshops is that they might better be called workshops on global *in*security, because, after you listen to a day and a half or two days of presentations, you might have a gloomy view of our future in the world, and probably with some reason. Fortunately, pleasant people always attend the workshops, we always have wonderful cultural experiences, and we always have warm experiences. So we do not need to be quite so gloomy.

However, there are a lot of reasons for having a sense of insecurity. In addition to what we think of as traditional global threats posed by nation-states, we also have to be concerned these days about the threats from terrorists, energy costs and shortages, climate change, unchecked immigration, and economic uncertainty. And those are just a few of the things that have been mentioned during the conference.

THE CHALLENGES OF EFFECTIVELY USING OUR DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE CAPABILITIES

This distinguished panel is going to discuss what may be a more pleasant topic—the global defense industrial base, which I believe is strong, innovative, and capable of providing us with the equipment and technology that will permit us to defeat our adversaries, whoever they may be. The challenge, however, is how to effectively use this existing, enormous industrial and technological capability. I think it will become evident during the discussion that we can do a lot better job of using our industrial resources. But there are many issues that governments and industry must address if we are to effectively equip our

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Mr. Alfred Volkman is Director for International Cooperation in the Office of the United States Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).

warfighters and, as General Joulwan would be the first to say, that is what this is all about. It is about our warfighters, and making sure that they can do their job.

As several speakers have mentioned, we have scarce resources. There is never enough money, and we now seem to be entering a time of economic hardship and economic decline. For example, recently the *Wall Street Journal* said that the public debt in Italy exceeds 100% of the annual gross national product, and that is not picking on Italy; in the United States we are also experiencing some economic difficulties. So it is reasonable to expect that the resources that are available for defense will be challenged. What do we do about that? Politicians want jobs for their constituents, military men want military capability, politicians and government administrators also want to keep constraining the costs that are associated with equipping our forces and with defending our national security. In NATO, for instance, we have been trying for over 10 years to get a ground surveillance capability. I would contend that this is because we cannot strike the right balance among industrial participation by nations, military capability, and the cost that is required to provide this kind of capability—a problem we need to address.

Most nations are now actively engaged in a war against terrorists, but many nations believe that they also must be prepared to fight conventional wars against nation-states. How do we balance the resources that we have to wage the battle against terrorism, the long war that we will be fighting against terrorist threats, with the legitimate need to think about how we must defend ourselves in a more conventional war against traditional nation-states? You could argue that this has been on the front page of papers in the United States lately because, frankly, it cost my friend and former boss Secretary of the Air Force Mike Wynne his job because of a disagreement he and Mr. Gates had over the exact direction we should go in this regard. As a matter of fact, Mr. Wynne told me once that he had a personality conflict with his boss, and he said that when that is the case, your boss has the personality and you have the conflict! (That is my one joke!)

Another question we must ask is, What industrial capability must governments maintain within their borders and for what else can they rely on the global industrial base? I know that the United Kingdom has been struggling for several years with defense industrial policy, though my U.K. colleagues may disagree with the word “struggling.” But it is a difficult area that requires a lot of thought, and, no matter what you decide, someone is going to be unhappy about your decision. We have here a distinguished panel of industrialists and government officials to discuss some of the issues I have just raised.

Chapter 32

Finding Operational Solutions: Italy's Approach

Major General Claudio Tozzi¹

The European integration process is leading to a significant increase in intergovernmental cooperation programs, ranging from R&D to production to the creation of transnational defense companies. European enterprises are losing their national identity. This is driving European governments to reinforce their cooperation in the fields of procurement, research, market rules, and exports—all matters that are dealt with in environments such as LOI, OCCAR, and the European Defense Agency. Although the Europeans' assumption of greater responsibilities in maintaining peace and sharing relative costs is viewed very favorably, worries arising from global competition are still a constraint. This prevents the improvement of cooperative initiatives between the U.S. and EU, which in the foreseeable future will remain the two main actors in the fields of technology and international programs.

ITALY'S COMMITMENT TO FINDING OPERATIONAL SOLUTIONS

In recent years, Italy has been strongly committed to finding operational solutions for promoting a more balanced situation between the parties involved and for allowing greater possibilities for cooperation with the U.S. in the armaments field. Within the framework of the Declaration of Principles, significant agreement on supply security has been achieved. This has led to a way to regulate priorities for defense orders whenever national interests require prioritization, through a system based on voluntary commitment to a code of conduct. Agreements like this have contributed towards creating an environment of greater reciprocal trust, which should lead to further developments in the armaments sector, such as the adoption of an initial fast-track procedure to speed up ITAR authorizations, which could lead to exemption from ITAR regulations altogether.

Italy encourages an innovative approach to multi-partnership programs. For example, the E5 program should be used as a natural platform from which to experiment and reinforce the possibility of greater future cooperation at the governmental and industrial level. On the basis of lessons learned and the experience acquired through system development and demonstration, we believe that an innovative approach

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will enable the possibility of having future program phases, such as production support and development.

THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN THE EXPORT-CONTROL SYSTEM

However, some changes could be made to the export control system. The traditional U.S. approach has been to have just one American military component in the system and to require authorization by the American government before the component can be reexported. This approach results in the involvement of all component-supply nations and political responsibility for exports to third-party nations. However, significant progress in this sector has been seen in the DOD's consideration of simplifying the license-granting process for exports for countries deemed reliable, rather than continuing case-by-case assessment, with its unacceptably long lead times.

A far more significant step forward in relations between the U.S. and some selected Western countries can be seen in the defense trade cooperation treaties signed in 2007. These treaties, currently in Congress's ratification phase, will make it easier to trade military items by eliminating the need for most of the export licenses that companies now must obtain before they can sell to foreign buyers. In practice, instead of requiring a license for each transaction, the treaties create approved communities of companies that can freely buy and sell most military items under certain circumstances. Eliminating the need for most export licenses will also increase joint research, development, and production of defense equipment and expedite delivery of critical warfighting equipment, thus providing greater and lower-cost access to world-class cutting-edge technologies in the U.S., the U.K., and Australia, much to taxpayers' benefit.

We fully recognize the primary need to prevent equipment from going to potential adversaries, but opening U.S. export control policy could deeply benefit the armed forces, which could be far more integrated and interoperable than they are today. As a matter of fact, treaties such as those mentioned will enable defense establishments to achieve fully interoperable forces and to leverage the strength of defense industries in support of the armed forces. This cooperation will benefit operational defense capabilities by improving the interoperability of equipment and systems for forces who must be able to fight not only in traditional battlefield situations but also when they are faced by asymmetric threats such as improvised explosive devices. By removing barriers to communication and collaboration between the armed forces and defense industries, it will be much easier to counter such threats.

Such new arrangements will help to maintain the strength of the respective defense industries by taking advantage of highly developed technical expertise. For example, as a consequence of the U.S. acquiring important European products, such as the Joint Cargo Aircraft, for both the U.S. army and the air force, the defense treaty community would be expanded to other European countries such as Italy and France and, later, to the whole of Europe. The ongoing process of developing a fully integrated European defense equipment market, in my opinion, is an excellent way to improve transatlantic collaboration, not based on bilateral agreements but on bi-continental cooperation between the EU and the U.S.

RETAINING CAPABILITIES WHILE INCREASING COLLABORATION

The above, in my view, is the real challenge that in the short to medium term must be faced by our governments. But it is my wish that we consider this challenge more as an opportunity rather than as a risk, because a fully fledged transatlantic market could improve the efficiency of the American market as a consequence of increasing competition. Therefore a good solution for the European side is to retain its own key industrial capabilities while at the same time increasing industrial collaboration among its own companies, in order to create a stronger European DTIB in a more and more transparent defense equip-

ment market. In the meantime, it should be very fruitful to foster cooperation with the U.S. in order to develop international programs in common technologies. Renewing such relations between the two shores could be accomplished through the aforementioned multilateral defense cooperation tools OCCAR, the European Defense Agency, and LOI, which have proven their reliability on several occasions.

As for the decline in defense budgets, the way out is rather clear. We need to work better together and to pool our research, technology, and know-how in order to spend our resources in an intelligent way. The key is to encourage all programs that are run in cooperation with other member-nations and to support collaboration between companies. Such behavior will also contribute to avoiding unnecessary competition and will give new impetus to developing common capabilities.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Every operational solution aimed at balancing responsibilities and duties between European countries and the United States will contribute towards eliminating the obstacles on the road. It will also help to create an efficient defense market and to reinforce the strategic *raison d'être* of our transatlantic alliance.

Chapter 33

A Vision for the European Defense and Security Industrial Base: From Fragmentation to Integration

Mr. Thomas Homberg¹

My theses are these: First, because today's threat scenarios are *global*, purely *national* security approaches are definitely insufficient. Second, because we have to internationalize and integrate security, we have to do the same for policies and for the industrial setup. With these two theses in mind, I will comment on the integration and further consolidation of the industrial base in close coordination with politics and with defense and security forces.

THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE DEFENSE-SECURITY LANDSCAPE

All societies require an adapted security toolbox, i.e., defense and security forces equipped with the latest available technology and the equipment to match today's threat complexity. To ensure this, we need a performing, competitive, and sustainable industrial base. But how does this base look today? Today's defense and security industrial landscape is rather fragmented. In particular, there is fragmentation:

Of the industrial and technological capabilities within EU member-states and in the transatlantic context

Of product specifications answering diverse national requirements—this nonalignment leads to redundant, complex, and very costly developments, and the different national specifications also cause interoperability issues when we send our troops in theater

Of funding for research, development, and procurement

And all of this fragmentation is directly caused by the huge number of industrial players

Let me give you just one figure to illustrate the lack of joint funding. According to the figures of the European Defense Agency, more than 70% of defense equipment procurement is nationally funded versus roughly 20% that is spent collaboratively in the European framework and just a marginal amount in the non-European framework. This phenomenon hurts particularly in Europe (although not exclusively), because our budgets here are, at least compared to U.S. funding, still rather low.

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Mr. Thomas Homberg is Corporate Vice President, Strategic Coordination.

Defense investment spending in Europe is lower than that in the U.S. by a factor of ~ 2.5 , and R&D expenditure in Europe is even lower, by a factor of ~ 6 . Too many national players in Europe lead to industrial inefficiencies, and it is rather obvious that we do not spend cleverly enough when accepting redundancies and overlaps, specifically in times of restrained resources. Europe has the obligation to improve competitiveness in order to preserve its capability to act as a credible and sustainable partner on an eye-to-eye level with all our U.S. and global friends as we take on global threats. If we believe in transatlantic cooperation we cannot afford asymmetry in that relation.

A VISION FOR THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL BASE AND THE TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY

For these reasons, the vision for the European industrial base and also for the transatlantic link should be comprised of at least the following seven points:

1. Consolidation of demand to best use our European industrial strength, thereby contributing to a real transatlantic and global effort
2. Harmonization of requirements to strongly support industrial rationalization; it would also be desirable to define strategic interest, including the industrial domain, on an international rather than a national level
3. Establishment of common programs and real work sharing, based on centers of excellence
4. More focus on, more coordination of, and more money for research
5. Common programs based on common standards to optimize the warfighter's efficiency; I think that organizations such as the European Defense Agency and the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC) in the U.S. will be of good help in this area
6. Good and open access to government defense and security planners and their concepts in order to ensure fast and cost-efficient development cycles
7. Access to lessons learned from exercises and operations to step wise, push forward, and optimize industrial solutions in a spiral development.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I would like to conclude with three points:

1. We have to overcome the trend towards national industrial protectionism. If all parties insist on protecting the national champions first, the result will be reduced competitiveness, limited innovation capability, and, ultimately, the risk of erosion.
2. Industry is being asked to support global security in various matters and it is obvious that mastering these challenges is not feasible alone on purely national grounds.
3. It requires a dedicated industrial policy to ensure European industrial competitiveness and thereby strengthen the transatlantic link. This policy should target long-term sustainability and the capability to act as a partner on an eye-to-eye level for the best possible European contribution to protecting against common global threats.

The good news here is that the majority of the points I mentioned are well known. The bad news, however, is that we do not push sufficiently to make faster progress on the above requirements.

Let me make a personal concluding comment. For nearly 20 years I served in the German armed forces in paratroop and airborne units and having experienced industry as well being the Head of Strategy of my group, I know a little bit of "both worlds." I believe in the following principle: We are obliged

to deliver the best available equipment to our forces in theater and in operations, since they take care of our security, putting their lives at risk. This incentive shall be the strongest of all, leading us to faster results. It is an obligation which must not become a victim of any industrial or political power game.

Chapter 34

Comments on Recent Developments

Mr. Timothy Shephard¹

OPENING REMARKS

It has consistently been my contention that the necessary symbiosis of politics and procurement trends in the United States is toward utility for the end user first and to political considerations, though omnipresent, second. At stake presently, however, is the perception of political procurement, in which U.S. government prerogatives to attach ITAR principles of export controls for non-U.S. technology exported to undesirable third countries is best justified by the promise of access to America's unsurpassed defense acquisition budget.

I warmed immediately to Des Browne when he said that he believed in politics—he made me feel that he saw the value of his personal investments in time and effort. I would like to say something similar without undue irony, which is that I believe in the military-industrial complex. In addition to earthquakes, floods, and fires, the Old Testament Book of Revelations cites the occurrence of opposites coexisting as a physical paradox at the end of days. It is like dogs and cats living together in apparent harmony, the tallest guy in the National Basketball Association being from China, the U.S. Democratic Party declaring itself the champion of no big contracts, and congressional doves posing as born-again nationalists for domestic political purposes.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TANKER COMPETITION

I would now like to draw your attention to a few matters of record. That there has been a tanker competition at all is the direct result of the 2004 lobbyist activities to push through funding for a massive sole-source contract and for the Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee to bar competitors. Those tactics comprised the largest-ever congressional earmark allowing a contract to side-step normal contract and competition rules. The resulting investigation by the Senate Armed Services Committee saw significant consequences for several individuals, both in industry and in the civilian arm of the acquisition process.

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Mr. Timothy Shephard is Regional Vice President, Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems International, EuroAmerican.

Subsequently, a Northrop-EADS bid to bring 48,000 jobs to the American south was questioned by nativist elements in America who championed a competitor's bid. That competitor would build or source much of its own tankers outside America, principally in Europe, ironically, through its commercial partnerships there, but the bid may paradoxically include component subsystems from as far away as China. I refer you again to my Book of Revelations.

In the end, any thoughtful person will find it difficult to see the benefit from a delay in getting new versions of critical defense infrastructure online, infrastructure that directly impacts the ability to keep airborne and operational the air cover and persistent surveillance available to the groundfighter and that has direct impact on the mortality rate of all of our soldiers.

The events playing out are being set back, and we feel it as a physical blow to our coalition troops, who are stuck fighting two hard 21st-century wars with Eisenhower air tankers. That brings me back to my ruminations on the military-industrial complex. It was Eisenhower himself who warned of the military-industrial complex's potentially corrosive impact on American society and government. His comments in 1961 were made in the context of the times, a post-atomic world firmly in the grip of the Cold War, when Orwell's famous first seminal work, *1984*, announced that war is peace. I am now reminded of the political rhetoric in Orwell's second most popular double-think missive: that ignorance is strength. These words are now in danger of applying to any government procurement process, be it in America or Europe, where protected industry is championed on the basis of sovereignty and nationalism at the expense of effectiveness and truth. And we may yet be defined by the ultimate double-think term: that freedom is slavery.

I think the U.S. system is based on the rule of law, and I urge my colleagues at this workshop to hold faith that our system will run its course and that we will end up with the best solution. I can hope for nothing less.

Chapter 35

Why We Need a Strong Technology Base

Dr. Edgar Buckley¹

THE NEED FOR A STRONG DEFENSE AND TECHNOLOGY BASE

I want to start with a simple point, which is that the defense industry and defense technology base as well as civilian security forces are capabilities in just the same way military forces are. You commonly see capabilities expressed in terms of military and civilian assets, but you hardly ever see capabilities defined to include the defense industry and defense technology. To prove my point, if you look in the European Union's security strategy and do a word search for the word "industry," you will not find it. And if you do a word search for the word "technology," you will not find it either. So here is a security strategy that thinks it can do it all without the defence industry, and I hardly think that is possible.

I do not think you can have strong defense and security without a strong defense and technology base. We need that in the United States. We also need it in Europe. I have yet to hear Al Volkman say that we need a strong European defense industrial technology base, though I hope I will soon. I have said it about the United States, so it is only fair that he should say it about Europe.

In Europe, then, we need to push ahead with building a strong European defense, and I think Thomas Homborg gave us the recipe for that. At the same time, we need to strengthen transatlantic defense industrial cooperation, including taking steps to streamline, simplify, and make more logical and efficient the regulatory practices on both sides of the Atlantic. Of course, when such regulations serve a security purpose, we need to keep them and make them work efficiently.

THALES RAYTHEON SYSTEMS AND NCOIC

That is all I want to say about this process. Now I want to talk about two successful transatlantic ventures my company is involved in —one is called Thales Raytheon Systems and the other is the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium (NCOIC).

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Dr. Edgar Buckley is Senior Vice President for EU, NATO and European Cooperation, European Business Development, at Thales.

Thales Raytheon Systems (TRS) is a 50-50 joint venture with Raytheon, the only functioning joint venture of its type. It operates with an integrated management, not a proxy board, and because it has a special security agreement called a Security Control Agreement, it operates as a proper company. TRS employs 1,500 people on both sides of the Atlantic and is successful. It delivers one of the most important backbone items for NATO and Europe, the Air Command and Control System (ACCS), which will be coming to the end of its development tests in the next few months. That system is also going to be at the heart of NATO's active layer theater ballistic missile defense system. We have formed a TRS-led group of companies to bid for this contract that includes Lockheed Martin, Selex, EADS and IABG. It is a very good consortium and we think we will soon have a contract to provide the software for theater missile defense.

Why is this company successful? I think there are three reasons why transatlantic cooperation has worked here. First of all, it is a venture that has very strong support from the parent companies. They stuck with it even when the going was difficult. Just as important, it has very strong support from the governments on both sides. The company would never have been set up if we had not had active support from officials in the Pentagon and from French authorities. Third, the company is focused strongly on operational needs.

Now let me turn to a second example of successful transatlantic cooperation, the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium. In just over three years, NCOIC has also become an outstanding success. Over 100 companies are involved, mostly from the United States and Europe, including almost every major company in the defense and information systems business.

Though NCOIC has not yet delivered breakthrough products, we think it will. We have settled on how we are going to deliver network-centricity on a global basis, and that is through defining repeatable patterns of how to solve problems in a network-centric architecture. There are not that many patterns that we will have to agree on before we can significantly accelerate network-centricity, which is what we want to see.

With NCOIC we also have very strong support from the governments and the international organizations involved. We have a star-studded group of people on our advisory council, including the four senior NATO officials responsible for NATO Network Enabled Capability. We also have very senior representatives of the U.S. and European governments, including the Honorable John Grimes. All the allied countries, apart from Spain, are involved. In addition, the European Defense Agency is participating. We have brought everybody together and we are all contributing to making this work.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I draw two key conclusions from what I've talked about:

When we go forward in this community to write new security strategies, don't forget the defense technology and industrial base. We will not achieve anything without it.

We can achieve success if we all commit to it, governments as well as companies. We must work together. It is not easy, but together we can succeed.

Chapter 36

Challenges of Transatlantic Defense Industrial Cooperation

Dr. Scott A. Harris¹

It is my pleasure to appear with my colleagues on this panel on issues concerning the global industrial base. Al Volkman asked us also to comment on the response of industry to declining global defense budgets. He also asked us to be brief, to allow time for comments and questions. Therefore, I will get right to the heart of the matter.

My focus is on transatlantic defense cooperation. While our friends in Asia and in other parts of the world are developing some industrial capabilities, the transatlantic arena is the key arena for the globalizing industrial base.

TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

If we are to have a robust and healthy transatlantic industrial base, then companies on both sides of the Atlantic must be able to contribute meaningfully to technology and equipment requirements. This is only possible if levels of investment are adequate and companies are kept lean and efficient through the discipline of an open and competitive marketplace.

In this regard, I see three notable trends:

1. The European Commission and the European Defence Agency are attempting to create greater transparency and competition in the European market. This is good. They are not attempting to foster transatlantic cooperation, leaving that issue to the Member States. There is an undertone in some of the discussion in Brussels that European markets and industries should be protected and strengthened before being subjected to the rigors of international competition. This, in my view, is misguided. Protectionism has never been a substitute for competitive strength, and companies who seek such protection will only grow weaker until they are, quite literally, protected to death.

2. The second trend is toward increased transatlantic cooperation. I will name some of the more prominent programs, many of which are associated with my company: The German-Italian-American MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense) program; the U.S. VH-71 presidential helicopter; Aegis combat systems on European ships; European components on American ships for littoral combat and the Coast Guard; C-27J and UH-145 aircraft in the United States; and, of course, air refueling tankers, which

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are still in contention. We also see the formation of international industrial teams to pursue opportunities to support NATO directly, as in command and control or missile defense. And I would single out for special mention the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the flagship international cooperation program which is setting new standards for international partnership and technological and industrial cooperation.

These trends are all good from the standpoint of strengthened transatlantic cooperation, but each has a worrisome side. It is difficult to sustain political support for international programs, nations tend to pursue their own goals within the programs, making management complex and costly, and issues such as technology transfer can add immensely to the management challenges. Nevertheless, the fact that the number of these programs is increasing tells us that the industrial base is globalizing as fast and as far as the political environment will permit.

3. An increasing number of European firms are expanding their presence in the American market through investment. As these companies acquire American companies, they become transatlantic in character and further unify the industrial base.

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

That is the relatively positive side of the story. What about resources? Here, the picture is not so good.

It is by now well known that the United States outspends Europe by better than 2-1 in procurement and 6-1 in research and development. Most European countries fail to reach the target of 2% of GDP expended on defense. Six countries in Europe provide 80% of Europe's defense spending. What we must recognize is that these ratios have not changed at all for nearly ten years, and that the cumulative effect of this differential, repeated year after year, is a capabilities gap across the Atlantic that threatens to become unbridgeable.

Without sufficient resources, we will be unable to continue to advance transatlantic defense cooperation. Meaningful collaboration becomes more difficult, emerging technologies are concentrated on one side of the ocean, the workforces do not have comparable skills. Therefore, I would point out the fundamental reality: There is no substitute for real expenditures on tangible programs if the health of European industry is to be preserved and if further transatlantic cooperation is to be possible.

At Lockheed Martin, we are committed to transatlantic cooperation and to the creation of global products for global markets. We will continue to work to enforce the positive trends cited above and to overcome the obstacles to further cooperation. We will continue to invest in technology, work to streamline the regulatory framework through which that technology can appropriately be shared, and seek to provide needed capability to our customers. And we will continue to advocate for an open and integrated transatlantic marketplace.

Chapter 37

How Industry and Government Must Work Together to Provide Best Value

Mr. Kent Schneider¹

AFCEA, the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, does not compete in this global and transatlantic market but rather has about 1,700 corporate members, including every company at this table, who participate in that market. Since about one in four members is located in Europe, we feel as though we have a foot on each side of the Atlantic.

I would like to give you our total memberships' perspective. And I'd like to talk about some of the themes you have heard about already but with just a little different spin on them.

SOME STATISTICS ON RESOURCES AND BUDGETS

We heard earlier from a number of speakers about dwindling resources and tightening budgets. Let me give you some numbers so that you can put some scale to that. In the U.S., in the defense market, we have experienced 34% real growth in the 2001–2008 time frame, and that includes the supplementals that have been so critical to meeting obligations. However, if you look at the 2009–2013 budgets, the expectation is, if the budgets hold up, that we will have a decline in real terms of 3.3% per year. Similar pressures in Europe are now being experienced, with recent budget reductions on the defense side in Germany, the U.K., and elsewhere. Of course, compounding those issues are the facts that the allocation of resources has shifted and that personal costs and inventory replacement as a result of the persistent conflict we have been experiencing, and O and M costs are increasing as a percentage of the budget. So that means that modernization programs and other efforts to improve capability get pushed even farther back as a result of those pressures.

THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY COMMUNICATION

To reinforce what Scott Harris was saying, globalization on the industry side is occurring at an incredible rate. Industry is expanding its market view. Why? Because budgets are declining everywhere, and as industries look locally, they do not see enough business to sustain themselves and so they start looking

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Mr. Kent Schneider is CEO of AFCEA International.

more broadly. The pace of change is also forcing industry to get farther ahead of what is going on. There needs to be more communication between government and industry because, in the absence of government vision, industry does not know where to go and does not know where to invest. It tries to get farther ahead, understand requirements, and invest earlier, and it is teaming because what it hears from government is that government wants total solutions. Most companies are not able to single-handedly provide that kind of capability so we are seeing more teaming and we are seeing teaming on a global basis.

We are also seeing companies intensify research and development. R&D spending in industry is going up in real terms every year and that is probably appropriate, particularly in the government space and the defense market, because government spending is going to go down. In real terms in the U.S., government R&D is going to be down 21.7% over the 2009–2013 period, and the only place where that slack is going to be made up is on the industry side.

Of course, cross-border M and A activity is at an all-time high. The defense industrial strategies of the European Union are forcing U.S. companies to acquire in Europe. Why? Because you say you want to buy local, so U.S. companies are acquiring local so that they can be viewed as a local player. On the other side of the Atlantic, the motivation is a little bit different. With the change and exchange rates, U.S. companies are selling at bargain rates—the number three acquirer of public sector IT companies last year in the U.S. was QinetiQ North America, a U.S.-based company. However, the players at this table from Europe, EADS, and Thales have also been major acquirers along with BAE, VT, and a number of others.

PROVIDING BEST VALUE

Let me shift to the notion of best value. We have been talking about capabilities and optimizing capabilities and I will return the favor to Edgar Buckley and say that, yes, we in the U.S. believe that European industry needs to be strong and to have capability, and we need to team to provide best value. I think it is important to realize—and here I go back to Scott Harris's point—that with globalization, industry provider choices are no longer continental. Today, it is inappropriate to think that we want to buy European or we want to buy U.S. or we want to buy Asian. That is because all companies are globalizing, and even if you do not buy from a global company, the likelihood is that you are going to buy from a global team, because we are going to team across the Atlantic or across the Pacific in order to provide total capability.

I would argue that purchasing decisions should be made on best value. The dilemma there is figuring out what best value is—best value, like politics, is local and should be comprehensive, but it should be on the table at the beginning of an acquisition. Previously, in referring to the Northrop Grumman-EADS/Boeing tanker procurement, someone mentioned that the problem is one of process. Well, the problem with the process was that the Government Accountability Office determined that the rules changed in the middle of the procurement, so best value was defined in the RFP and then defined differently in the final evaluation. I do not know whether that is right or wrong. History will tell when the process is done. The point is that this is not the first time that criteria have been applied that were not on the table at the beginning of a procurement. So it seems to me that you want to encourage global teaming, you want to get the best capability—we need the best capability for our warfighters—but we also have to define and make known at the outset what best value means for a particular procurement. It should be holistic and it should be open so that industry can make good decisions about where to engage.

CREATING A LONG-RANGE STRATEGY

We should not be reluctant to put all the criteria on the table. Those of you who have been doing business in Europe for some time will remember when Geoff Hoon was the Secretary of State for Defense in the U.K. and published what is known as Hoon's Rules. Hoon's Rules basically said that we are interested

in quality capabilities but there are other things that interest us: We want to preserve intellectual property for the U.K., we want to grow jobs in the U.K., we want to advance the U.K. economy as part of this process. Well, all that is perfectly fair and everybody does that. The problem is that they don't all put it on the table. If you look at U.K. defense industrial strategy, you will see that many of Hoon's Rules are now embedded in that strategy—maybe not in exactly the same words, but the point is that it is about more than just an individual procurement, it is about long-range national strategy. I would argue that whether you talk about a national strategy or a coalition strategy for NATO, the same issue applies. And we need to put it on the table at the beginning and keep it stable through the acquisition.

We all need to move together to remove obstacles. ITAR has already been mentioned, and clearly ITAR can be a huge problem. When I was at Northrop Grumman, we won the contract in the U.K. to sustain and modernize the AWACS fleet and we teamed with a company called AAR in the United States to do supply chain. What we found was that every time we sent a major item back to the U.S. to be repaired, it had to be re-exported, because we had added value even though it came back exactly the way it looked before; we added value because when we sent it back it was broken and when it was returned to us it wasn't. So they said we had to re-export it, and then we could not meet the contract requirements. We ended up moving that operation for major repairs to the Netherlands.

What was the impact on the United States? It lost jobs. What was the impact on Europe? It gained jobs. And all this was because of an export policy that made no sense in the context in which we used it. We are all in favor of controlling the export of militarily sensitive items to make sure that they don't get in the hands of players we do not want involved. But we have to be realistic about what we control and how we do it.

Risk sharing is also an issue. It has been mentioned here, but a tendency of government when programs do not go well is to shift the risk to industry. When you do that, industry will raise the price to hedge the risk and, in the end, nobody will get best value. In the beginning, it is a good idea to talk about how you are going to handle risk. A procurement policy, of course, needs to be open and honest.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To close, what does industry need from government? First, it needs vision, because if we do not understand where government is going and we cannot position industry to support it, whether in Europe or in the U.S., we need government to define requirements and keep them stable. Most programs that fail do so because requirements drift over the course of the program and expectations are different at the end than they were in the beginning.

We also need short acquisition cycles—they are much too long. It is a lot easier to maintain requirements over months rather than years, and this is particularly acute in the IT environment, as I am sure General Wolf and his panel will talk about.

We also need to share risk appropriately and portray the playing field honestly, based on best value. We must put it all out there up front and keep it stable through to the end.

Chapter 38

Rethinking our Acquisition Policies

Mr. David Patterson¹

THE RESOURCE CRUNCH

I offer several points for your consideration. First, despite whatever the European security community believes about the willingness and appetite of the United States to continue to fund at the level it has been funding, I would suggest to you that it is not true. Despite the fact that we have enjoyed a fairly robust budget from the beginning of the 21st century until now, I submit that those times are over. Though the US has a base budget of \$512.5 billion and with an investment in procurement and research and development of over \$180 billion, we have remained somewhat stagnant at between 3.7% and 3.9% of the gross domestic product, which is the lowest since World War II.

Let me also explain that the reason you will see a resource crunch is because the focus of future years' budgets will not be on new starts but on reconstitution, repair, and replacement of existing equipment. Some dollars will be spent on recapitalization, but I leave it to your imagination to determine the definition of recapitalization. The word has a variety of definitions within the Pentagon, none of which are common, but I believe major program new starts will be few and far between.

So what is the challenge? The challenge is for industry to gather with government, which incidentally is the only major global enterprise relationship that has a monopoly selling to a monopsony. Unfortunately, what we have today with regard to that relationship—and this may sound unfair, but I am not so sure it is not true—is that government looks at industry and says, “I need it faster, cheaper, better.” Then industry says to government, “Outstanding! We can make it faster, cheaper, better, no matter how much it costs or how long it takes.” And government replies, “Hot dog (or bratwurst)! Where do we sign?” This approach to the acquisition relationship must stop.

DECLINING COMPETENCE

Another very difficult problem we have is that we have declining competence and a declining skill set within our acquisition workforce. This started during the 1990s, when we decided we were going to get

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rid of our “shoppers” and managed to get rid of our system engineers and cost estimators at the same time, which caused us untold problems. I do not think this is a problem that is unique to the United States or uncommon within the European community.

One of the consequences of not having a correctly sized, skilled workforce is that you cannot give them the flexibility to do contracting and source selection in the way we did in the past. I offer the fact that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has sustained protests on programs that would not have been protested in the past and that, more tragically, we do not have the capability, not only in the Air Force but also in the Army to create a protest-proof solicitation. The Army lost the ACS because they cancelled it after about \$900 million was spent. The contract for interpreters in Iraq continues to be in protest. Apparently, we do not have the competence to run a competition that is not protested and the protests sustained. What I submit to you is that it is fundamental to the experience levels of our people. In light of that, I submit that we need to replace the 54-page set of instructions with a rule set that establishes very clear and unambiguous direction, for example, when you enter systems development and demonstration, there are no more requirements allowed. The opportunity to provide the next greatest thing will not be allowed, unless those requesting the insertion of a new requirement can guarantee that there will be a four-to-one payback in savings and that the schedule will not be impacted.

BUILDING AND FUNDING NEEDS

Here is another rule for your consideration: The contractor will build what he bid and there will not be any more opportunities, while the ink is drying on the contract, for the folks from government to come in and say, “Oh, boy, I know what we asked for but what we really want is . . .” That should stop. Everything should be done within a time-defined period. I do not think that an airplane should take longer than five years—the F15 did not, the F16 did not, and the F15 came from a clean sheet of paper, not from a prototype competition.

We also need to insist on a stable budget, and we have recommended this as an initiative in what we refer to as capital funding. If you tell us how long it is going to take, we will guarantee that within that time frame we will fund you at the appropriate level. But do not fail! Your program will be reviewed by Congress twice a year, and, if three reviews in a row are red, your program is cancelled. Those kinds of rule sets, I believe, will be helpful in establishing programs that actually field weapons in a timely fashion.

COOPERATION, COLLABORATION, AND COMPETITION

Last, as a policy matter, I think that the United States government needs to understand the difference between cooperation, collaboration, and competition, and I offer some definitions. First of all, cooperation entails seeking to meet the government customer’s objectives in a relatively collegial manner while still striving to achieve company objectives and enhance shareholder value. Collaboration, on the other hand, is best characterized as teaming with other companies or the government customer, often suborning the company’s objectives to some commonly held goal. And competition is mobilizing all of the company’s resources to win a contract—it is clearly distinct from cooperation and collaboration. The government customer and the company do not sit down as partners.

I do not know how many times I have run up against folks in government who honestly believe that they are in a collaborative partnership, and how many times I’ve heard the word “partnership” while at the same time hearing, “Oh, by the way, we want the industry to suborn any profit motive in favor of the government’s objectives.” That is just plain silly. Industry is in business to make a profit. Industry does what government asks it to do contractually and to suggest anything else is naive.

RETHINKING OFFSETS

As a policy matter, and this is personal bias here, one of the things I have noted is that in the world of offsets and industrial participation often puts US industry at a competitive disadvantage. The United States Department of Defense has a Presidential executive order that proscribes it from encouraging our industries from seeking offsets as a condition of sale for other governments. Now, what is the consequence of that? Well, over the last 14 years, we have had a perpetual 71.2% disadvantage in offsets. In 2003, it was 124%. Over the last 14 years, we sold roughly \$80 billion worth of goods and had to buy \$60 billion dollars worth of goods in order to do that. I think we need to rethink that position. It may be appropriate in some cases, but it is not appropriate in every case. A system of reciprocity seems a better solution for the US aerospace and defense industry, if it is to compete successfully on a global scale. So I think that as a matter of policy we do need to rethink that position.

I offer these thoughts for your consideration, and I am grateful for this opportunity to be part of these discussions.

Part Seven

The Honorable John Grimes
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense

Mr. Robert Lentz
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo
Minister of Defense of Estonia

Mr. Tim Bloechl
Microsoft Corporation

Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

Chapter 39

Vulnerabilities and Dependencies in Cyber-Space

The Honorable John G. Grimes¹

Last year, when I spoke at the workshop, I focused on the global society dependency on the Internet and how threats to our networks could cause major disruptions. Activities across the global economy, government operations, business operations, airlines, air traffic control, and military operations—are just a few examples of how dependent we have become on this infrastructure, on the Internet.

As I also mentioned last year, and more so now, criminals, terrorists, state and non-state actors, are using IT Network technology for their purposes which are not always for good reasons. At the opening of the workshop, General Camporini mentioned that “the terrorists get more leverage from IT and the Internet than we do.” The fact that he made IT a major point in his presentation, to include network exploitation, tells you it is on the minds of military leaders. General Camporini also mentioned attribution. The attribution of an attack is hard to determine. The attack last year on Estonia’s Internet infrastructure used botnets (robots on the network) to take over computers and use them to attack other computers. Who did it? Was that a criminal act or was it an article 5 like act, intentional war?

On the NATO side, at the Riga and Bucharest summits, NATO communiqués recognized the criticality of cyber security to the Alliance. After the events in Estonia, the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board (NC3 board) which Peter Flory chairs, formalized some of the cyber security processes that address policy, technology and cyber defense operations. NATO also has an operations center headed by General Wolf, the director of the CIS Service Agency, to defend NATO’s networks and systems.

Cyber space is where IT is happening. The Internet continues to be a changing influence. The value of IT enabled global trade is estimated at 30% of the global GDP. That is 14 trillion dollars in global economic value that would have been lost without the Internet technology that most of us have in our homes, at work, and even in our pockets (wireless, the BlackBerry or Smart Phone, and other equivalent

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personal digital assistants). As more IT services and capabilities go online, more markets open up and new technologies fuel creative business models that dictate the need for robust cyber security solutions.

What do we need to be aware of when we talk about cyberspace? A few points can help bring things into focus:

First, what kinds of vulnerabilities and dependencies do we face in cyberspace?

Second, how are networks and computers being compromised—what are attackers doing?

Finally, what is being done now, and what can be done down the road to increase security?

VULNERABILITIES AND DEPENDENCIES IN CYBER-SPACE—WHAT DO WE FACE IN CYBER-SPACE?

Let us consider the nature of the problem: When cyber activity is detected, is it a crime or an act of war? Who decides? How?

A good example is the Estonian incident of April 2007 in which:

Hackers used the denial of service attack against the nation of Estonia;

The attack was focused on ministries, banks, newspapers, TV/radio and the Parliament in order to bring the country down on its knees;

Websites were knocked offline, emergency telephone lines were inoperable;

Botnets were used;

Fortunately, Estonia was able to recover very quickly thanks to its Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) but I am not sure that every nation has all those capabilities.

What do cyber-aggressors have in common?

About 90% of the attacks focus on home users. This is a global threat but with low value in our minds.

70% of the data breaches are in finance, government, and education. This is a corporate threat with medium value.

Less than 1% of the attacks focus on specific targets for military and corporate espionage such as nuclear command and control, or corporate strategic plans or programs. This is a cyber war threat of high value targets.

HOW DO SYSTEMS GET COMPROMISED?

Gaining Unauthorized Access to Computer Systems

Attackers seek to gain unauthorized access to our computer systems through known security holes in the software. Security flaws in web browsers and servers make it possible to exploit web-based applications, particularly on interactive sites using databases and scripts to generate content. As we move to a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and get away from the database architectures, we will have much better security in our networks for sharing information. This is already the case for Google and for the financial markets, which have already moved in that direction.

Security flaws that make it possible to push malicious software to computers are causing widespread problems. In fact, one in four home computers are infected with spyware, key-loggers or other malicious code, called MalWare. Recent reports by Google's security team indicate that 1.3% of search results link

to sites infected with MalWare. This means that about 59 million web pages have been intentionally damaged. The trend for new attacks has been going up very fast. There have been about 375 attacks per day over the last two years, and 72% of the PCs that do not have anti-virus protection have MalWare in them. The proliferation of MalWare is approaching epidemic levels, and it is a major concern to our government networks.

Socially Engineered Deception and Cyber Crime

Attackers often use fake emails or web sites to steal information and compromise users' computers. How does it work? A type of attack called "spear phishing" using emails targeted at specific users tries to get them to visit malicious web sites. These emails appear to be from a known or trusted source, from a trusted acquaintance, agency or business with a serious subject like would be for instance "Official information for UBS client." These emails entice users to go to realistic websites, causing their computers to be attacked. The web sites push out MalWare, which is set up as a "back door" on the computer for later attacks.

These socially engineered schemes are a growth industry for organized crime because they are effective, profitable and they work. Criminals craft emails that appear to be from courts of law, businesses, prospective employers, respected civic organizations and more. Sources indicate that since February 07, two groups are behind 95% of these attacks. They are increasingly focused on financial information, institutions and transactions.

There is also something quite disturbing called "e-currency" which is a slightly different problem from the other Information Assurance/Cyber issues. E-currency has its roots in the early days of the World Wide Web and has a direct impact on economic and national security. Risk assessment tied to e-currency is very complex. Transactions are difficult to track, accessible anywhere and fit well into the illicit movement of money—there is no way to dispute charges or rescind payment. Why do we care? Because terrorists can move and access money with virtually no accountability, creating tremendous opportunities for illicit activity.

Global Supply Chain Manipulation

Globalization of the supply chain processes and products is another major concern. The offshore global supply chain of computer H/W & S/W is particularly vulnerable to manipulation. An in-depth approach for managing product integrity will be required for ensuring the protection of H/W and S/W IT products. Let me give you a few examples:

Example 1. On February 29, 2008, the U.S. FBI's Cyber Division, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police cracked a case that identified about 3,500 counterfeit Cisco network components. This led to 10 convictions and \$1.7 million in restitution. The retail value of the counterfeit gear was \$3.5 million.

Example 2. On January 4, 2008, two brothers in the U.S. were indicted under allegations that they purchased and imported counterfeit computer network hardware from China, then sold them to retailers across the country. Some items were sold to the military, the FAA, the FBI, as well as several defense contractors, universities and financial institutions that procured them through a third party computer retailer.

The Defense Industrial Base (DIB) will need to focus on the industry protection of U.S. government sensitive information on their networks.

IMPROVING CYBER OR INTERNET SECURITY

What are the near term solutions?

A Shift from IPv4 to IPv6. The transition from Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) to Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) will dramatically improve security and scalability. The European Commission is looking to get 25% of businesses, public authorities and households on IPv6 by 2010.

Partnerships—International Cooperation.

ITU: The International Telecommunication Union is working to improve collaboration between industry and government; establishing computer security incident response teams, information sharing and analysis centers and warning, advice and reporting points.

ICANN: The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers is working to enforce domain name registration among registrants identified as having registered web site generating illicit traffic. Nearly 90% of illicit sites are tied to approximately 20 registrants.

NATO: The Estonian Cyber Center of Excellence focuses on training, tools and procedures related to improving cyber security and responsiveness.

The Council of Europe: The Convention on Cyber Crime is the first and only legal instrument addressing cyber attacks. It applies only to signatory nations, which are 38 Council members, plus the U.S., Canada, Japan, South Africa, and Montenegro.

ENISA: The European Network and Information Security Agency is looking at the policies and regulations that exist across EU Member States, the measures operators take and the technologies available to improve the resilience (availability and integrity) of communication networks.

WRAP-UP

The global information infrastructure is under siege every single day—it is being hit constantly, probed for weaknesses and openings where bad actors can gain unauthorized access. Cyber attacks are getting much more focused, and the level of sophistication we are seeing is growing. These cyber security challenges are coming at the same time as the network environment is rapidly expanding, sheer computing capacity is accelerating, and network costs are dropping.

At a recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology workshop on the issue of cyber security, some of the core issues that were discussed have relevance here. Let me share three of them in closing:

Does the spread of information warfare capabilities impact the stability of the international system?

Can we create a shared model or concept of escalation levels with related cyber actions that will enjoy international recognition?

Are cyber agreements really possible given the challenges of enforcement?

The need to cooperate and collaborate and share cyber security information at the national, regional and international level must take place through international partnerships and initiatives that are enforceable before we face a global 9/11.

Chapter 40

Cyber-Security as a Global Priority

Mr. Robert Lentz¹

We are now going to continue the discussion on cyber-security that John Grimes teed up at lunchtime. I am not sure how many of you were at the Moscow workshop in 2003, but that was the first time we had an in-depth discussion on cyber-security, and we began the dialogue that has continued ever since. Roger has been nice enough to make this topic a key part of this year's workshop.

CYBER-SECURITY—A GLOBAL PRIORITY

Cyber-security within the U.S. and within the international community, especially NATO, has become a very, very high priority. In January 2008 the president of the United States issued a new presidential directive on this issue. President Clinton issued the first one back in 1997-98 on critical infrastructure protection, and President Bush issued the first truly overarching one in 2003. Altogether there have been four or five presidential directives on cyber-security, so we are beginning to accelerate our emphasis on this issue.

As we talked about in 2007 with the defense minister from Estonia, the events in Estonia really upped the emphasis within the European continent on the fragility of the network. Within the Department of Defense and within the U.S. as a whole, the fragility of the network became a core issue in the late 90s; some of you might remember Solar Sunrise, which highlighted the challenges of defending the network and how fragile it was. It turned out that just three kids, one from Israel and two from California, brought down good chunks of the network. Soon after that event we conducted an exercise called Eligible Receiver that opened up the Department of Defense's eyes to how much work we have to do to tighten up the network.

The bottom line is that the threat is increasing at such a rate that our dependency on the network and all the information that flows on it, all the platforms that are now tied to it, and all the business systems and economic systems that are linked to it make it imperative that the cyber-defenders and cyber-protectors do their job effectively. At this point in time, my assessment is that we are losing that battle. We have got to get on top of it.

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Chapter 41

Dealing with Cyber-Attacks: A Global Challenge?

His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo¹

A little more than 10 years ago I lived much more of an academic than a political life. I was asked by the then-government to join in as a non-political cabinet member and to become the minister for education and research. One of the projects I launched was computerizing and networking all Estonian schools, so that every school boy and girl would have access to the Internet. Some critics said that there were not only good things on the Internet but bad ones as well, but I was reluctant to believe that this would be a major threat. The project was completed by 1999, which was pretty early on both a European and a global scale. Now I am responsible for fighting all the threats that can come from the Internet, which come along with all the good things.

I am going to share my views on this subject with slightly more of a political than a technical or a defense-related emphasis. Before doing so, however, I would like to reflect on the things that I have heard during the last three days and also give a bit of background on my presentation.

HOW GLOBAL IS THE THREAT OF CYBER-ATTACKS?

Throughout our deliberations I have been asking how global our threat assessments are. Haven't our perceptions been limited to the Euro-Atlantic space? The answer to that question is up in the air, but my asking it is appropriate, because, as was said at the beginning of this workshop, the meaning of the word security is "having no fear," and fear is much more a subconscious feeling than the result of some rational argument. I think a lot of what we do in defense, at least on the political level, is very much related to our perception of threats, to what our fears are based upon, and that some of the problems we face in global as well as regional security and defense policies are sometimes diversions of these perceptions. We perceive the threats differently—some as real, some as less real—and that creates a number of problems and misunderstandings.

In that regard, and with the somewhat Euro-Atlantic perception of global threats, it was very enlightening to listen to the contributions of Munir Akram from Pakistan and a number of other people who gave some insights into how they feel and what their perceptions of the threats are—maybe not the global threats but the very real national and regional threats. If we could create a network of those threats

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His Excellency Jaak Aaviksoo is the Minister of Defense of Estonia.

and have a map of the perceptions of those threats, we might be more successful in solving at least some of them.

I do believe that cyber-threats are generically global, and it is thus very appropriate to address this threat in a workshop on global security. Cyber-threats can emerge from anywhere in the world, and they can hit you in milliseconds anywhere in the world. It is hard to imagine something more global than cyber-threats; if you use a computer or a PDA such threats will address you directly, but cyber-attacks can influence you in indirect ways as well. And again perception is important; some of us may be annoyed when a large amount of spam mail or viruses invades our systems or we have a program that will not start, and some of us may have countrywide networks go down.

ADDRESSING THE DIVERGENCE IN THREAT PERCEPTION

As we learned in Estonia, and as some other countries have learned, both government and non-government institutions can come under unfriendly attacks with different objectives. If we ask, “What is the national perception of a possible cyber-threat?” Will there be a coherent understanding of the extent to which such a threat is shared by different agencies and government offices? I think the picture would be blurred, which is characteristic of the modern security environment at large. This divergence in threat perception is the biggest problem I see. If you ask defense or foreign affairs professionals where they feel national security threats lie and compare their answer to that of ordinary politicians and their constituents, you will see quite a large gap. I don’t think we will be able to address all of the problems unless we can bridge that gap.

Do we lack the resources to implement the Comprehensive Approach, whether or not everybody agrees to exactly what it is? No, we do not. I believe there are enough resources in the hands of the international community to follow the Comprehensive Approach. Therefore, can’t we raise enough resources to solve some security-related issues? Don’t we have enough resources? I think we do despite the fact that there are small gaps, because these can be breached provided the political will is there. In a way, the further we go from our borders, the greater the problem becomes, because we cannot consolidate political will. This inability, I believe, is directly related to the fact that we perceive the threats differently, within countries, between countries, in the Euro-Atlantic space, and across the Atlantic. And that is one of the reasons why we have not been able to perform as well as we might wish.

That is also why, when I was asked, “Minister, do you think that the gap between the words and the deeds of President Karzai regarding corruption is greater or smaller than the gap between the words and deeds of the international community on a comprehensive and coordinated approach?” I failed to give a good answer. I gave an answer as a politician, but I was not satisfied with it. The need to concentrate political will applies to a number of modern security issues, including cyber-defense. One of our major problems is trying to achieve this concentration in order to breach the perception gap and to decide how big a threat cyber-attacks truly are.

Are cyber-threats global threats? Yes, they are—there is no doubt. Are they real or imaginary? I believe that they will be real threats in the next several years to come, with a medium-level threat probability. Are we united in our perception of these threats? Regarding the military, politicians, and administrations internationally, the most probable answer is not yet.

OUR VULNERABILITY TO AND THE EFFECTS OF CYBER-THREATS

How vulnerable are we to these threats? As has been said twice at this conference, an interesting characteristic of the Internet is that the democratic international community believes that the Internet provides open access to information, that it is the best instrument for undermining totalitarian systems, and

that some countries have not only put limitations on but even plan to punish people who make use of the Internet. That is all true. But I think that all governments have not been able to efficiently use the possibilities the Internet offers against totalitarian regimes that use thousands of Internet sites to successfully spread their ideologies. So we must keep this fundamentally asymmetric characteristic of the Internet in mind whenever we address the question of how vulnerable we are.

Is it probable that threats from the Internet can cause casualties or kinetic effects? There is a very low probability of this. I know that several staged attacks have taken place to try to hack into some critical infrastructure, but they have usually failed at an early stage. In addition, the threat of an infrastructure being put out of order for considerable amounts of time so that the economy and social or public order is affected is low to medium.

Where I think we are more vulnerable is the integrity of our information systems. Most probably, our classified information systems are much better protected than large public or semi-public information systems, but when you think about how many people rely on public information systems in their decision making, it is a serious threat that could have an enormous impact. We need to remember that cyber-threats can have great effects on the hearts and minds of our people. Their ability to spread terror or at least to destabilize was efficiently proved in Estonia more than a year ago, and I estimate that there is a medium to high probability that the same kind of thing will happen again in the near future. Even more probable, however, is encountering the ongoing ideological pressure of totalitarian regimes whenever you spend 30 minutes looking at what is on the Internet.

COOPERATING AGAINST CYBER-THREATS

Now let me talk a bit from a somewhat political point of view. After the attacks in Estonia, my country started to compile a national cyber-defense strategy. This involves technology that we can develop and use to invent more complicated systems and critical infrastructures, which is a national responsibility on the political level. But I think we have to do more in the area of legislation on both the national and international levels. The fact that we have the Council of Europe Conventional Cyber Crime document, which has been ratified by a little less than 40 countries, is clearly a great step forward, but it is insufficient, not only in coverage but in depth of penetration. Nevertheless, I invite all countries to move ahead with that concept since territorial coverage is of fundamental importance.

In the area of international cooperation, there clearly has not been enough; whenever you want to disrupt a cyber-attack, you immediately run into activities that have to have international support, and if the legal framework is not in place, we have problems. Even if friendly help is provided there is always the possibility of infringing on third-party interest. In that respect I am glad that we recently signed a memorandum of understanding to start a cooperative Cyber-Defense Center of Excellence, which should be fully operational by the end of 2008. It is very much in line with NATO's cyber-defense policy that states that cyber-defense is first and foremost a national responsibility and that, secondly, cooperative cyber-defense builds on national capabilities.

If we want to solve the problems of cyber-security, then we have to speak about the policing of cyber-space. What do we mean by this? Whenever there is policing, individual rights are infringed upon, and this is always a high-profile political issue. So how can we enforce traffic rules? Can we impose hardware and software on the Internet? What should the proportions be regarding the expenditure limits of private companies and private individuals compared to public security interest? And who is responsible for enforcing the rules? What are legitimate means for counter-attacking even when we are able to identify the possible intruder? Since most attacks are globally distributed, there is a legitimacy problem. To what extent will we be willing to tolerate infringement of national rules when there is a possible target in a

third country? And last, as is usual in crime prevention, do we develop only reactive measures or do we devise and develop active cyber-crime prevention measures, including intelligence and other means?

CONCLUDING REMARKS

There are a lot of politically sensitive issues up in the air. Some of them are being solved on national levels and a few on the international level. But clearly there must be a lot more political engagement and discussion to build on public awareness of the seriousness of cyber-threats. That is why I am making it my mission to share my experience with cyber-attacks after being a strong proponent of a free Internet for many years before that event. I am still a proponent of a free Internet, there is no doubt about that, but I have seen the problems and I want to make the international public aware that we need to do something with that wonderful instrument if we want the Internet to be the friendly Internet.

Chapter 42

Protecting Critical Infrastructures

Mr. Tim Bloechl¹

Every time we get cash from an ATM, scan a bar code at the store, make a phone call, file an insurance claim, or use a search engine on the Internet, we are using part of the critical infrastructure. The critical infrastructure supports us at work, at play, in business, and, of course, across almost all aspects of military operations.

DEFINING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

In general terms, we define critical infrastructure as the facilities, services, and installations required by our societies to operate. It includes transportation, water, power, food delivery, banking and finance, hospitals, civil defense, police and fire support, telecommunications, and, of particular importance to this audience, national security networks. Critical infrastructure relating to information technology (IT) includes the global information and telecommunications network comprised of such entities as the Internet, satellite communications, television, telephones, and shared databases. These IT elements permeate all other aspects of the critical infrastructure.

When one considers just the networks we operate to control military operations—the interrelationship of these networks with commercial infrastructure to transport forces, logistics, and information—and the necessity to communicate across coalitions or with NGOs or other non-military actors, it is self-evident that military operational networks in peace and war are also a very important part of this critical infrastructure.

THE CURRENT AND FUTURE STATE OF THE MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE

We are certainly living through the evolution of the Information Age, and I for one believe we are closer to the beginning of it than to the end. The ability of military forces to see the battlefield with UAVs, satellites, and other means of detection; the ability to maintain a common, digital operating picture of

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friendly, threat, and other forces and actors based on an ever-expanding base of information that we must turn into knowledge; and the ability to move information and orders around the battlefield from the strategic level to the tip of the spear, including live video teleconference communications and soldier-level operating pictures and alerts—all of these capabilities and others have a significant impact on the speed within which decisions are made, targets are engaged, and maneuvers are executed. Also, as others have mentioned, modern telecommunications in the hands of the press and the general public have certainly had an impact on our operations as well.

Change will continue to be rapid as industry and military R&D efforts search for even greater capabilities. Near-term technologies allow touch or voice manipulation and searches of massive amounts of data and imagery on commercially available and inexpensive horizontal and vertical displays. Pilots will learn basic flying skills or plan and “fly through” flight missions using computer-generated cockpits within virtual worlds displaying real terrain and weather on laptops or desktop computers at minimal cost. This same capability may soon be in the hands of platoon and squad leaders on the ground, armed with the latest imagery from military and commercial sources and augmented with 3D, 360-degree views of target areas and routes. Mission planning, war gaming, and after-action reviews of mission execution captured with computers simplifies our ability to evaluate the effectiveness of courses of action and significantly decreases the time it takes to do so. Additionally, as computer and Internet search capabilities continue to improve, and data storage and bandwidth become less of an issue for supporting military operations, planners, warfighters, and staffs will reap even greater opportunities to improve mission execution.

While information technology and its impact on military operations evolve, some believe that if our networks and, to a greater extent, other segments of our critical infrastructure are left unprotected, IT will become our Achilles heel. As was mentioned by several of the speakers at this workshop, the loss or degradation of such infrastructure would have a serious impact on local, regional, or even global economies and societies, and certainly huge implications for national security.

WHY THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IS VULNERABLE

The critical infrastructure has always been vulnerable to some extent. Water supplies, transportation networks, and power plants have never been completely free of the threat of a physical attack. Today, because of the increasing ubiquity of IT and the global reach of the Internet, that vulnerability has been extended. Now we must also guard against thieves, vandals, hackers, terrorists, and, in cases involving military and intelligence operations, computer network attack or computer network exploitation, in network-centric warfare terms. Given the nature of incidents and manipulation against computers today, it is very difficult to be certain of the source of these attacks and infiltrations, because they appear to come from anywhere around the globe; the identities of those involved are difficult, if not impossible, to establish; and the full extent of damage may be hard to determine.

Furthermore, and perhaps even more alarming, would be efforts to quietly infiltrate infrastructure-related computer networks and, when the time is right, to execute attacks to disrupt or render inoperative elements of the infrastructure. This type of attack would certainly be a consideration for military operations; it is the source of much discussion in terms of the law of land warfare, doctrine, and war planning. If such attacks are carried out by terrorist organizations that do not identify themselves as the source of the attack and do not ascribe to the Geneva Convention and other forms of international order, how would we respond? Would such asymmetric attacks constitute a violation of national sovereignty? Would the circumstances of the attack present a *casus belli*? And who would we counterattack if it did? And what ROE would we employ as part of such operations?

Protecting the IT critical infrastructure has been an evolving process. Only a decade or so ago, applications, servers, and systems were not built with security, interconnectivity, resilience from attack, and reliability integral to their code. As the IT infrastructure matured, the need for these considerations became more obvious. Provisions for those features were “laid on top” of existing technology, sometimes with mixed results. Today security, privacy, and reliability are not merely optional features added to software—they must be engineered into these products.

CHALLENGES OF PROTECTING THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The overriding purpose of protecting the critical infrastructure is to assure the delivery of critical services to citizens and to allow government, and indeed our military forces, to function and fulfill obligations to the citizenry. However, some basic characteristics of our critical infrastructure present a challenge:

Society is more reliant on the critical infrastructure than ever before.

The sectors that make up the critical infrastructure are increasingly interdependent. In particular, all of them are increasingly dependent on IT.

The sectors are increasingly connected to untrusted and unregulated environments such as the Internet.

Our ability to protect the critical infrastructure has not kept pace with the pace at which new threats have arisen.

A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

Securing this critical infrastructure requires efforts on many fronts. No single group has the scope in terms of mandate or composition to address the entire problem, so partnership is a means, if not a necessity, to pool the best resources for the benefit of all and to share the solutions.

Even consumers, including most of us at this workshop, who have only their personal computers to protect, share some responsibility for the critical infrastructure. Not only do we have an interest in protecting the information on our own computers, but we must also guard against our computers being compromised and used to launch attacks on others.

Let me now identify the general roles and shared responsibilities I think we must observe:

Governments should:

Create an environment in which market-based incentives encourage the private sector to create secure products and services.

Help create guidance and best practices for government, the private sector, and consumers.

Be a role model by securing government systems and encouraging the procurement of products engineered for trustworthiness.

As part of government, military and national security organizations need to:

Establish agile certification standards for software and other IT products destined for sensitive networks. In this regard our view is that the Common Criteria standard is in great need of revision, and we welcome the opportunity to work with government to evolve this process.

The military should also establish and publish software assessment or evaluation procedures that lead to the adoption of the appropriate level of risk when making IT decisions. This will ensure that our military forces enjoy the best possible benefits from IT advances while protecting the networks these forces depend on from attack and exploitation.

Government also needs to help change current procurement procedures that stand in the way of spiral development and the rapid insertion of new technologies. I point out here that procurement bureaucracies are not a problem for some of the most dangerous terrorist organizations we face today.

I wonder what the role is for military and security services across other government and commercial critical infrastructures should they, and not the military networks, be attacked. This question could, by itself, be the discussion point for another panel, perhaps next year. Indeed, when one looks at the current state of these defenses, they are largely based on individual networks and not a combination of the whole. I wonder if we must move to the next step with defenses that are cross-functional, cross-industry, and perhaps regional or international. Without such an approach I worry that a local event against a particularly vulnerable node of the critical infrastructure could quickly become a national or international man-made disaster.

The private sector needs to:

Take seriously the responsibility to build secure products and services.

Build trustworthy products and services as a means to a competitive advantage.

Provide tools and guidance to help customers deploy and use their products.

I also think that all sides must focus on developing interoperable systems that allow us to reduce stovepipes and reduce the complexity of these systems, thereby leading to a higher probability that we will be able to defend them successfully.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I believe that we have some tremendous IT capabilities at work on the battlefield, within our logistics systems, and throughout the many other functional processes that form the basis of our military critical infrastructure. I am excited about the possibilities this and future technology advances offer us. At the same time, security must be considered throughout the development, testing, and deployment of these capabilities, so I would like to reinforce the comments of my colleagues on the panel today – cyber defense has become a critical warfighting mission. We must ensure the continuous operation of our military networks through a concerted military, government, and industry partnership and the development of resilient and agile defenses.

*Source utilized: Jerry Cochran, Microsoft Senior Security Strategist

Chapter 43

NATO and Cyber-Defense

Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf¹

At the last International Workshop in Paris, I recommended an open, politically driven discussion and an in-depth threat assessment to support a common, realistic understanding of the cyber-defense situation. The aim was the development of a comprehensive strategy. We needed an effective multiorganizational and multinational defense capability. Since that time, NATO has moved forward on this work and achieved major progress.

NCSA OPERATIONS

My organization, the NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA), has been in the driver's seat in improving NATO's operational capabilities in cyber-defense. We have also supported activities on the strategic and political levels.

The role of NCSA is to “ensure the provision of secure end-to-end information exchange services and information processing services required for NATO consultation, command and control using fielded communication and information systems in the most cost-effective manner.” These services are provided to over 100,000 users in North America, Europe, and Asia, in operational field situations as well as in many static headquarters and the mobile situations between them. NCSA supports six current operations, ranging from Afghanistan and Iraq to the Balkans and the maritime counter-terrorism operation in the Adriatic. We support 10 different security levels of communication and information systems (CISs)—some of which are interconnected—that have distinct user populations. In short, we have a fairly complex cyber-environment.

My agency is also involved in a seventh operation. Although largely unpublicized, every minute of every day we conduct an operation to defend NATO's critical CIS infrastructure, protecting borders that are often obscure against threats that are asymmetric, dangerous, and constant. As the director of NCSA, I am the commander of NATO's cyber-defense operations.

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Lieutenant General Ulrich Wolf is Director, NATO CIS Service Agency.

NATO AND CYBER-DEFENSE

After September 11, nations and organizations seriously began to consider protecting their critical communication and information systems infrastructure. NATO was one of them. In 2002, at the Prague Summit, our heads of state endorsed a formal Cyber-Defense Program. This three-phased program aimed to field a more coordinated and technologically modern defense of our networks and to further expand capabilities in subsequent phases. The first phase, which has been completed, enabled NATO's Computer Incident Response capability and saw the installation of intrusion detection systems on our networks.

Then, in 2007, we witnessed the distributed denial of service attacks against the communication and information systems infrastructure of Estonia, a NATO member-nation. NATO nations needed to be assured that our networks would be successfully defended in a similar situation. So NCSA was tasked to conduct a security assessment of NATO's infrastructure. Our report was used as the basis for continuing work in the area of NATO cyber-defense. In April 2008, the following statement was included in the Bucharest Summit Declaration, which was issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council:

"NATO remains committed to strengthening key Alliance information systems against cyber-attacks. We have recently adopted a Policy on Cyber-Defense, and are developing the structures and authorities to carry it out. Our Policy on Cyber-Defense emphasizes the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber-attack. We look forward to continuing the development of NATO's cyber-defense capabilities and strengthening the linkages between NATO and national authorities."

We realize that our infrastructure within NATO crosses traditional boundaries, and that what happens on one part of this linked network can very quickly affect another, with potentially catastrophic results. So any true defense must involve all of the major NATO stakeholders, from the political leadership to the military commands and the communication and information systems service provider.

This new organization is the NATO Cyber-Defense Management Authority (CDMA). The CDMA's primary mission is to review and coordinate NATO's cyber-defense capabilities, addressing in particular the cyber-threat to NATO, security risk management, vulnerability and assessment and business continuity with respect to communication and information systems that are critical to the functioning of the Alliance. The NATO CDMA has sole responsibility to act as a NATO-wide cyber-defense management authority and to initiate and coordinate immediate and effective cyber-defense action where appropriate. For the first time, the Alliance is addressing cyber-defense from a truly corporate perspective.

But there is no silver-bullet solution to cyber-defense, and we realize that there is no such thing as total security. However, NATO's work in modernizing its cyber-defense has been very successful so far, from the agreements and endorsements at the political level to the formation of strong and coordinated management structures through to the deployment of modern and effective operational defenses. Much of this, particularly at the front line of our cyber-defenses, has been achieved with the help of strong and effective partnerships with industry.

Such partnerships with our member-nations' cyber-defense capabilities are key to successful defense. For many years, NATO has survived on the tenet of "collective defense," which has never been more necessary than in today's globally connected world. Cooperation and sharing of information is critical for our collective effort. Within the Alliance, we strive to share information and learn best practices from each other. It makes me very proud that many of our nations have consulted my agency so that they can learn from and emulate our NATO Computer Incident Response capability.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To conclude, I would like to mention another indication of NATO's commitment to cyber-defense: The formation of the Center of Excellence for Cooperative Cyber-Defense (COE-CCD) in Tallinn, Estonia. The COE-CCD aims to further enhance NATO's cyber-defense capabilities with its highly specialized staffs, all of whom are voluntarily contributed by member-states.

I would also like to say that political interest in cyber-defense was triggered by September 11 and the events in Estonia in 2007. But we need to keep this interest alive in times without a major cyber-attack. The danger to our societies is too serious to leave it only in the hands of technical experts.

Part Eight

Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte
Italian Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee

Ambassador Kirsti Lintonen
Finnish Ambassador to the United Nations

Dr. Stefano Silvestri
President of Istituto Affari Internazionali

Ambassador Youcef Yousfi
Algerian Ambassador to Tunisia, former Foreign Minister

Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Admiral Luciano Zappata
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

Chapter 44

Thinking about Strategies

Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte¹

Today's proceedings had a lot to do with "strategy shaping." Strategy, though, is a difficult animal to handle. Unlike politics, it looks beyond two- to three-year time spans, and, also unlike politics, as Gen. Camporini pointed out, it is not reactive—it helps focus on the ultimate aim. Therefore, a lot of reflection is needed, as Peter Flory rightly said when he mentioned that Gen. Ulysses Grant regretted that he had not reflected more on the likely course of action his Confederate opponent, Gen. Johnson, might undertake.

Sun Tzu said something similar when he stated that "The winning general spends many hours in his tent before the battle." Actually, I am not certain whether he meant that a general, before battle, should have a sound sleep, like the Prince of Condé, or if he was encouraging his compatriots to do what Gen. Grant should have done, namely, to think out a well-conceived plan.

THE USE OF OMLTs

A well-conceived plan implies having clear knowledge of the tools you are about to use. One tool that we have is Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs).

OMLTs are not involved with training. They provide Afghan National Army (ANA) units with the human capabilities they do not have, such as the ability to coordinate fire, synergy in action, provisioning of medevac helicopters, and so on. OMLTs are precious, but they do not increase the skills of their Afghan fellow soldiers, unless these are taught to them through an ad-hoc curriculum.

A young diplomat from my country, in fact, was puzzled at the difficulty nations have in providing OMLTs, whose numbers range between 19 and 35 elements each, only to be told that the provisioning of one OMLT implies the stand-down of an operational battalion, which has to give up all its key figures at the junior officer and NCO level in order to generate the OMLT.

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At the time of the workshop, Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte was the Italian Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee.

ANA training, in short, is a lot more than OMLT provisions. It is no surprise, therefore, that SHAPE insists that medium- and long-term measures be taken in accordance with its well-conceived and comprehensive plan.

USING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

It is worth mentioning that the Comprehensive Approach, another tool that was mentioned earlier, is based on EBAO—the effect-based approach to operations—and that the latter relies heavily on bottom-up feedback, so that the top brass can draw lessons in real time not only from failures but from successes. A risk looms over the whole system, however. How can a young lieutenant tell a highly opinionated general that he has to change approach—without incurring his wrath?

As was noted today, there are strong, diverging opinions on the approaches that should be taken in Afghanistan, so strong that they recall Mahan's statement about "those strong, even uninterested emotions (which are) the only factor diplomacy cannot master." An example of that is the Surobi District case, in which the local population, reassured by ISAF's presence and ability to cooperate, is handing over large amounts of weapons and narcotics. Because of this, the nation providing forces to the district had to partially give up its plan to concentrate in another region, very much like Amb. Winid said, because a turnover between units in that area would have hampered cooperation. On the other hand, some influential media were quick to pretend that any province in Afghanistan is a self-standing reality, and therefore the Surobi case cannot be reproduced elsewhere, i.e. the validity of a policy of cooperation with local elders, carried out as done in Surobi is not generally valid. When politics try to shape also tactical aspects of a campaign, as those newspapers did in this case, EBAO is dead!

STRATEGY AND KNOWLEDGE

I would like to mention, while we are on this subject, what Corbett said about strategy, namely, that it should enable those involved to extract from the particulars of any single situation the general, recurring aspects, so that "the normal case" can be found, very much like finding the musical theme from which all variations are derived.

So, strategy fears emotion, and implies finding, by trial and error, the right way to reach the desired aim, the *zweck*. This requires sound knowledge of the human environment. An international organization—not NATO—issued several documents stating that knowledge is connected to intelligence. Well, it is much more than that!

In explaining the essence of knowledge, a recent book recalls that, when he was in Madagascar, the French General Gallieni—the very man who stopped the German offensive of 1914 by summoning all the taxis in Paris, thus deploying quickly the troops required to stop the enemy—"compelled those who worked in his staff to know as deeply as possible the history, the culture, the mindset and behavior of all the tribes they were facing." The need for deep knowledge is not new, and, because Gen. Gallieni was operating in a counter-insurgency context, this form of operation is not new either.

BALANCING ACTION WITH LOCAL OWNERSHIP

Very recently, Spain celebrated the 200th anniversary of its invasion by Napoleon; the books published on this occasion may shed new light on the difficulties of his counter-insurgency campaign, whose magnitude was only slightly less than the German effort during World War II. Many of the features of this campaign in fact bear a close resemblance to what happened in more recent years and show the need to carefully balance direct action with local ownership.

Before looking at the most recent instances of this issue, I would like to recall what happened in northern Italy between 1943 and 1945. Of the 25 German divisions deployed there after the armistice to stop the advance of the Allies through the peninsula, more than half were diverted to carry out counter-insurgency action—little attention was devoted to developing local forces, whose training took an extraordinarily long time because of the scarce resources allotted by Germany. Therefore the Italian insurgents, or partisans, as they were called, were well supplied by the Allies and able to distract increasing numbers of troops from the battlefield.

Now, however, the Allies are reluctant to act directly and are not overly enthusiastic about filling a steadily growing CJSOR. This may be disappointing, but it is how alliances are. Many years ago, in fact, the French strategist Daveluy said that “alliances were made to wage war at a cheap price,” and he claimed that the opposite should be true, that all alliances should throw into the fight whatever they can in order to succeed.

Unfortunately—and Vietnam showed this at length—the more troops you pour into a theatre, the more the resistance stiffens, and you and your allies end up exhausted, unmotivated, and incapable of acting alone. Countering narcotics traffic in Afghanistan, therefore, will require a careful balance between the will to succeed quickly and the need to avoid transforming the Afghan operation into a fight in which the locals move increasingly to the insurgent side.

In an environment in which the opposition is land-heavy, there is no point in trying to match numbers by relying on superior firepower. Asymmetry is at the heart of this science, and the enemy’s weak spots must be targeted. The history of counter-insurgency, though, shows that such an approach is seldom taken. Sending more troops is a way to avoid deep thinking.

STRATEGY AND WMD

Today we also discussed the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Here, fortunately, strategy shaping is in full swing. PSI and Operation Active Endeavor are demonstrating the soundness of Mahan, who said, “One ounce of prevention is worth one pound of treatment.”

However, there is a distinction between fending off WMD attacks and dealing with the aspirations of those states that wish to dissuade others from using them, very much in line with Gen. De Gaulle’s remark “*On va lui arracher un bras.*” Gen. Camporini said that security concerns lead to a lot of violence if they are not properly taken care of, and for this reason the struggle against proliferation will not be complete without complementing muscle with some guarantees.

International organizations exist to do that, but the problem that emerged from today’s debate is what kind of relations should exist among them.

THE NEED FOR PATIENCE AND STEADINESS

Being associated with both NATO and the EU, I have observed two interesting points.

First, international organizations are, from time to time, inherently incapable of having normal relations with other international organizations, very much like people suffering from enormous stress. Unless the root causes of their malaise are cured, they will be unable to behave as others wish.

Also, international organizations are continually tempted to argue with their member-states, often about relatively minor issues. Those nations, though, not only provide the international organizations with money and force, but they are their natural customers, and they expect results, often disproportionate to the resources provided.

In order to overcome these and the other challenges of our times, living in an environment marked by harsh competition and growing tension, we need patience coupled with steadiness. Only strategy will help us to go beyond the action-reaction loop, which is so common but so self-defeating.

Chapter 45

How to Deal with the Current Challenges: The Role of International Organizations

Ambassador Kirsti Lintonen¹

I would like to begin by quoting our Workshop Chairman, Dr Weissinger-Baylon: “in a world that is no longer unipolar, international organizations such as the U.N., OSCE, EU and NATO must play a strong role. The U.N. is especially vital because of the scope of its interests and because its involvement brings international legitimacy.”

This is very true. We are now in a new historical era and we cannot protect ourselves by becoming gated communities. We have to be globally connected by engaging others in a give and take. There has been an unparalleled world-wide political awakening, making the global population more politically active than ever before. This has to be taken duly into account.

Decision-making at the U.N. has its well known problems and is therefore often slow and cumbersome. However, the unparalleled legitimacy of its decisions goes a long way to make up for the hiccups in the process.

It is also important to note that the United Nations, as a truly global actor, is not only able to, but also has a duty to address issues all over the world. This is reflected in the scope of the peacekeeping missions managed by the U.N. The geographical scope of peacekeeping covers countries from Haiti to Timor Leste and there are now a total of over 100 000 personnel working in 20 operations

Much of the U.N.'s legitimacy derives from the fact that it is perceived as neutral. In this regard it is extremely worrying that there are signs of this perception changing. As the attacks in Baghdad and Algiers demonstrate, the U.N. has become a direct target for terrorists. This is very dangerous and troubling and everything must be done to reverse this development.

CHANGES AND CHALLENGES

The organizations I mentioned have achieved a lot during their existence—the U.N. for 63 years, the EU for 50 years, NATO since 1947 and the OSCE since 1975. Today, each of them is going through a

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reform process. This reflects the fact that the world has changed tremendously, and, as a result, the threats and challenges we face today are different.

The pace of the change has surprised us all. Recent developments and the resulting interlinkages should make us adopt a much more shared and comprehensive approach. Take climate change, for example. Just as we had become fully aware of the acute need to combat climate change, we were also confronted with the interlinked issues of food crisis and energy crisis.

The food crisis today may have developed as a consequence of several factors like

climate change

energy crisis/biofuels

lack of access to land

poor soil

trade policies/agricultural subsidies

lack of interest by the World Bank and others concerning food production in developing countries

All these phenomena might lead to popular anger and create security risks in one way or the other

It is therefore important to keep in mind that most of the challenges we face today are somehow interconnected. Climate change has severe implications for security. Human rights and the rule of law have a crucial role in building sustainable peace. Development is essential for creating conditions conducive to lasting peace. Peace and security, development and human rights are interconnected and mutually reinforcing.

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

A comprehensive approach has been the main theme of our workshop, and we have discussed it especially in the connection of NATO's new strategy concept. For a comprehensive approach to work, the U.N., EU, OSCE and NATO should share a common vision and a common analysis of the situation, as the organizations should complement each other's work in order to be maximally effective.

However, during this workshop we have learned that coordination and cooperation is not functioning, one unfortunate example being Kosovo. UNMIK is not taking leadership, and NATO and the EU are not able to cooperate and complement each other's actions.

Why has it come to this in Kosovo?

Is the mandate not clear enough? It is true that Security Council Resolutions are often a result of compromises. The now-famous resolution 1244 on Kosovo is not an exception. Clarity is therefore essential, especially on the operational level.

Do the actors lack a common vision of the strategy and a shared starting position? If not, a comprehensive approach is badly needed, as well as a common understanding of the facts relating to the situation.

Are the actors duplicating each other's work or leaving things unaccomplished? If that is the case, coordination, leadership and a clear division of labour are needed.

If the actors do not share a strategy in the beginning, how can they agree on timing and exit strategy? In today's world, the issues we face are complex, and cooperation of various organizations is desperately needed. At the outset, the organizations need a common strategy, a mutually agreed division of labour and a clear exit strategy.

OSCE

As Finland has the Chairmanship of the OSCE during the year 2008, I take it as my duty to respond to some of the criticism towards the current work of the organization, as expressed here by some delegates.

It is important to remember that decision-making at the OSCE is based on consensus. The results depend on Member States. In post-conflict situations in the region, it seems very difficult for the Member States to find consensus. As a result, we haven't always been able to stabilize post-conflict situations without freezing the underlying problems.

The OSCE has a comprehensive approach, which includes a politico-military aspect, a human rights-human security aspect, and an economy-environment aspect.

Some of the problems we face in the OSCE are linked with the monitoring of elections—a very important area, in which reform is needed to make the monitoring applicable to every OSCE-country.

Other problems stem from the implementation of treaties, like the one on conventional arms.

But despite these problems, the OSCE has since its inception been an important instrument of peaceful change in Europe. It remains a valuable organization and has potential to be an important actor in defence of democracy, peace and human rights in the future as well. We need the political will to fully employ it. The future of the OSCE depends on the Member States.

Chapter 46

Preparing for International Crises

Dr. Stefano Silvestri¹

THE DIFFICULTY IN IDENTIFYING A WINNING STRATEGY

I think it is very difficult to consider what to do in the future because it is very difficult to assess the possibilities. For instance, we may find ourselves in a very difficult situation very shortly in Turkey. What should we do if the Turkish Constitutional Court bans the present government party? Who will be our friends? It will be very difficult to decide because very bad consequences can result from all actions. This kind of thing can happen in Turkey as well as elsewhere, because presently we are involved in a very large number of crises throughout the world for which we do not have a clear way of identifying a winning strategy, let alone an exit strategy.

We know, for instance, that Asia will be at the center of world actions during the next 20 to 40 years but we do not know how. When we try to understand what China is, what China will do in the next 20 or so years, we have more question marks than responses. During the coffee break, we talked about how intelligence is one thing and knowledge is another, and that the two may go into different directions at times. For instance, I have difficulty understanding the Chinese regime's definition of the Chinese Constitution. The definition is that China is a democratic people's dictatorship under the direction of the Communist Party. Now, if someone can explain this to me so that I truly understand it, we might be able to project something about China's future, but I doubt that anyone is capable of that today.

Of course, there are other problems, including demographics. Someone said recently that, given the fact that China will have about 30 million more men than women in 2030 or 2040, there will be a more bellicose regime. I do not know if that is true or not, but apparently it is a statistical probability. However, China will also have important vulnerabilities. The country, as well as Japan, India, and all the major Asian powers, will be vulnerable in the energy field and will have important food shortages, though Japan will have the money to pay for food. These kinds of problems may create a very difficult international situation in which the management of violent crises will become much more uncertain and difficult.

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PREPARING FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

How do we prepare for that? Right now I think we are not prepared. If I look at what we have on the ground today and what we plan to have, we do not have many men. *Quantity* is lacking, and we are more and more involved in the management of crises in which the number of men we can put on the ground is more and more important.

We also lack *quality* in the sense of capabilities. Sometimes we have very good capabilities to fight a war that we will never fight, but we do not have the necessary capability to fight the real operations we are engaged in.

We also lack *strategies*. Do we have clear strategies on how to deal with the number of situations in which we are involved? Sometimes, it looks as though we are engaged in tourism. In Chad, for instance, we appear to be engaged in a kind of military tourism.

Finally, we lack *civilian-military integration*. Are we capable of conceiving a strategy that is both civilian and military, with a single command and a single strategy? If not, then probably we are undermining both civilian intervention and military intervention; they tend to act against each other.

The next American presidential election is another factor of uncertainty, which may result in *high pressure to abruptly change direction*. We heard the very interesting speech made by the Pakistani ambassador. I do not want us to find ourselves in a situation in which we have to choose whether to lose Afghanistan or lose Pakistan. Regarding Iran and other areas we may also find ourselves needing to abruptly change direction. That in part would be forced upon us by the absence of capabilities, strategies, qualities, and quantities.

I would like to conclude by simply stating that western Europe is practically the only area in which military expenditures are diminishing. This should give us an idea of our present security culture, which we should perhaps discuss with more intensity.

Chapter 47

Facing the Threats: The Need for International Cooperation

Ambassador Youcef Yousfi¹

At the end of our exercise, it may be a little difficult to summarize in a few words the very rich debate and the comprehensive interventions that we made during this workshop. But despite the differences in our views on how to address the threats to global security, we agreed on the need for common and coordinated strategies. We have also gone a long way toward reaching a definition of the threats that face us. These efforts should be pursued not only at this very interesting forum, but also and especially at fora within large organizations such as the United Nations. To face the so-called regional threats that we talked about during this workshop, in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean region, in Africa, and even in Asia, the international community must provide a collective, cohesive, and coordinated response.

I have noted the interest in having a stable, secure Mediterranean region and for having the area contribute to international peace and security. It is necessary to address this issue within a comprehensive framework, taking into account the political security, economic and human interests, and concerns of countries on both shores. I have also noted the common interest in having indivisible security in the Mediterranean area and in efforts aimed at Mediterranean peace, stability, and cooperation.

Regarding the issue of nonproliferation and weapons of mass destruction, it is clear that proliferation is a threat to international peace and security. But the position of weapons of mass destruction is really a permanent threat to countries and to the existence of mankind. The strengthening of nuclear nonproliferation regimes is necessary when it is coupled with significant progress in nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we would like to point out our strong concern regarding resorting to unilateralism. Multilateralism and mutually agreed upon solutions in accordance with the U.N. Charter provide the only sustainable method for addressing disarmament and international security issues. The global community needs to come together and work hard to realize a world in which coming generations can live without fear of nuclear armaments.

Regarding the use of the Internet and IT by terrorist groups, our country is facing real problems with groups linked to Al Qaeda. They are using Web sites for recruitment, propaganda, and conducting

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attacks. International cooperation is also needed to face this issue and we need to think how we can develop such cooperation.

Chapter 48

The Growing Threats: Egypt's Approach

Ambassador Mahmoud Karem¹

In the past few days, the discussion has reflected the ongoing debate and the divergence of views on a standard definition of security. Globalization has indeed affected us all—the world has become smaller and intertwined, and reciprocal dependence has become greater. Most of the present-day challenges and threats are transnational. They emanate from different sources, not only from governmental and non-state actors.

THE MANY TYPES OF CURRENT THREATS

Some people have identified the threats we face today as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. But the threat list is longer, and includes regional and interstate conflicts, failing or failed states, energy insufficiency, diseases, migration, water security, cyber-crimes, poverty, infectious diseases, environmental dangers, and organized crime, among others; they have all impinged one way or another on our national security. The feeling of insecurity is pervasive, with 40% of the world's population living below the poverty level of \$2 a day.

Today food security as well as speculation and conflicting biddings by major financial institutions and funds, as announced by the Saudis one morning during the workshop, impinge adversely on global markets, pushing societies and economies to the edge and causing domestic disturbances, turmoil, and ruptures. So the question is, What might happen if a strong nexus develops between soaring food prices, energy shortages, and a global water crisis? Could this become the recipe for a new war on a global scale? How will this triad affect regional and international peace and security?

OPERATING WITH SIMILAR POLICIES AND APPROACHES

NATO's comprehensive approach may not be synonymous with other regional or even national endeavors' approaches. Misperceptions still remain and the historical legacy has not been forgotten.

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NATO speaks of transformation without telling us whether transformation will be carried out across the board or will remain applicable only to certain regions or against a selective list of sources of threat. Perhaps this is the reason for the shift in NAM movement in New York recently.

If we agree that there is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan, we must still agree on what constitutes the rule of law, education, training, and so on. Which is more applicable, western-style democracy or rural tribal ethics as well as Islamic values that have been in existence for centuries? On what should we base civil reconstruction? How can we avoid sectarianism? Uprooting or uplifting national values should not be the mission of NATO. In the meantime we cannot be selective or apply double standards. Take the case of drugs and opium in Afghanistan. If the nexus between crime, terrorism, small arms and light weapons, and drugs has existed for a long time, why is it today, after the coalition forces have been present for a long time, that we still argue that these social problems relate to common trade and social values and allow opium growing to worsen. International expectations were high regarding what coalition forces would bring in order to end this vicious circle.

What this compels us to deal with is the fact that in many parts of the world and because of historical reasons and former conflicting and competing alliance policies, NATO still suffers from an image complex. We are reminded occasionally of that argument when collateral damage is caused by air raids in Afghanistan. However, a lot has been done in this regard, mainly through NATO's public diplomacy programs. Beyond those, however, there must be additional operational/cooperation programs tailored to basic-needs projects that are destined to spill over into civilian benefits. This will demonstrate to the people around the world what NATO can do to improve their daily lives.

EGYPT'S EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE DANGERS

We, in Egypt, proposed one such project to NATO to detect the 17.5 million land mines that still infest our rich western desert and have been in place since the great battle of Alamein in the Second World War, a battle Egypt had nothing to do with except to suffer the consequences of having those deadly mines and unexploded ordinances placed there because of the artillery exchange between German and Allied forces.

On the global quest to address the dangers from WMDs, we have been successful in laying down the foundations of a solid regime that incorporates and solicits support and cooperation from a variety of states. We all know the danger from failed states, non-state actors, terrorist groups, and so on. The measures we have been taking have evolved into a regime that has changed the modus operandi of military tracking in the Mediterranean to unloading containers anywhere around the world. I am pleased to announce that the port of Alexandria in Egypt has been declared a "white port" internationally, meaning that the security, loading, and verification performed by Egyptians there are not revised or repeated even in ports of entry in the United States, a matter that underscores Egypt's full cooperation with recent international measures to combat illicit trade in and the prevention of WMDs.

We hear, see, and smell every move. But is all that enough? As we move from general guidelines to specific measures we are moving to the microcosm of what we should do. Recently we heard a comment on the need to include forensic medicine. Are we ready to incur the financial costs of all such measures and to transplant them worldwide while leaving the most important question aside? We need to deny terrorists the benefit of the argument they use most, especially in recruiting and conducting suicide operations—namely, to solve the root cause of conflicts and to allow international legitimacy, principles, and the provisions of the U.N. Charter to succeed. There must be justice and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The proponents of this view also believe in the positive correlation between the lack of a political

settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rise of terrorism, fundamentalism, and the culture of animosity and hatred.

THE NEED TO IMPROVE COOPERATION

We all agree on the need to improve cooperation between regional organizations and the U.N. recently saw this happen in an important visit by the Assistant Secretary of NATO to the Arab League headquarters in Cairo. This was the first-ever contact of this nature at this high level. Additional cooperation is underway between NATO and the U.N. in fields such as combating international terrorism.

We have seen how regional organizations offer not only support for coalition missions but for the *raison d'être* and legitimacy of conducting such missions. The Arab League in Cairo paved the way for a Security Council resolution to liberate Kuwait and later on for operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. It was also the Arab League that adopted an Arab peace plan in Lebanon that culminated in an important agreement, the election for a new president, and the diffusing of a serious problem that would have pushed Lebanon to the edge of yet another civil war. The role of Egypt in both cases was imperative if not vital. Also, the African Union agreed with NATO to hold a logistical and training mission in Darfur with no boots on the ground. To argue therefore that increasing recourse to regional organizations must not call into question the universal nature of the U.N. and its legitimacy, as we heard from one speaker before my presentation today, is not without problems, since arguments of this sort invite a restricted and limited definition of assigning a role to the U.N.

ADDRESSING REGIONAL INITIATIVES

Another challenge is how to address regional initiatives. To elucidate, take, for instance, Article VII of the NPT, which underscores the right of regions to enter into regional disarmament initiatives and arrangements. The question is, "How will NATO, as it undergoes a transformation in policy, face these challenges? Will NATO consider regional initiatives such as Tlatelolco, a NWFZ in central Asia, and a NWFZ in Africa as impediments to its operational mobility, freedom of movement, transit, and docking? Or will it turn around and take advantage of regional initiatives that underpin regional agreements and collective consensus to proceed and cooperate with such regional arrangements?"

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP

My final comment is on the excellent panel we just attended on the defense industry and its relationship with government. We heard excellent arguments on how to change within a new Euro-Atlantic relationship; certain explanations and recommendations on procurement, R&D, marketing, competition, and cutting-edge technology; and, finally, on the need for a code of conduct. Can we envision somewhere in this proposed code of conduct a commitment and agreement between the defense community players and actors that designates a specific role for what this community can do to reduce the impact of the present food crisis or to provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters around the world, in the same way that NATO conducted operations in Pakistan after the earthquake and in the tsunami-stricken countries?

Chapter 49

A Vision for Transatlantic Solidarity

Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk¹

TRANSATLANTIC UNITY AND SOLIDARITY

Iwould like to share with you my vision of transatlantic unity and solidarity as well as talk about Ukraine's role in this process. Transatlantic unity and solidarity is an asset, which should not be neglected or even doubted due to the following essential reasons:

The security and defence sector remains the least developed and consolidated element within all EU common policies.

NATO as a mechanism of transatlantic unity and solidarity remains the most effective instrument to meet current challenges and guarantee security in Europe and the world.

Today none of the international institutions is able to deal with instabilities and conflicts in the world. For example, given its recent decline in efficiency, the U.N. has sought to cooperate more often with NATO in conducting peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.

In this regard, any transatlantic dispute that is motivated by a domestic political agenda not only undermines transatlantic unity and solidarity but affects the Alliance's ability to meet global challenges. As a result, a third party may win!

The new initiative to establish an "all-European security system" is directed against transatlantic unity and solidarity and seeks to push the United States out of European affairs.

EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

Enlargement of the EU and NATO is another key issue exerting influence on global security. I am convinced that further enlargement will continue to strengthen security and stability. For example, the

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new members' access to the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization has enlarged the space of peace, stability and security in Europe.

Unfortunately, some internal problems and discussions within the EU and NATO as well as some external messages, threats and intimidation are preventing these organizations from implementing further enlargement policies. In the case of the EU, it was the referendum's failure in Ireland; in NATO's case, it was the Bucharest Summit and the odd discussion over the name of the country.

DIRECT REPERCUSSIONS ON UKRAINE

Processes related to transatlantic unity and solidarity as well as to the enlargement of NATO and the EU all have direct repercussions on Ukraine. Today Ukraine is already a net contributor to peace and security in Europe and beyond.

Ukraine is the only non-NATO country that participates in all NATO-led operations.

Ukraine participates in all EU security-related operations. I believe that the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) is a unique and successful operation which may serve as a pilot project for other regions.

Discussions prior to and during the Bucharest Summit over the Membership Action Plan (MAP) were rather dramatic. Some European countries stated that Ukraine was not ready to participate in the MAP. These statements appear quite strange to me because, as Ukraine's Foreign Minister at the time, I had an opportunity to participate in 2006 in the negotiations over the MAP. The main question then was not "if" but "when" Ukraine would receive the MAP – would it be during the Foreign Ministers meeting or during the NATO Summit in Riga?

Regarding the current situation and Ukraine's chances to join the MAP in December or April, the unity and ability to resist external pressure is important. Certainly Ukraine still has to fulfill its commitments under the ATP-2008, which in fact overlaps with the requirements of the Membership Action Plan by 90%.

As to public opinion on the issue of NATO in Ukraine, I wonder if someone there was preoccupied with it in 2002 or 2003 when Ukraine passed the legislation that enshrined accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the ultimate goal of the Ukrainian foreign policy. Nobody was preoccupied with the public opinion in 2004 when the "Strategy of Economic and Social Development of Ukraine towards the European Integration for 2004 – 2015" was adopted under the full supervision of Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich. According to this strategy Ukraine had to approve the Membership Action Plan in 2004 and join NATO in 2008.

The situation with the poor public support of the strategic course towards the Euro-Atlantic integration is very similar to the situation previously observed in other Eastern European countries, which has proved that public opinion can be rapidly changed if the society gets access to the relevant information.

Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an ultimate goal of the Ukrainian foreign policy because it means greater stability and security not only in Ukraine but also in entire Europe.

Chapter 50

Dealing with the Future Security Environment

Admiral Luciano Zappata¹

OPENING REMARKS

I am the last obstacle between you and the end of the workshop! This gives me power over your personal freedom that I shall restrain from using provided you show your gratitude at the end of the evening and toast my national football team's victory over Spain (this is my level of ambition for tonight)!

I will start by thanking Roger for inviting me. This workshop had great speakers, great speeches, and great discussions, and I received a lot of important takeaways. Thank you, Roger! And many thanks to your very professional staff, to the great work, and to your hospitality.

Since tonight I represent the Italian CHOD, I am also very pleased to extend to Roger, his staff, and all the participants at the workshop the warmest appreciation of the Italian Minister of Defense and my CHOD, General Vincenzo Camporini. When you introduced him, Roger, you presented him as an admiral; actually, he is a true joint leader, so I am very happy for this special award.

Allied Command Transformation

As the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, I work with this NATO organization to lead the military transformation of the Alliance. To do this, my organization works with Allied Command Operations (ACO) to support them in their mission, and with the individual nations that deliver most of the capabilities. We do not want to duplicate any of their efforts; rather, we provide a forum for bringing national processes together in a coherent way to develop interoperable capabilities. And we do not just work within NATO; often we work with partner countries, the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), the participants in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and with contact countries. NATO, however, is a reference point for interoperability, and has a well-proven standing command-and-control structure, which is well represented here by Allied Command Operations.

Military transformation is a cycle in which concept development and experimentation, innovation, analysis of lessons learned, and training combine to facilitate change and adaptation to new challenges. It

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does this maintaining a delicate balance between short-term requirements and a longer-term assessment of threats and risks. It is not just hardware; rather, it is more mindset and training.

We know that life is change; life is transformation. Last night, on the top of Castel Sant' Angelo, this was very clear as I looked at this city that is so often called "eternal." But, what is new in our day? Are we at peace? Are new military threats coming? What capabilities do we need? How long will we be allowed to think, discuss, and prepare ourselves for what is ahead? I am going to try to set the scene for your thoughts and perhaps comments or questions.

THE NEW FACTORS OF TRANSFORMATION

Admiral Di Paola said that the new factors of change are the "speed and span" of change, and I fully agree. However, I would add to these factors the worldwide reach of change and its extension to the space surrounding our planet. This includes the discovery of a new parallel "ocean" whose waves are electromagnetic (is its name Cyber?) but have the same characteristics of all seas: positive and negative opportunities, trades and threats, treasures and pirates, and so on. From the virtual beaches of this ocean we can sail (or surf, using the slang of the new sailors, the Net people), without space and time constraints, with new vessels provided to us by the IT era. This beautiful opportunity is available to everybody in a transversal, transnational, globalized way: One person is as powerful as an army. The new cyber-ocean is making possible the new shipping routes—the Net—to a new world.

One other factor in the new change is that we all live in a glass house, with the eyes and ears of the media ever present everywhere.

THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

During the course of this workshop we looked at various scenarios and discussed them. We all saw how difficult it is to deal with them: In this global world, local and global issues are closely linked, and each affects the others, often unpredictably. I don't want to make any attempts to predict the future. Our wise Secretary General, in a recent speech, recalled that the old criminal code of New York considered prediction to be a criminal offense. I don't like Castel Sant' Angelo jails—they're cold in winter, hot in summer, with no air conditioning at all!

But what can we expect in the future? How can we describe the future security environment and the challenges we have ahead? To what extent does resolving a problem create new ones?

Recently we started a project called Multiple Futures. Rather than predict the future—if we could do so, we would dedicate ourselves entirely to our finances—we are trying to help illustrate the challenges and their implications that decision-makers may face, and better understand and analyze how we may best organize and equip our forces and define our future capability requirements. We will be analyzing the global trends and key drivers in the future security environment. This work will help us to understand the resultant implications in terms of potential threats and risks to our populations and values and then help frame the discussion on future challenges and military implications in terms of roles and missions. For example, which capabilities must we develop, and within what timeframe? Nations are now fully involved in this process through their institutions and academia. Our aim is to bring them together, without duplicating their efforts, and so far we have had an enthusiastic response.

Admiral Di Paola provided us with a few of the key drivers. The Secretary General also talked about them in a recent speech. We have found through discussions in different forums, that, although there is quite a uniform view, there are some distinctions, which is good because it ensures that we take into account most views. We want to be as inclusive as possible: The future belongs to all.

THE EUROPEAN DREAM

A few years ago I wrote a paper for the University of Pisa, located in another historic Italian city, about a possible “European Dream,” in the fashion of the “American Dream.” After the devastating Second World War, our European fathers had a dream for us, their children: Never again to have war in Europe. NATO has provided the stability and peace needed to develop such a dream, and Europe is now growing. Some clear examples: Our fathers succeeded in creating a common currency, the euro, and today we can drive across our borders without controls and with no need to show our EU citizen passports. The great changes in history have come from dreams. I don’t know if we Europeans have a dream, but I believe we strongly need one (and, I would add, we deserve one). This, I think, is the challenge for our European political masters and our military.

One dream I have is the birth of a European armed force. This seems to me the best way that European nations can better contribute to NATO in times of dramatically decreasing resources. But I am part of the military, and the military can dream only at night. So let’s come back to reality.

To close this event, I would like to involve all of you by having you ask questions, some of which I hope will be provocative, because those provide the best opportunities for open talks.

QUESTIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Can we remain dominant in conventional wars while improving military-operational effectiveness in the new irregular wars? Must our nations invest and cooperate intensively to maintain technological supremacy in the traditional areas of warfare?

General Camporini told us about technology fascination. Indeed, we have the same tension in our HQ, and our Commander, General Mattis, who is an experienced soldier, warned us about surrendering to this fascination and I agree very much. So, how much must we rely on technology? Is this an area on which we must work, or do we need to look more at other aspects? Where will C.A. lead us?

Information technology, we were reminded, is a two-edged sword that enables terrorist groups to fight on the same level as we do in the cyber-ocean and to network in an unprecedented manner. Is this a new battlefield? How much of it is the domain of the military, how much of it is national space, and how much of it is international space, like the oceans? We have come to rely on mobile phones, we are in the process of abdicating our map reading in favor of the GPS, and we are surrendering more and more of our abilities to networks, which in turn are becoming more vulnerable. As citizens of the world, we feel personally under continuous surveillance by the Big Brother anticipated by Mr. Orwell: through our credit cards, video cameras, cell phones with or without GPS, e-mail, PDAs, networked games, Internet shopping, and on and on.

If climate change opens new sea routes and opportunities in the northern seas, what capabilities will we need to ensure our security? Could the Arctic Ocean be subject to international status?

If we are to conduct future operations with partner nations, should interoperability, collaboration, and information sharing be our priorities if we want to be effective and successful? Are we to link and synchronize our action with other organizations? When implementing the comprehensive approach at the operational level, in order to act in a coordinated way and apply a wide spectrum of instruments, we need to network and develop synergies with major actors, such as the EU, the U.N., and the various NGOs.

The military needs to plan with a horizon of 10 to 20 years. However, we heard concern that the political level is drawn to a nearer-term view by the need to respond to the short-term needs of electorates. What are the incentives to draw short-terms views toward the long term?

In that respect, how do we combine the lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan with those gained from realistic training? To what extent must we lock on to the current battle and look at the long term?

How much do we need to develop in support of the current operations, and how much do we need to dedicate to the next fight?

The military needs to be given a mission and political directives. If we do not receive these, we might not be able to deliver what you want from us and there might be a disconnect. What military problems do you want us to solve? We might not be in agreement about what the future will be, simply because a degree of unpredictability will always exist, but we will share a vision. From my limited perspective, the more NATO and the EU have in common, the better it will be for all of us. There is only a limited pot of resources, and we are acutely aware of the need nations have to develop one set of capabilities that can fit all. Ultimately, interoperability remains the only guarantee that we have spent our money—however little—wisely. In Afghanistan, the failure to do so cost lives.

While the future may be filled with risks, every risk is a hidden opportunity. A vision can help us walk to the future with eyes wide open. The scarcity of resources and the threats to our peoples must become factors of unity. We must remember that the world is so little that everybody can now rock the boat!

Now, more than ever, it is wise to quote an American soldier who used to say, “Have a dream.” We need a vision of where we want to be in the next years. Afghanistan, arguably, is suggesting a direction, but the short and the long term must be combined, starting now, to ensure that global security remains an achievable objective in the decades to come.

We now have three different network enablers: oceans, cyber-space, and space. Oceans interconnect nations through an interdependent network of relationships. Cyber-space allows the free flow of information, the most important commodity of the post-Industrial Age. Finally, space allows the exploitation of freedom of movement and provides a new frontier. Together these dimensions present tremendous opportunities and risks. But we must continue to drive the transformational process to be more adaptive and responsive to new challenges and changing conditions.